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ABSTRACT
SUSTAINABLE URBAN GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE IN FAISALABAD,
PAKISTAN: CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES
Shahbaz Altaf
November 19, 2021
Groundwater use is high in developing countries, especially in places where
municipal water authorities struggle to meet the water demand of the residents. To analyze
interactions between groundwater and piped water, Faisalabad, Pakistan was taken as case
study area. Using the Institutional Analysis and Development framework and Elinor
Ostrom’s design principles as institutional analysis tools, formal and informal institutions
governing the piped water and groundwater, including their congruence with the social and
ecological factors, were explored. The results showed that scarcity of piped water pushed
people towards groundwater and the absence of informal and the weakness of formal
governance rules allowed people to access freshwater aquifer without restrictions. As a
result, urban groundwater in several parts of the city has depleted, while in others, it is
close to depletion.

According to Garrett Hardin, open-access common pool resources like groundwater
are vulnerable to unsustainable exploitation unless government regulates or privatizes
them. Elinor Ostrom contested this idea and argued that there is a third way to manage the
resources held in common; resource users can come together and devise institutions to
v

govern the resource themselves. A one-shot common pool resource experiment was
conducted with the household heads in Faisalabad to test if people want to want to come
together to govern groundwater. The results of the game showed that participants are
willing to moderately cooperate with each other. In addition, an Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression model was estimated, which demonstrated that a lack of trust, corruption,
impatience, and a decline in egalitarianism increase the rate of groundwater extraction. The
residents’ choice for the piped water governance mode were also explored, as the majority
of the people are free-riding on the piped water and contributing to the creation of public
goods dilemma. I employed the discrete choice experiment to elicit public preferences and
the conditional logit model to process the choice data. The results showed that people prefer
to have a state-owned piped water system. In terms of governance, they prefer impartial
governance and, to a lesser extent, prefer to co-produce or get involved in the affairs of the
public service provision.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Water is the most abundant resource in the world, but only 0.62 percent of it is
groundwater. Most of it is inaccessible because it is located far deep in the earth's crust or
too saline for human consumption. Only a fraction (0.0091 percent) of the total water in
the world is present in the lakes, rivers, and freshwater aquifers (Bureau of Reclamation
California, 2019). Most populous countries in the world, India, China, and Pakistan, are
free-riding on these freshwater aquifers (Seckler et al., 1999). The dependence on
groundwater is exceptionally high in the cities because water demand is concentrated in a
small area. However, the demand for groundwater is especially high in the urban areas of
the developing world, as 1.5 billion urban dwellers rely on aquifers (UNESCO, 2012). The
groundwater extraction is either unregulated or stipulated laws are not enforced
(Ramachandran, 2008). The local municipal water supply authorities are usually mired in
administrative and financial challenges, therefore failing to meet the residents' water
demand (Biswas et al., 2017). To meet their partial or complete unmet water demand,
citizens use groundwater; typically, it is a cheap and easily accessible alternative water
source. The negative consequence of this development is that groundwater reduction is
getting more and more pernicious in the urban areas of the Global South (e.g., Klassert et
al., 2015; Silva et al., 2020).
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1.1 Justification of the study
In the previous studies, groundwater withdrawal and municipal water supply
systems are analyzed separately (Araral, 2008; Arbúes et al., 2004; Foster, 2020; Seward
& Xu, 2019). Thus, there is academic space to explore the connections between these two
sources of water. The challenges that groundwater or the municipal water supply systems
face can be ecological (e.g., dried up water wells, poor rainfall), social (e.g., political
interventions, cheap water pumping technology), and institutional (e.g., lack of social trust,
dependence on donor agencies). I want to analyze how municipal water supply and
groundwater consumption are related and investigate this relationship from the institutional
perspective. According to the United Nations, all the water crises today are a crisis of
governance (WWAP, 2003). According to the cross-country analysis of the water
governance institutions, the performance of the water resource management depends more
on the quality of institutions than the sole focus on the physical, ecological, or economic
dimension of the problem (Saleth & Dinar, 2004).
In developing countries, formal institutions are generally weak (Kessides, 2005,
p.86) and drenched in various types of corruption (e.g., rent-seeking, patronage, bribery,
state capture), bureaucratic inefficiencies (Rothstein & Varraich, 2017), and social traps
(Rothstein, 2005). In contrast, informal institutions are more potent and can play a positive
or a negative role. For instance, trust networks based on caste, kinship, or religion reduce
uncertainty and help develop trust among the members of the network (Malik, 2017). A
higher level of trust leads to a higher degree of cooperation among the group members in
social dilemmas. On the negative side, informal institutions might, for example, exclude
women from decision-making arenas by restricting their physical mobility or devising
2

discriminatory property rights that leave them with limited access to wealth or other
resources (Jütting et al., 2007). Nonetheless, looking at the groundwater withdrawal and
depletion problem from the institutional perspective is crucial to understand why
groundwater scarcity is a much severe problem in the Global South.

1.2 Study Area
To conduct research in the context of developing world, Faisalabad, Pakistan, was
selected as a case study area as it faces massive groundwater scarcity and piped water
supply challenges. This city is the author's hometown; therefore, familiarity with the
geography, people, and institutions are substantial. In Faisalabad, people are part of or
grouped in biraderi1 based trust networks (informal instituions). A higher level of
communication and contact between the members of the biraderi helps garner the
environment of trust and reciprocity in society, which in result removes obstacles to
cooperation (Malik, 2017, p.245; Rothstein, 2005). Biraderies are active in politics,
especially during the elections for provincial and national parliaments. All the members
follow the lead of the biraderi head and vote in unison for the candidate of his or her
choosing. The leadership of the trust network strives to secure public sector jobs for the
members of their biraderi using political connections or personal relationships with the
bureaucrats. Once the politicians and government employees whom they have endorsed
assume power, biraderi heads start to seek privileged treatment in accessing goods and
services for themselves and their group members (Anwar, 2019). This relationship between
formal (e.g., bureaucrats) and informal actors (biraderi based trust-networks) creates an
informal governance system, that makes the state appear less like a legitimate democratic

1

The term refers to caste, clan, religion, tribe, or sect.
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entity but more like a vehicle for the illegal distribution of goods and services (Malik,
2017). An even bigger problem is that biraderies are not equal in terms of their influence
and resources, the key factors that guarantee access to the sought-after goods and services
in society (Gazdar, 2007).

1.3 Research Design
I followed the journal article format and wrote three papers, presented in the
dissertation as Chapter 2, 3, 4. In each chapter, I looked at the different aspects of the
problem and provided policy recommendations. In chapter 2, Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) framework and Elinor Ostrom's design principles to explore social,
ecological, and institutional factors affecting the piped water and groundwater governance
in Faisalabad. The results of the institutional analysis showed that the water sector in
Faisalabad is facing two kinds of social dilemmas, 1) Public Goods dilemma, as citizens
do not pay their bills and there is a challenge of illegal connections. Informal governance
units comprised of politicians, bureaucrats, and biraderi (clan, caste) based trust-network
subvert and undermine the authority of water agency. The cash-strapped water agency then
starts to look for subsidies and aid to perform basic operations like water filtration. The
dependence on external funds has slowed the institutional maturation process of the water
agency. 2) Common Pool Resource dilemma, as groundwater table is declining thanks to
the consistent overuse of the aquifer. The absence of informal rules and the weakness of
formal groundwater governance allowed people to exploit the freshwater aquifer without
any restrictions. As a result, urban groundwater in some parts of the city is depleted, and
in others, it is declining. In Faisalabad, the water agency is also formally responsible for
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the protection of groundwater. Hence, to arrest the groundwater decline and provide quality
piped water service, the performance of the water agency must be improved as well.
In the chapter 2, institutional analysis was conducted In chapter 3, a one-shot
common pool resource game was played with the household heads in Faisalabad. The goal
was to determine if the people would cooperate in the CPR dilemma and devise institutions
to self-govern the aquifer. The game results showed that respondents moderately
cooperate, indicating a real potential for the community-based organization to work on
groundwater management. In addition, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model
was estimated to explore which factors affect the level of cooperation in the game. The
findings showed that trust, lack of corruption in the water agency, patience, and
egalitarianism increase cooperation. In chapter 4, I explored what kind of piped water
governance residents of Faisalabad would prefer. I employed the discrete choice
experiment to elicit their preferences and later used the conditional logit model to process
the choice data. The model results showed that people prefer to have a state-owned piped
water system that is impartial and willing to involve consumers in administrative affairs.
In chapter 5, a summary of the findings and possible future research directions are
presented.
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CHAPTER 2: GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE IN FAISALABAD,
PAKISTAN-AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

2.1 Introduction
To meet their domestic water needs 2.5 billion people around the world are
dependent on groundwater, and approximately 1.5 billion users among them are urban
dwellers (UNESCO, 2012; Foster et al., 2010)2. The reliance on groundwater is high and
continuously increasing in the developing cities, particularly in places where governmentled water supply systems have been struggling to fulfill domestic and non-domestic water
demands of the residents (Silva et al., 2020; Grönwall & Danert, 2020; Foster et al., 2011;
UN-Water, 2009). To satisfy their unmet water demand, people start to rely on groundwater
either directly when in-situ private access to the aquifers is a feasible option or indirectly
through vendors who pump water from the distant locations (e.g., Biswas et al., 2017;
Zozmann et al., 2019). The private in-situ self-supply of groundwater is increasing in South
Asia, continental Africa, Southeast Asia, and some parts of Latin America. For example,
in 2015, about 369 million people (or 79 percent of the total city population) in urban
continental Africa were meeting their drinking and other domestic needs (e.g., bathing,
washing dishes) from groundwater. In Lucknow and Delhi, India, 50 percent, and 43
percent of the population, respectively, is involved in uncontrolled private drilling of

2

There is no systematic and comprehensive data available on global urban groundwater consumption. This
estimation is based on the observed trends of aquifer exploitation in the major regions of the world.
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groundwater, causing the water table to decline (Ramachandran, 2008). Similarly,
according to the urban water consumption data collected by Carrard et al. (2019) from 10
Southeast Asian and Pacific Island cities, 66 percent of urban households are privately
extracting groundwater. On the other hand, 100 percent of the resident’s rely on
groundwater in Natal, Brazil. As a result, the aquifer has started to experience an intrusion
of seawater, turning the freshwater brackish due to the excessive lowering of the water
table (Foster et al., 2011). The spatial concentration of hundreds of thousands private
groundwater pumps in urban areas put extreme pressure on the aquifers, as the rate of
groundwater discharge is often higher than the rate of recharge (McDonald et al., 2014).
Consequently, aquifers have either completely dried up (e.g., Klassert et al., 2015), or they
are experiencing decline in their water tables in global south cities (van Leeuwen et al.,
2016).

To explore the dynamics between the performance of municipal water supply
systems and the groundwater consumption including the factors that influence them, I have
chosen Faisalabad, Pakistan as a case study. It is a city where the local water agency is
struggling to cope with the residents' domestic and non-domestic water demand. According
to the survey conducted by the Japan International Cooperation Agency with 600
households from all income categories in Faisalabad, on average a typical resident fulfills
75 percent of its domestic water demand (103 liters per day) from groundwater. The local
water agency meets only 24 percent (33 liters per day) of the domestic demand (JICA,
2019b, p.A2-38). Approximately 72.6 percent of the households have installed private insitu motorized pumps on their premises to extract groundwater to compensate for the lack
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of municipal water (JICA, 2019c, p.B5-13). Similarly, 100 surveys conducted with the
commercial and industrial water users in the water agency’s service and the non-service
areas show that only 8 percent of the respondents were dependent on the municipal water
supply, while 18 percent used both municipal water and groundwater, and 59 percent used
groundwater (JICA, 2019b, p. A2-44). This massive exploitation of the groundwater is
negatively impacting the aquifer lying directly underneath the city. According to the water
agency officials, the groundwater table is declining at a rate of ~2 feet per year (Jamal,
2019, p.17). Moreover, the Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR)
found that the freshwater layer of the aquifer in some regions of the city it is already
depleted while likely depleted in others (Khan et al., 2016, p.3).

2.1.1 Causes of Urban Water Scarcity
The poor performance of public piped water supply systems and the subsequent
rise in groundwater consumption in the metropolitan areas of the developing world have
been attributed to factors such as population growth and urbanization (Grönwall & Danert,
2020; Kalhor & Emaminejad, 2019). Fifty-five percent of the world population (4.2 billion)
is urban, and it is expected to increase up to 68 percent, injecting 2.5 billion more people
into the cities by 2050. According to the United Nations’ estimation, 91 percent of this
growth is taking place in developing nations (UN-DESA, 2018). With the growth of urban
population, the demand of water for domestic, commercial, and industrial uses increases
as well. Local administrations build more water supply infrastructure but usually find it
difficult to keep pace with the rapid rate of urbanization (McDonald et al., 2014). For
example, in Erbil, Iraq, a 278 percent increase in urban population between 2004 and 2014
led to a 54 percent decline in the water table (Ibrahim, 2015). Another strand of research
8

focused on climate change suggests that changes in the Earth’s natural water cycle have
altered the rainfall patterns in the world’s river systems. That is the primary reason, some
regions of the world are facing surface and groundwater shortage, while others are
experiencing flooding (UN-Water, 2021). For instance, in South Korea, a reduction in
precipitation, -32 mm/yr in the dry season and -29.6 mm/yr in the wet season and a decline
in groundwater level were correlated in 70 percent of the sites monitored in a single year
(Lee et al., 2014).

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the UN report Water for People, Water for
Life claimed that the water crisis the world is facing today is actually a crisis of governance
(WWAP, 2003). Thenceforth, debates and discussions on governance issues in water
management literature have multiplied. Some scholars are analyzing public, private, and
community-based piped water governance models (e.g., Bakker, 2007), while others focus
on getting tariffs right, corruption, bureaucratic inefficiencies (e.g., Araral, 2008), or
human resource management issues like overstaffing and nebulous or opaque personnel
promotion mechanisms (e.g., Tortajada, 2006). In contrast, the scholarship originating
from the Bloomington School3, not only considers the governance/institutional aspects but
biophysical conditions and community attributes of the problem as well (Ostrom, 1990).
This line of research evaluates whether institutions governing the resource/public goods
align with the socio-economic, political, and ecological conditions linked to the policy

3

It refers to the interdisciplinary research program founded and advanced by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, most notably
through the workshop they established at Indiana University Bloomington. Now the term refers to the entire research
agenda of the Ostroms and their associates, which is pursued in various research centers across the globe (e.g., CPR
management, polycentricity, public administration, self-governance).
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problem. In other words, it seeks to discover context-specific institutional arrangements
that might help ensure natural resource sustainability and effective public goods
management (Epstein et al., 2015). Overall, the governance scholars contend that for better
resource protection and management the creation of robust institutions is far more critical
than tackling social or ecological issues alone (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2011; Lu et al.,
2014; Ostrom, 2005). For example, there are places where the water is available in
abundance, but the people still face drought and scarcity, chiefly due to poor governance
(Araral, 2008). On the other hand, some areas were experiencing acute water shortage, but
strong institutions were able to provide an adequate amount of clean water to the public
(Tortajada, 2006). In addition, when the institutions are weak, uncertainties (e.g., water
scarcity) emanating from phenomena such as climate change and urbanization may be
exacerbated (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012).

2.1.2 What are Institutions?
Institutions are the instruments through which the formation and execution of
governance4 occurs (Kooiman, 2003). The term institutions refer to formal and informal
rules, norms, and shared strategies. Formal rules are usually written and encapsulated in
constitutions, laws, regulations, and legal systems. Official entities like police, courts, or
bureaucrats enforce the formal rules and punish the violators (Ostrom, 2005). On the other
hand, informal rules are unwritten, created, communicated, and enforced outside the
officially sanctioned channels like social taboos. Unlike formal institutions or formal rules,

4The

term governance can be defined as “the sum total of the institutions and processes by which society orders and
conducts its collective or common affairs (Institute of Governance Studies, 2009, p.1), which takes place both inside and
outside of formal institutions at multiple levels and scales (Ostrom, 2005, p.215).
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breaking informal rules results in subtle, illegal, or hidden sanctions like hostile remarks,
ostracism, and loss of friends (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006). In addition, norms are standard
behaviors shared by the members of a social group, such as reciprocity. No external
punishments or rewards are needed to ensure conformity toward norms because individuals
generally unconsciously follow them. Lastly, individuals follow particular strategies at a
specific time and place because it pays to do so. Neither norms nor rules can prevent an
individual from adopting strategies. A deep understanding of the strategies followed by the
people in a community reveals how they coordinate with each other during social
interactions (Schlüter & Theesfeld, 2010). I will call informal rules, norms, and shared
strategies informal institutions in this study.

According to the cross-country analysis of the water governance institutions
(formal and informal laws and regulations, policies and administration etc.) on the
performance of the water utilities, water resource management is dependent more on the
quality of institutions than the independent isolated focus on physical, ecological or
economic dimension of the governance (Saleth & Dinar, 2004). However, in developing
countries, formal institutions are generally weak and exist mainly on paper (Kessides,
2005, p.86). They are drenched in all kinds of corruption (e.g., rent-seeking, patronage,
bribery, favoritism), bureaucratic inefficiencies (Rothstein & Varraich, 2017), and social
traps (Rothstein, 2005). On the other hand, informal institutions are more potent and play
a positive or a negative role. For instance, trust networks based on caste, kinship, or religion
reduce uncertainty and help develop trust among the members of the network (Malik,
2017). A higher level of trust leads to a higher degree of cooperation among the group
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members in social dilemmas. On the negative side, informal institutions might, for
example, exclude women from decision-making arenas by restricting their physical
mobility or devising discriminatory property rights that leave them with limited access to
wealth or other resources (Jütting et al., 2007). Nonetheless, informal institutions are
flexible enough to play complementary, accommodating, competing, or substitutive roles
in relation to formal institutions (O’Donnell, 2006).

2.1.3 Common Pool and Public Goods Dilemmas
Water pumped from underground aquifers or accessed through a piped water
network is a common pool resource (CPR). The core characteristics of a CPR are, first, it
is rival, meaning consumption of one unit of water by an individual makes it unavailable
to others. Second, it is non-exclusionary; it is costly and difficult to exclude people from
groundwater pumping or connection holders from consuming pipe water. On the other
hand, piped water supply infrastructure is a public good. It is non-rival, the use of the
infrastructure network by one person does not reduce its availability for others, and nonexclusionary as utilities are legally bound to serve everyone (Flint, 2011). These properties
of CPRs and public goods makes them prone to social dilemmas, a situation in which
rational short-term self-interests of the individuals leads to long term unsustainable results
for the collective (van Soest, 2013). To elaborate, a public goods dilemma occurs when
self-interest dictates that an individual let others contribute towards the production,
delivery, and maintenance of the public good and then free-ride on their efforts (Dionisio
& Gordo, 2006; Olson, 1965). However, if everyone decide not to contribute, the public
good would not be produced and everyone will be worse off (Wasko & Teigland, 2004).
Similarly, the tragedy of the commons or CPR dilemma arises when an individual receives
12

a direct benefit from the overuse of the commonly held resource but bears only his/her own
share of the costs. Hence, refraining from over-exploitation does not guarantee that
everyone will comply and avert the tragedy of the commons. So, the resource is fated to go
extinct (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990).
It is harder to solve social dilemmas using non-institutional measures alone, such
as building more infrastructure to deal with water scarcity. Notwithstanding, if people are
unwilling to pay their bills, there will be no funds to pay for a long run for construction,
operations, and maintenance of the infrastructure. By contrast, appropriate institutional
arrangements can spur collective action and engender trust among the people and the public
officials to solve issues such as non-payment of utility bills or uncontrolled groundwater
abstraction. Thus, I have used the Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) framework to
explore the dynamics between piped water supply and groundwater abstraction, as well as
to examine if the common pool and public goods dilemmas are present in the water sector
of Faisalabad. I used the IAD to identify biophysical, socio-economic, political, and
institutional factors that enable or hinder collective action and to provide solutions for the
social dilemmas. Furthermore, I explored weaknesses in groundwater governance using
Ostrom's design principles for sustainable common pool resource governance and the role
of institutional power in decision-making and the enforcement of stipulated rules.

2.2 Institutional Analysis
Institutional analysis highlights formal and informal institutions that give meaning,
legitimacy, and direction to governance in a broader ecological, socio-economic, and
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institutional context. In this section, the IAD framework and design principles, including
the use of these institutional analysis tools, are discussed.

2.2.1 Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework is a systematic
approach to organize policy analysis, developed by Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom and
colleagues at Indiana University, Bloomington (Ostrom, 1990, 2010; Ostrom et al., 1994).
The framework helps researchers interested in designing, reforming, and evaluating policy
interventions break down complex social and environmental issues into more
comprehensible and manageable activities (Polski & Ostrom, 1999). The IAD draws
attention to the full range of factors and dynamic processes involved in the operation and
management of the commons (McGinnis & Hall, 2019, p.14). Villholth & Conti (2017)
contend that it is also well equipped to handle complexities inherent in the urban
groundwater systems. The graphical representation of the IAD framework (Figure 2.1)
shows that at its center lies an action situation. It is a social space where actors (e.g.,
individuals, households, or organizations) interact, solve problems, dominate one another,
or create social dilemmas. The action situations are influenced by external variables
grouped into three categories: (a) biophysical conditions discuss characteristics of the
resource under study and its relationship to the users; (b) attributes of the
community includes social, economic, political, and cultural attributes of the entities
affected by the policy problem; and (c) rules-in-use consider the entire body of laws,
regulations, rules, norms, and shared understandings among the participants relevant to the
problem situation. In the action situation, actors make choices based on their beliefs,
incentives, and available information or act to uphold social expectations. The interactions
14

among the actors result in specific outcomes which are evaluated against an agreed upon
criterion (e.g., accountability, sustainability, and equity) by the actors doing the
evaluations. These outcomes and the evaluations then inform back the entire set of
exogenous variables, setting the stage for the next round of action situations (McGinnis &
Hall, 2019).

Figure 2.1: The graphical representation of the IAD framework
Source: Ostrom (2011)

2.2.2 Ostrom’s Design Principles
Ostrom’s design principles for sustainable common pool resource governance are:
(a) clearly defined boundaries of both the common pool resource and the users; (b) the
congruence of the resource’s appropriation and provision rules with local conditions; (c)
the ability of those affected by the rules to participate in the collective choice arenas; (d)
monitoring of the resource condition, appropriation, and provision levels by the individuals
who are accountable to the users; (e) punishment of rule violators based on the seriousness
of the offense; (f) access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms for resource users; (g)
external authorities recognize minimal rights of users to organize and create their own
institutions; and (h) governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested
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enterprises (Ostrom, 1990). All the design principles can be interpreted as outcomes
generated by the action situations. They explicitly connect factors from one or more of the
three categories of external variables: biophysical conditions, rules-in-use, and community
attributes. For instance, in an action situation, if sanctions are not applied consistently, they
lose their legitimacy among the people; conversely, if sanctions do not match the severity
of the offense, people will start to resent them (McGinnis & Hall, 2019). This observation
about sanctions then informs the evaluation of design principle, graduated sanctions. The
probability of a common pool resource governance to remain effective is high if all the
design principles are present. However, it is a probabilistic, not a deterministic rule
(Ostrom, 2005; Cox et al., 2010). Therefore, there might be a governance system in which
all the design principles are present, but it still might fail to sustainably manage the resource
and vice versa.

2.2.3 Some Applications of the IAD Framework and Design Principles in the Water
Sector
The IAD framework and design principles have been widely used to explore water
governance institutions. For example, Stone-Jovicich et al. (2009) employed the IAD
framework to examine water scarcity issues in the Australian Outback, where drought
conditions are a common occurrence. The findings suggest that non-transparent centralized
water resource governance is the primary cause of perennial water shortages. Similarly,
Kadirbeyoglu & Özertan, (2015) have used the IAD to explore the impact of water users'
satisfaction level on irrigation water sustainability in Sanliurfa, Turkey. The results showed
that even though consumers were satisfied with the performance of water user associations
and operational rules, especially the low amount of fees imposed on the users, the total
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funds collected were not enough to maintain the resource and ensure its long-term
sustainability. On the other hand, Ross & Martinez-Santos (2010) examined the relevance
of Ostrom's design principles for groundwater management in the Murray Darling Basin,
Australia, and the Upper Guadiana Basin, Spain. They found that stakeholders struggled to
agree on appropriation, monitoring, and sanctioning rules crucial for sustainable
groundwater management, including the need for collaboration between water users and
the government. Moreover, Lopez-Gunn (2003) utilized the IAD and its design principles
to study the role of water user associations in facilitating collective action in the Mancha
region of Spain. The outcomes of the study suggest that while solutions like subsidies might
help mitigate aquifer overuse in the basin temporarily, this strategy is not suitable for the
resource's long-term sustainability. She recommended that trust between water user
associations and the state must be improved to devise robust groundwater protection
policies.
Additionally, Kamran & Shivakoti (2013) used the IAD framework and design
principles to compare the community-led tribal and state-administered spate irrigation
system in Punjab, Pakistan. The canals in the spate system get water only after the seasonal
rains and floods that make the appropriation and provision of water difficult, including
managing the cost of operations and maintenance. The results found that community based
tribal administration worked comparatively better than state-controlled governance. In a
state-led system, rules were externally enforced and communicated in written English. As
a result, farmers were not familiar with the provision, monitoring, and sanctioning rules
the government applied to them, and public officials were taking advantage of the low
literacy rate among the farmers. Kamran and Shivakoti reported that the officials asked the
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farmers for bribes under the false charges that they had violated one or more rules, which
the farmers were often not even aware of. They stress the farmers that the best solution for
them to get out of this trouble and avoid hefty official fines is to bribe them. By contrast,
water users in the tribal system held regular meetings, communicated, and codified rules
in the local language. They also appointed monitors and punished violators with fines and
on occasion social seclusion. The democratic representation in the decision making and
enforcement provided incentives for unbiased treatment of all users. In addition, customary
rules were highly flexible and well understood by the resource users.

2.2.4 Institutional Power
Institutions, due to their particular form and structure, have the power to inﬂuence
decision-making and subsequent outcomes. They can bring people to do what they
normally would not do in their absence and to do what does not always serve their interests
(Lukes, 2005). In addition, they have the ability to affect the behaviors, beliefs, and
perceptions of the individuals and groups in a society (Lawrence, 2008). It is also critical
to note that institutional power is not a property of actions, but rather a capacity, as one can
have institutional power without necessarily exercising it (Searle, 2005). The nature and
the type of institutional arrangements determine the capacity or distribution of power. For
example, in administrative monopolies one person or a single group has all the decisionmaking and enforcement authority, while in a contrasting institutional arrangement all the
agents can have a symmetric distribution of power (Stahl, 2011).
Institutional power can be wielded to manipulate people to pursue narrow selfinterests or rectify problems for everyone (Riker, 1980). In reality, Stahl (2011) noted that
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institutional power frequently masks hidden agendas, personal motives, and deceptive
behavior of the people in authority, especially if the institutional structure is so complex
that a common citizen is unable to fully comprehend it. The Bloomington School of new
institutionalism is often criticized for ignoring the role of power in their institutional
analysis tools and governance improvement mechanisms (e.g., Clement, 2010; Whaley,
2018). However, Epstein et al. (2014, p.128) argue that the Bloomington School does not
disregard power; in fact, power is, and always has been, part of new institutionalism,
although the term power is rarely invoked in their scholarship. For instance, both the IAD
framework and design principles can be operationalized to understand and explore the
effects of institutional power in formal or informal governance arrangements including the
processes used to create and manipulate rules (Epstein et al., 2014).

2.3 Methodology
Urban groundwater and piped water systems are composed of technical (e.g., water
infrastructure), environmental (e.g., water resources), and social components (e.g., income
level) (Anderies et al., 2004; House-Peters & Chang, 2011). They can be studied as
complex social-ecological systems in which heterogeneous individuals and groups act
based on their diverse value systems and objectives (Pahl-Wostl, 2003). The source of the
heterogeneity might be behavioral diversity (e.g., in decision-making or personality),
demographic diversity (e.g., race, sex, and age), or diversity in context (e.g., urban, rural)
(Sterman, 2006). According to Ostrom (2011) and (Knüppe & Pahl-Wostl, 2011),
frameworks provide organized and context-specific assessments that can help researchers
structure their thinking and, in turn, render socio-ecological systems more transparent and
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understandable. In this paper, the IAD framework is used to explore biophysical, social,
and institutional factors that give rise to the challenges of piped water scarcity and
groundwater depletion, as well as the dynamics between the two. Then, design principles
are employed to evaluate the outcomes of the IAD analysis and role of power in the
governance activities.

2.3.1 Case Study Area
Faisalabad is located in the central region of the Punjab province of Pakistan
(Figure 2.2). It is the third-biggest city in the nation, with a population of about 3.2 million.
The city has 506,870 households and an average family size of 6.45 people (Pakistan
Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Its population is growing at the rate of 2.5 percent per year and
is expected to reach 5 million in 2035 (World Population Review, 2020). To accommodate
this population, Faisalabad is expanding into peri-urban areas at an explosive rate. In 1995,
the city’s area was 85 km2; in 2020, it was projected to be 252 km2, an addition of 167 km2
in 25 years (Javed & Qureshi, 2019; Punjab Cities Growth Atlas, 2018). Moreover, the city
is a large industrial hub, contributing 15 percent to the national economy. It receives on
average 200 mm of rainfall annually and has a hot, desert-like climate. The temperature
ranges from 17°C in winter to 50°C in summer (JICA, 2019b).
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Figure 2.2: Location of the Faisalabad city
Source: Javed & Qureshi, 2019

2.3.2 Data Collection
To get a detailed picture of the state-led piped water supply and groundwater
management systems in Faisalabad, I have gathered data from multiple sources:

1. I conducted five semi-structured, open-ended interviews with two water agency
officials (labeled as Respondent-W1 and Respondent-W2), a local academic
(labeled as Respondent-A), the head of a non-profit organization (labeled as
Respondent-N), and an employee of the French Development Agency (labeled as
Respondent-D) working in the water sector of Faisalabad (Appendix-I).
2. I performed a document analysis. I analyzed five volumes of Water and Sanitation
Master Plan of Faisalabad of the Japan International Cooperation Agency in 2019,
a water supply network map provided by the water agency, laws and policies
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enacted by the Punjab Assembly (provincial parliament), and reports and
documents provided by the nonprofit organization.
3. I conducted a literature search on water governance in developing countries, the
IAD framework, Elinor Ostrom’s design principles, and institutional power in
water governance using Google Scholar, Web of Science, University of Louisville’s
online library, and Google search engine.

2.4 Application of the IAD framework
In this section, external variables (biophysical conditions, attributes of the
community, and rules in use), action situations, outcomes, and evaluations are presented.

2.4.1 Biophysical Conditions
Faisalabad is situated on the Indus River Basin that stretches from the Himalayas
in the north to the Arabian Sea in the south, covering approximately 16 million hectares of
land area (Haider, 2000). The native groundwater of the basin is saline due to its marine
origin and is therefore unfit for human consumption. The development of the irrigation
canals on the Indus River and its tributaries in the late 1800s helped create a freshwater
layer on top of the existing saline water (JICA, 2019b, p.A3-1). The residents of Faisalabad
are dependent on this freshwater layer which extends beyond the city limits into
surrounding peri-urban and rural areas. It stretches in the east to the River Ravi and in the
West up to the River Chenab. The Q.B. Link Canal is at its northern boundary, while the
southern boundary is not defined by the irrigation department yet (see Appendix-I). The
primary sources of groundwater recharge today are irrigation canals (JICA, 2019c, p.B212). Rainfall could contribute up to 15 percent to the recharge, but roads, pavements, and
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buildings do not let rainwater seep into the ground to feed the aquifer. Thus, the actual
contribution from rainfall is insignificant (Jamal, 2019). According to an investigation
conducted by the Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR), the average
depth of the freshwater layer in the areas immediately adjacent to Faisalabad is ~100 feet.
By contrast, it is either close to depletion (40 feet) or already depleted (<40 feet) in several
parts of the metropolis (Khan et al., 2016). Additionally, the flow volume of the rivers in
Pakistan is predicted to decrease between 30-40 percent in the next 100 years due to climate
change, since glaciers in northern areas are melting faster than usual and monsoon rains
are becoming less frequent (Kugelman & Hathaway, 2009). Reduction in the flow means
diminished availability of groundwater, as rivers are responsible for more than 70 percent
of the recharge in the Indus River Basin (Laghari et al., 2012). Therefore, the potential
negative effects of climate change are expected to put pressure on the dwindling
groundwater resource in Faisalabad.

The Water and Sanitation Agency of Faisalabad5 is legally responsible for the piped
water provision in the city. The municipal water supply system gets 86 percent of water
from the underground aquifers and 14 percent from the surface water (JICA, 2019b, p.B21). The primary groundwater sources are Chenab Well Field, Jhang Branch Canal, and
Rakh Branch Canal. The first two sources are 27 km and 15 km away from the city limits,
while the third source is located at the northern edge of the city. The primary source of
surface water is the Rakh Branch Canal which passes through the city center (WASA-F,
2020). Owing to excessive pumping, the water table at the Chenab well field dropped ~11

5

I referred to it as “the water agency” in this study.
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m from 1992 to 2007. Afterward, the deterioration in the water uptake capacity by
happenstance stabilized the water table. The water table adjacent to the Jhang Branch Canal
was declining at rate of 1 m per year as well, but it was stabilized when the rate of discharge
was reduced up to 62 percent, again by accident. Similarly, well fields built along the Rakh
Branch Canal within the metropolitan boundaries were closed due to excessive pumping
and subsequent groundwater decline. Later, these wells were moved upstream, far away
from the city (JICA, 2019b, p.B2-4-6). Thus, currently, the overall rate of groundwater
discharge by the water agency is equal to the rate of recharge (JICA, 2019b, p.B2-34).

2.4.2 Attributes of the Community
The primary actors active in the groundwater and municipal water supply in
Faisalabad are the parliament of Punjab, the provincial government of Punjab, donor
agencies, the water agency, and water users. The attributes of these actors are discussed in
detail below.

Provincial Parliament and Provincial Government
The parliament of the Punjab Province have enacted the “Punjab Development of
Cities Act–1976” and “Punjab Irrigation & Drainage Act–1997” to manage the surface
water and groundwater in urban and rural areas of the province under the guidance of
national government. However, in 2010, the 18th amendment to the constitution of Pakistan
gave provinces the sole responsibility of water resource governance and provision of water
to the general public (Cookman, 2010). Assuming its independent legislative
responsibilities, the provincial parliament of Punjab recently enacted the comprehensive
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“Punjab Water Act-2019” that deals with surface water, groundwater, and piped water
supply systems. The enforcement arm of the government of Punjab is Housing, Urban, and
Public Health Department (HUD&PHED), which executes the laws legislated by the
parliament. In addition, it can also enact policies, such as “Punjab Urban Water and
Sanitation Policy–2007” and “Punjab Drinking Water Policy–2011”. These laws and
policies give local water authorities autonomy to formulate their own rules. However,
HUD&PHED has the power to override local planning, design, and operational rules at any
time and propose its own rules instead. In other words, the water agency is not fully
autonomous in its governance; it shares decision-making and operational jurisdictions with
the provincial government, an arrangement that sometimes creates tension between
municipal and provincial administrations.

The Water Agency
The Water Agency was established in 1978 under the “Punjab Development of
Cities Act-1976” to provide water, sewerage, and drainage services to the residents.
According to the formal law, Punjab Water Act-2019, it is the primary and most powerful
actor in the water sector of Faisalabad. It is responsible for operational rule-making (tariff
setting, monitoring, sanctioning etc.) with respect to piped water provision and
groundwater appropriation (WASA-F, 2020). However, in practice, the water agency has
limited authority (power) to devise rules without the approval of the provincial government
(HUD&PHED). So far, it has not been able to meet the water demand of the citizens. The
total water demand for domestic and non-domestic uses in Faisalabad is 170 million gallons
per day, but the designed capacity of the water supply system is only 110 million gallons
per day (Respondent-W1, 2021). Even in the face of a piped water shortage, the water
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agency is operating at 64 percent of its production capacity. The total water produced is
not 110 million gallons per day but 70.4 million gallons per day (JICA, 2019a, p.A8-3).
The diminished water production is caused by the deteriorated water uptake capacity of
Chenab well field (43 percent reduction), Jhang Branch Canal (28 percent reduction), and
Rakh Branch Canal tube wells (88 percent reduction). In addition, the surface water
treatment plants are not fully functional (56.5 percent reduction in output) because they are
old and often require shutting down for maintenance (JICA, 2019c, p.B3-7). Furthermore,
the 70.4 million gallons of water produced by the water agency does not reach the
consumers; 40 percent of it leaks through pipes or is stolen via illegal connections. The
actual amount of water in the water supply network is only 42 million gallons per day (or
25 percent of the demand), of which 37.8 million gallons are supplied to households and
4.2 percent to non-domestic users. Overall, the total water shortage is 128 million gallons
per day (JICA, 2019b, p. A8-3).

Donor Agencies
The most prominent donor agencies currently working in Faisalabad are Japan
International Corporation Agency (JICA) and French Development Agency (AFD). JICA
worked with the local water agency to develop the Water and Sanitation Master Plan of
Faisalabad in 2019. It also provides funds and technical supervision to implement the
master plan. The core objective of JICA is to build new water supply infrastructure close
to the irrigation canals to meet the increasing water demand and in turn shift some burden
from the groundwater to the surface water (JICA, 2019a). In addition, the stated mission
of the AFD is to improve the duration and pressure of the piped water supply in cooperation
with the water agency. It is building water purification plants on the Rakh Branch canal to
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filter canal water to add it to the municipal piped water supply system. The AFD is in
communication with public officials to provide water leakage detection technology to
reduce water wastage (AFD, 2019). On the other hand, WaterAid and the United Nations
are working at the provincial level to advise policy-making and finance drinking water
projects (HUD & PHED, 2021). Khan & Ahmed (2007) examined whether foreign aid was
a blessing or a curse for the socio-economic development of Pakistan for the period
between 1972-2006. They found no evidence of any positive impact of aid on the social
infrastructure development. Instead, they noticed that foreign aid actually promoted aid
dependency, which stymied the maturation process of critical local public institutions.

Water Users
In Faisalabad, people are part of or grouped in biraderi6 based trust networks, which
are sources of social capital. Social capital is "the shared knowledge, understandings,
norms, rules, and expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of individuals
bring to a recurrent activity" (Ostrom, 2000, p.176). A higher level of communication and
contact between the members of the biraderi helps garner the environment of trust and
reciprocity in society, which, in turn, removes obstacles to cooperation (Malik, 2017,
p.245; Rothstein, 2005). Membership in a trust network might mean access to additional
employment opportunities, funds when needed, and a larger pool of potential marriage
partners (Tilly, 2005). This within group trust and connections is an example of bonding
social capital (Pretty, 2003). One major negative impact of bonding social capital might be
the development of distrustful attitudes toward the members of other biraderies (Tilly,

6

The term refers to caste, clan, religion, tribe, or sect.
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2005). An even bigger problem is that biraderies are not equal in terms of their influence
and resources, the key factor that guarantee access to the sought-after goods and services
in society (Gazdar, 2007). Hence, in the absence of bridging social capital, or when the
trust between different biraderies is non-existent, inequalities in the communities multiply.

The most influential trust networks in Faisalabad are caste-based biraderies: Jatt,
Arian, Gujjar, Rajput, and Sayyed. They are active in politics, especially during the
elections for provincial and national parliaments. All the members follow the lead of the
biraderi head and vote in unison for the candidate of his or her choosing. The leadership of
the trust network strives to secure public sector jobs for the members of their biraderi using
political connections or personal relationships with the bureaucrats. Once the politicians
and government employees whom they have endorsed assume power, biraderi heads start
to seek privileged treatment in accessing goods and services for themselves and their group
members (Anwar, 2019). This relationship between formal (e.g., bureaucrats) and informal
actors (biraderi based trust-networks) creates an informal governance system, that makes
the state appear less like a legitimate democratic entity but more like a vehicle for the illegal
distribution of goods and services. Moreover, these institutional arrangements are such that
the law is selectively applied to favor individuals with wealth and powerful connections
(Malik, 2017).
Furthermore, mental models, which are "internal representations of external reality
that people use to interact with the world around them,” provide a mechanism through
which an individual can filter and store information (Jones et al., 2011, p.1). These models
can be applied to storing the rules governing resources like groundwater. Mental models
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can give researchers insights into various aspects of human cognition that underpin
preferences, behaviors, and actions of individuals. This information is of great value for
the practitioners and scholars working to devise actionable policies (Jones et al., 2011).
The investigation conducted by Qasim et al. (2018) gave a glimpse into the mental models
of the groundwater users in Faisalabad. The study showed a severe lack of information
among the public on the condition of the aquifer. The majority (83 percent) believed that
humans would never run out of groundwater and that the phenomenon of aquifer depletion
is only temporary. Moreover, 63 percent of participants were unaware of terms such as
“watershed” and “hydrological cycle” and how they are connected to the water table.

2.4.3 Rules-in-Use
There are numerous collective-choice and operational rules developed at the
national, provincial, municipal, and community levels pertaining to the management and
use of groundwater and piped water supply in Faisalabad (see Table 2.1). Collective-choice
rules refer to the constitutive processes through which institutions are constructed
(McGinnis, 2011), and at the operational level, formal and/or informal institutions directly
affect the behavior of individuals, such as when and how one can access the resource
(Banerji, 2013, p.87). The politicians have legislated collective-choice rules such as the
Punjab Development of Cities Act-1976, Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Act–1997, and
The Punjab Water Act-2019 in the provincial parliament. Meanwhile, the donor agencies,
the United Nations, and WaterAid influenced the HUD&PHED to produce policies like the
“Punjab Urban Water and Sanitation Policy-2007” and the Punjab Drinking Water Policy2011. The Changa Pani Program (CPP) was developed by the non-profit organization to
help the government close the gap between water supply and demand in the cities. On the
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other hand, operational rules, The Easement Act-1882 was developed during the British
Raj in the sub-continent. The Water Supply Faisalabad Regulations–2015 were written by
the bureaucrats of the water agency. In addition, “Water and Sanitation Committee
Organization (WASCO)” is an informal community-led governance system of piped water
management, and “Panchayats” are a low-cost conflict resolution mechanism comprised
of influential local community members.
The piped water users and groundwater consumers were not involved in the
collective-choice and operational rule-making processes (except for WASCO and
Panchayat), even though the “Punjab Water Act-2019”, “Punjab Urban Water & Sanitation
Policy–2007”, and “Punjab Drinking Water Policy-2011” recommend municipal water
agencies tto involve local communities in the groundwater/municipal water use decisionmaking processes. They are advised to help water users organize themselves for the
development of infrastructure and resource conservation. However, according to the
Societies Registration Act XXI-1860, community-led organizations must be registered
before they start any activities (The Urban Unit, 2010). The state does not explicitly
challenge any informal entity working to protect water resources or improve municipal
water provision. Thus, it is safe to deduce that appropriators are partially free to devise
their institutions, and there is a strong possibility that the state will not challenge them.

The Punjab Development of Cities Act-1976 provides legal foundation to the city
administration for the creation of the water agency. It also lays out who must be part of
decision-making arrangements determining the nature of the water supply system in
Faisalabad. The Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Act–1997 makes the Irrigation and
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Drainage Department responsible for the protection and monitoring of the groundwater and
surface water resources in the province. To access surface water and groundwater resources
for the piped water supply, the water agency has formal agreements with the irrigation
department which it renews every two years. In addition, the basic philosophy of the CCP
is that local communities must have a real financial stake in the production and
management of the public utility for it to be successful and function on the principles of
sustainability. In several cities of Punjab, including Faisalabad, where public piped water
supply systems are not available, an independent state-sponsored water provision system
based on the CCP model has been developed in several cities of Punjab including
Faisalabad.

The Punjab Water Act-2019 has both collective-choice and operational rules for the
piped water and groundwater management. According to its Clause-49, groundwater
underneath any urban jurisdiction of the province is public a property. When an individual
wants to extract groundwater for commercial or industrial purposes, a permit from the state
must be acquired that gives the right of access and withdrawal. By contrast, domestic
groundwater extraction does not fall under the ambit of this regulation because the
government needs to meet the piped water demand of all the residents in the city first. In
place of Punjab Water Act-2019, The Easement Act-1882 gives people unrestricted access
to the aquifer when exploited for domestic usage (Clause-7g). This law is based on the
archaic notion dating back to Roman law which states that “whoever owns the soil, holds
title all the way up to the heavens and down to the depths of hell” (Soofi, 2018). However,
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landowners are not allowed to sell this groundwater for commercial purposes as per Clause24(1b) of the Punjab Water Act-2019.
The Punjab Water Act-2019 gives the water agency the responsibility to monitor
the condition of the aquifer underneath the city (Clause-49). Similarly, Water Supply
Regulations-2015 makes the water agency responsible for monitoring piped water supply
and non-domestic groundwater extraction. However, it does not have enough resources
(workforce and technology) to monitor the groundwater withdrawal of all the resource
users. The graduated sanctions for those who break piped water supply or aquifer use rules
are laid out in Water Supply Regulations-2015. For instance, individuals convicted of
having illegal piped water connections can be subject to a fine not exceeding three years
of a water bill. Moreover, those who have illegal re-connections face one-month
imprisonment and a PKR 10,000 fine. Likewise, those who violate the non-domestic
groundwater extraction rules are punished based on the severity of their crime. Those who
do not pay their bills are disbarred from the groundwater extraction in addition to the fine
equivalent to the last three months of their utility bills. If someone withdraws from the
aquifer illegally, then the violator must pay a fine equal to the last six months of their utility
bills, together with a regularization fee for a new aquifer connection.

Furthermore, the formal groundwater governance activities are organized in
multiple interconnected layers in Faisalabad. The water agency is vertically linked to the
Housing Urban Development & Public Health Department (HUD&PHED), an executive
branch of the Punjab government. It is horizontally linked with the Irrigation and Drainage
Department to monitor surface water flows and groundwater levels in the well fields. The
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downward link is with the local communities via the Citizen Liaison Cell (CLC) created
by the water agency in 2013. The goal of the CLC is to create community-based
organizations to improve the water supply system in the city. The multiple jurisdictions are
supposed to make the governance system more robust, but in Faisalabad, the failure of the
water agency has not triggered an appreciable response from the HUD&PHED, irrigation
department, or from the local communities. Hence, the city still lacks functioning nested
enterprises for effective municipal water supply and groundwater governance.
Table 2.1: Formal and Informal Institutions Governing Groundwater & Piped Water in Faisalabad

Type

Formal Rules

Name

Institutional Level

Punjab Development of Cities Act–1976
Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Act–1997
Punjab Urban Water and Sanitation Policy–
2007
Punjab Drinking Water Policy–2011
Changa Pani Program

Collective-Choice
Provincial

CollectiveChoice/Operational

Punjab Water Act-2019

Informal Rules

The Easement Act-1882
Water Supply Faisalabad Regulations –2015
WASCO
Panchayat

National
Municipal

Operational

Community

2.4.4 Action Situations
An action situation is a space where actors interact and jointly produce outcomes
that they value differently (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014, p.2). It enables an analyst to isolate
a process of interest to explain regularities in human actions, results and then potentially
reform them (Ostrom & Ostrom, 2011). In this study, the focal action situations are
appropriation, provision, rule-making, monitoring and sanctioning of the piped water
supply and groundwater governance system in Faisalabad including the dynamics between
these two water resources. Although the IAD framework can differentiate among three
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conceptual levels of analysis—operational, collective choice, and constitutional—the
current research focuses on the operational level and, to some extent, on collective-choice
rules pertinent to action situations.

To understand why a typical resident is unsatisfied with the municipal water agency
and dependent on the groundwater, the interactions between the water agency and water
users are examined. The water agency produces 70.4 million gallons per day (JICA, 2019b,
p. A8-3), but according to the official estimates, the total water demand is 170 million
gallons per day (Respondent-W1, 2021). There are ecological, social, and institutional
factors that undergird this acute water shortage. The major ecological barrier is the limited
sustainable water production capacity of the water agency’s groundwater well-fields: ~60
million gallons per day (JICA, 2019c, p. B2-1). Social impediments, high population
growth (2.5 percent), and explosive urban expansion (167 percent increase in the past 25
years) contribute to the growth in the water demand7 as well. The water agency has not
been able to keep up with urbanization, as only 60 percent of the city has piped water
supply network (JICA, 2019a, p.1). Moreover, in the absence of leakage detection
technology, nearly 40 percent of the water produced leaks to the ground (Respondent-D,
2021). Thus, overall, the total water left in the piped water supply network is 42 million
gallons per day only.

To access the scarce municipal piped water, a resident invokes his or her biraderi
based trust-network. Then the biraderi head or the resident directly interacts with the

7

The estimation based on average per capita water consumption (137 liters), growth rate, and total population of 3.2
million would increase the water demand up to 2.4 million gallons per day in the next year.
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politicians or bureaucrats to acquire a piped water connection. In other situations, people
make a collective effort to get piped water infrastructure in their neighborhood or to receive
municipal water for at least four hours a day in their households (Zia & Chaudhry, 2019).
According to Malik (2017), this connection between informal trust-networks and state
officials is an example of type-III or unauthorized collective choice units that “provide
rules and determine who gets what, when, and how, at times directly contradicting laws
and formal rules” (Malik, 2017, p.65). So, in reality, the water agency which is formally
empowered to plan, design, operate, and maintain the piped water supply system does not
have full institutional authority. The unauthorized governance units functioning as a
patronage system undermine the water agency’s institutional power. In a patronage system,
patrons (e.g., politicians and the water agency) give clients (e.g., members of the biraderi)
special favors in return for votes or unspecified support at the cost of the common good
(Malik, 2017; Rothstein, 2011, p.79). Such a system is inherently corrupt, as patrons
monitor, sanction, or provide services to people independently of merit (or need) but rather
on personal and political considerations (Rothstein & Varraich, 2017). In Faisalabad,
unauthorized informal governance units are also known to protect neighborhoods where
illegal connections are commonplace and where consumers do not pay their utility bills
(Respondent-D, 2021).

The main issue with the biraderies is that they do not have equal resources and
opportunities to influence politicians and bureaucrats (Gazdar, 2007). Consequently, areas
inhabited by weak (particularly minority) biraderies, like Warispura, Nasir Town, and Aath
Chak, are not connected to the piped water supply system despite living on top or beside
the necessary infrastructure (see Appendix-II). Similarly, the duration of the water supply
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in some areas is less than the officially stated four hours a day, while other sites do not get
municipal water at all (JICA, 2019b). It has been observed that when the performance of
the public utility is poor, and the public officials are biased or corrupt, people start to feel
dissatisfied and lose trust in the utility provider (Rothstein, 2011). In turn, they stop paying
their utility bills (Jensena & Chindarkarb, 2017). According to the data collected by JICA
from the water agency, only 34.6 percent of domestic, 39.2 percent commercial, and 84.9
percent industrial water users pay their bills. In addition, 26.4 percent domestic, 67.2
percent commercial, and 99.5 percent industrial connections are illegal. The annual losses
due to unpaid bills and illegal connections are PRK 410.2 million and PKR 306.8 million
respectively (JICA, 2019b, p. A7-19). The water agency is currently recovering PKR 840
million, whereas PKR 2179 million are needed per annum for the annual operations and
maintenance of the water supply system (JICA, 2019b, p. A6-2). To make up for the losses
water agency is dependent on subsidies from the provincial government and donor agencies
(JICA, 2019a).

The failure of the water agency to meet their domestic and non-domestic water
demands has pushed residents to search for alternatives. Owing to the availability of cheap
groundwater extraction technology and benefits in terms of saved time and money, citizens
prefer to exploit the freshwater layer of the aquifer when compared to the tanker water
option (Nawaz, 2018; IDP, 2017). Today, 72.6 percent of the households and 77 percent
of the commercial and industrial entities in Faisalabad extract groundwater (JICA, 2019c,
p. B5-13; JICA, 2019b, p. A2-44). If a resident wants to extract groundwater for domestic
purposes, there is no need to get permission from the state because, according to the
“Easement Act-1882”, groundwater is an open access resource for the rightful landowner
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(Soofi, 2018). By contrast, groundwater pumping for non-domestic purposes requires a
permit from the local water agency as per Water Supply Faisalabad Regulations-2015
(clause-17b). Moreover, individuals’ perceptions of groundwater determine their behavior
toward consumption and conservation of the resource. An average resident in Faisalabad
considers groundwater a free gift of nature that will never go extinct and thinks that the
phenomenon of aquifer decline is only temporary (Jamal, 2019; Qasim et al., 2018). In this
situation, the only meaningful constraint against excessive groundwater extraction is the
exorbitant cost of electricity in Pakistan that is used to run the pumps. Lastly, as previously
discussed, the primary source of aquifer recharge are the local irrigation canals. The water
flow in the canals has not changed except for seasonal variations in the last two decades to
cause the slowdown in the rate of recharge. The groundwater level monitoring data
confirms this assertion as the groundwater table at the outer edges of the city and beyond
is stable (FoDP, 2012; IDP, 2021). Hence, the issue of groundwater decline seems solely
an urban issue, which indicates that the rate of concentrated groundwater draft in the city
is higher than the rate of recharge. However, there are no official estimates of how much
groundwater is extracted every day.

The water agency often struggles to punish those who are stealing piped water and
connection holders who do not pay their utility bills. The informal governance units use
bribery and connections with the powerful to ignore, subvert, and bend the formal rules in
their favor. As a result, the water agency loses power to implement or enforce its own laws
impartially. Moreover, to an outside observer, the monitoring and sanctioning activities of
the water agency might seem uncertain and ad hoc. Regarding groundwater, the
exploitation of the freshwater layer for domestic purposes is not regulated. However, when
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groundwater is extracted for non-domestic purposes without prior permission or when
terms of the permit are violated, then consumers will be warned, fined, or arrested as per
the Water Supply Rules-2015 (clauses 80-84). In practice, the water agency does not have
enough resources, like workforce and technology, to monitor the groundwater withdrawal
of hundreds of thousands of resource users. For example, the water agency has not been
able to force an estimated 70 percent of non-domestic groundwater consumers, of which
41.2 percent draw water illegally, to pay their bills (JICA, 2019b). It is also extremely
difficult to hold any government employee accountable for wrongdoing, like
mismanagement of the city’s groundwater or unequal treatment of piped water
users. Hence, public officials are accountable only on paper.

Additionally, the major conflicts between piped water users and the water agency
today are the non-payment of bills and use of illegal connections. Residents do not pay
their fixed monthly bills, citing intermittent and uncertain water supply. The water agency
does not want to disconnect households and other properties from the piped water network
but, rather, regularize them. It is currently trying to resolve this conflict through
negotiations involving local leaders. In contrast to the piped water, only non-domestic
groundwater users fall under the purview of the water agency. When conflict between the
groundwater users and the water agency arises, consumers do not approach official
channels, such as the water agency’s complaint center, police, or the courts, because these
platforms are time-consuming and expensive. Instead, water users make use of the informal
makeshift community-led justice system called ‘panchayat’. It is a low-cost decisionmaking arrangement that helps resolve disputes swiftly. However, access to these platforms
is unequal, poor, and extremely poor communities find it difficult to form panchayat.
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The water agency created the Citizen Liaison Cell (CLC) in 2013, which is a
platform to work with the piped water and groundwater users to improve piped water
provision and aquifer management. The donor agencies, Japan International Cooperation
Agency, and the French Development Agency, who are active in the formulation of local
water policy-making, have a negative view of the community involvement. One of them
stated that “community involvement does not work in large cities; it might work in the
small satellite towns or rural areas where the population is small and the willingness to get
involved in the development projects is high” (Respondent-D, 2021). Thus, they do not
encourage the water agency to proactively employ the CLC for community engagement,
nor involve locals in any decision-making endeavor. Therefore, the work of the CLC is
limited to the collection of unpaid bills and creation of WASCO in the Shahbaz Nagar
neighborhood. To elaborate, the people in Shahbaz Nagar developed an independent piped
water supply system under the component sharing program designed following the Changa
Pani Program. Then members of the community jointly created WASCO for the
governance of the system (e.g., developing operational rules like setting tariffs)
(Respondent-W2, 2020; The Urban Unit, 2010). In addition, there has not been any
evidence that people are making any effort or requesting the state to work together to create
operational rules for both piped water supply and groundwater use. Gazdar et al. (2013)
has argued that the most likely reason for low-and middle-income communities to avoid
engagement with each other and the state in Pakistan is that people do not think they are
savvy enough to contribute anything to the decision-making process, while some people
do not have time to participate in the discussions.
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2.4.5 Outcomes and Evaluation
The scarcity of piped water triggers the people to put their biraderi-based trust
networks into action and create informal governance units (comprised of biraderi heads,
politicians, and bureaucrats) to access the resource. Moreover, the work to protect illegal
connection holders and customers who do not pay their bills. The subversion of formal
regulations by some biraderies and the consequent unequal treatment by public officials
leads more piped water users to ignore or disobey the rules. Therefore, a huge number of
consumers have stopped paying their utility bills and begun stealing water (see action
situations). Now, the majority of the people who have water connections are free-riding on
the water supply infrastructure without contributing anything toward its production,
operation, and maintenance. This situation is an example of a public goods dilemma, as
most of the people are thinking and acting on their self-interests, though at the cost of the
overall performance and well-being of the water agency which is no shape to provide
quality service without economic wherewithal. The lack of funds has weakened the water
agency’s capacity to maintain, operate, and expand water infrastructure (the public good).
It has depended on the foreign funds from the last three decades to turn itself around, but
to no avail (JICA, 2019b). Similarly, the absence of informal institutions, and weak formal
governance institutions make pumping the most viable and cheap alternative to the piped
water for an average resident. Consequently, the massive groundwater draft has negatively
impacted the freshwater aquifer and caused it to decline in the city. It means the present
institutional arrangements are not aligned with the social and environmental conditions to
make sure groundwater is extracted sustainably. According to the water agency officials,
the groundwater level is decreasing at the rate of 2 feet per year (Jamal, 2019, p.17). The
investigation conducted by the PCRWR has found that the freshwater layer in some areas
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is close to depletion, and in others, it is already depleted (Khan et al., 2016, p.3). This
situation is an example of a common pool resource dilemma, as it is difficult to monitor
and sanction exclude hundreds of thousands of people who are pumping and overusing the
groundwater.

Equity
The informal governance units are usurping considerable power from the water
agency, especially when they perform functions such as monitoring and tariff collection.
The biraderies, which are the main constituent of these institutional mechanisms, have an
unequal power due to their uneven influence on the politicians and bureaucrats. The
variation in the quality of the municipal water supply in various neighborhoods of the city
is directly proportional to the differences in this power. For example, in areas where
predominately weak biraderies reside, access to piped water is either limited or nonexistent. Moreover, the unequal distribution and duration of the water supply combined
with the application of rules on some and a blind eye to others, both point to the fact that
informal governance units are corrupt and not playing a positive, complementary, or
accommodating role vis-à-vis the water agency.

Efficiency
The piped water supply system is not working efficiently. The majority of the water
connections (95 percent) are not metered. Thus, there is no way to know how much water
households/connection users are consuming (individually). In addition, water tariffs are
extremely low; even if the bill collection rate were 100 percent, it would not be enough to
cover operations and maintenance expenses. The loss of 40 percent of the piped water to
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leakages and illegal connections is another burden on the water agency. Concerning
groundwater, the recently legislated Punjab Water Act-2019 is of particular concern; it
prohibits regulation of groundwater extraction for domestic purposes until the local water
authorities provide an adequate amount of piped water to the residents (clause-49). This
restriction actually relieves the pressure of the water agency to quickly improve its service
quality and fulfill the municipal water needs of the public and reverse the groundwater
decline.

Environmental Sustainability
The main source of the municipal piped water supply is groundwater (86 percent).
The current rate of pumping is sustainable as the water tables of its well fields are stable
(JICA, 2019b, p. B2-1). Moreover, in order to increase the production of the piped water
to fulfill the unmet demand use of the surface water is a more viable option. In Faisalabad,
72.6 percent of households have installed private in-situ groundwater pumps on their
premises. In addition, 77 percent of the commercial and industrial entities extract
groundwater. The exact volume of water extracted by the groundwater users is not known
because aquifer exploitation for domestic usage is not regulated. On the other hand, the
technology, and resources to monitor groundwater extraction for non-domestic purposes
are not available. At present, the rate of groundwater exploitation is not sustainable as the
water table is declining at a pace of 2 feet per year. Meanwhile, the rate of groundwater
recharge has not changed in the city except for the minor impact of the lack of rainfall
absorption (see section 2.4.1).
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Ostrom’s Design Principles
The outcomes of the action situation are not positive for the piped water supply
system and freshwater aquifer in the city. The preceding evaluation of the outcomes from
the equity, efficiency, and sustainability perspectives indicate that Ostrom’s design
principles are violated. Therefore, groundwater governance has been evaluated for
weaknesses using the updated design principles by Cox et al. (2010) as well. The action
situation shows that the boundaries of the freshwater aquifer are known, and formal rules
clearly define legitimate and illegitimate groundwater users. The appropriation and
provision rules (and their absence) do not match with the prevailing socio-environmental
conditions, as the water table in various parts of the city is diminishing. In addition, the
cost of groundwater pumping is less than the benefits accrued in terms of time, expense,
and convenience (see Table 2.2).

On the other side of the problem, non-domestic groundwater extraction is regulated
by the state, but the consumers on which these rules are applied were not part of the rulemaking or rule-modifying processes. Conversely, groundwater pumping for domestic
purposes is open access. The water agency does not have any policy, technology, or
workforce to monitor the condition of the aquifer and groundwater withdrawal; neither it
is accountable to the public regarding the mismanagement. Moreover, sanctions to punish
the violators of the groundwater extraction rules are graduated, but they are applied
expediently, if at all. In the case of conflicts between users or between the users and public
officials, panchayats can be formed to offer rapid, low-cost justice. However, for the
marginalized and low-income communities, it is rather difficult to form and use these
platforms. The people are allowed to form groups and work to preserve groundwater, but
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it is not clear if they can work independently of the state. At the same time, there is no
example of any community-led group working to conserve groundwater or use it
sustainably. Lastly, the formal groundwater governance institutions are arranged in
multiple layers, but due to the lack of communication and coordination among them, they
are currently ineffective to play their role.

Table 2.2: Evaluation of Faisalabad’s groundwater governance

#

Principle 1

Principle 2

Principle 3

Principle 4

Principle 5

Updated Design Principles
(Cox et al., 2010)
Clearly-defined boundaries:
A) Clear and locally understood boundaries
between legitimate users and nonusers are
present.
B) Clear boundaries that separate a specific
common-pool resource from a larger socialecological system are present.
Congruence with local conditions:
A) Appropriation and provision rules are
congruent with local social and
environmental conditions.
B) Appropriation rules are congruent
with provision rules, the distribution of
costs is proportional to the distribution of
benefits.
Collective-choice arrangements:
Most individuals affected by operational
rules can participate in modifying the
operational rules.
Monitoring:
A) Monitors who are accountable to the
users monitor the appropriation and
provision levels of the users.
B) Monitors who are accountable to the
users monitor the condition of the resource.

Graduated sanctions:
Appropriators who violate operational rules
are likely to be assessed graduated
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Faisalabad’s Groundwater
Governance
Clearly-defined boundaries:
A) The formal law, the Easement Act1882, and the Punjab Water Act-2019
have defined legitimate and illegitimate
groundwater users.
B) The extent of the freshwater layer on
top of the saline Indus River Basin is
known to the public officials.
Congruence with local conditions:
A) The rate of groundwater discharge is
higher than the rate of recharge.
B) The value of groundwater, in terms
of cost, time, and convenience, is greater
than the cost of pumping.
Collective-choice arrangements:
Resource users do not participate in
creating or modifying operational piped
water and groundwater management
rules.
Monitoring:
A) The water agency does not have
adequate workforce or technology to
monitor the groundwater withdrawal of
all resource users.
B) The water agency does not have the
policies, technology, or interest to
systematically monitor the condition of
the groundwater resource.
Graduated sanctions:
Sanctions to punish violators of the
piped
water
and
groundwater

Evaluation

Present

Present

Absent

Absent

Absent

Absent

Absent

Weak

sanctions (depending on the seriousness
and the context of the offense).

Principle 6

Conflict-resolution mechanism:
Appropriators have rapid access to low-cost
local arenas to resolve conflicts between
them.

Minimal recognition of rights to organize:
The rights of appropriators to devise their
own institutions are not challenged by
external governmental authorities.
Principle 7

Principle 8

Nested Enterprises:
Appropriation, monitoring, enforcement,
conflict resolution, and governance
activities are organized in multiple layers of
nested enterprises.

management rules are graduated,
although the enforcement of these rules
is ad hoc and random.
Conflict-resolution mechanism:
The citizens can access a rapid and lowcost, informal conflict resolution
arrangement known as ‘panchayat,’ but
sometimes forming these makeshift
platforms is not equally attainable.
Minimal recognition of rights to
organize:
The government allows water users to
organize and work with it for piped
water provision and groundwater
withdrawal. However, there is a legal
grey area regarding the right of the
people to work independently of the
state.
Nested Enterprises:
Institutions govern groundwater in
multiple layers of nested enterprises, but
these governance jurisdictions are not
currently effective due to the lack of
coordination among them.

Weak

Weak

Weak

Source: Author

Role of Institutional Power
Action situations have helped uncover the impacts of power in the decision-making
and enforcement of operational rules pertaining to municipal piped water supply and
groundwater withdrawal. The formal rule-making powers are shared by the parliament of
Punjab, HUD&PHED, and the water agency. However, the power is not equally shared;
parliament and HUD&PHED give the water agency limited authority to function. They can
enact laws and change local operational rules, thus undermining the autonomy of the water
agency. However, the piped water users and non-domestic groundwater users are not part
of any formal collective-choice arena. The power of these government entities is not
absolute, since some of it is snatched from the state by the unauthorized informal
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governance units, especially regarding operational rules like monitoring, sanctioning, and
conflict resolution. The informal governance units subvert and bend the rules to
accommodate members of the powerful biraderies, as well as other wealthy and highly
connected individuals and groups. The donor agencies at the provincial level advise the
government to involve people in the planning, design, and delivery stages of the piped
water provision and in water resources conservation efforts (i.e., to share power with the
consumers). In contrast, the aid agencies at the local level recommend that the water agency
completely avoid public involvement. Hence, these foreign donor agencies do exercise
some indirect influence over the policy making and operational activities. Ultimately, the
de facto power is not concentrated in the hands of a single entity; it is distributed among
provincial, local, and informal governance units.

2.5 Discussion
The primary objective of this study is to explore the interactions between the
performance of municipal water supply system and groundwater consumption. I have
chosen Faisalabad, Pakistan as a case study to explore these connections using the IAD
framework and Ostrom’s design principles. The results of the analysis showed that socioeconomic and ecological challenges like rapid population growth, urbanization, and poor
rainfall recharge—although important—are not significant enough to deteriorate the piped
water supply and urban freshwater aquifer. Rather, these issues can be solved on the
foundation of strong formal or informal institutions; for instance, the water agency can
employ cheap rainwater harvesting technology developed by the University of Agriculture,
Faisalabad, to recharge the freshwater aquifer on a gigantic scale. Likewise, the predicted
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negative impacts of climate change on the flow of water in the irrigation network, on which
the freshwater layer depends for recharge, are expected to materialize in the next 100 years
(Kugelman and Hathaway, 2009). Furthermore, the average human being needs between
50 and 100 liters of water per day to meet basic needs like drinking, laundry, kitchen,
household hygiene, and personal sanitation (WHO, 2003). In Faisalabad, the average per
capita demand is 137 liters per day (JICA, 2019b). So, there is considerable room to reduce
the per capita water demand and alleviate some pressure off the municipal piped water
system.

Furthermore, an institutional lens provides the best explanation of the dynamics
within and between the municipal water supply and groundwater extraction in Faisalabad.
The action situation showed that the water agency has fallen into a vicious negative
feedback loop, in which lack of funds and unauthorized informal governance units
reinforce each other. Due to the paucity of funds, the water agency’s operations and
maintenance capabilities have deteriorated; pumping and water filtration capacity has
shrunken; and there is no budget to install leak detection technology meanwhile 40 percent
of the municipal water seeps into the ground. The shortage of piped water forces the public
to compete for municipal water through informal governance units. Consequently, some
neighborhoods with strong biraderies, or connections, get better water service, leaving the
majority dissatisfied with the water agency. For this reason, people neglect paying their
utility bills or simply steal water, putting additional financial damage on the water agency.
Therefore, the water supply system stays in this self-perpetuating cycle of negativity,
causing the performance to further deteriorate.
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To get out of a negative feedback loop, the water agency regularly seeks financial
help from the foreign donor agencies. The Asian Development Bank gave monetary
assistance to construct the Chenab Well Field in 1992; similarly, the World Bank helped
build a groundwater pumping station on Jhang Branch Canal in 2007. Currently, the French
Development Agency and the Japan International Cooperation Agency are helping develop
water policy and water supply infrastructure. Nevertheless, the regular substantial
economic help has not been able to reduce the piped water scarcity or arrest the water table
decline. The water agency and the international donors are of the view that technocratic
solutions are the way to solve water scarcity problems in Faisalabad. In practice, therefore,
the availability of external funds has stunted the water agency’s ability and sense of
urgency to create and modify municipal and groundwater governance institutions to tackle
piped water security and groundwater depletion problems differently. For instance, piped
water tariffs are so low that they do not even cover the operations and maintenance costs.
The availability of external funds and subsidies does not push the water agency toward
robust tariff policy as funds kept coming. Moreover, Djankov et al. (2008) argued that
foreign aid does not work in places where institutions are weak and corruption is endemic.
Adding more money in such cities or utilities means more rent-seeking opportunities for
the public officials.

The probability of a governance system to manage the CPR more sustainably
increases when it meets Ostrom’s design principles (Cox et al., 2010). Analysis of the
action situations showed that groundwater governance in Faisalabad satisfies only one out
of eight design principles, while the rest of them are either weak or absent (see Table 2.2).
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It is a strong indication for the policy makers who want to protect the groundwater to
consider these institutional weaknesses (or absent and weak design principles) more
seriously. Take for instance Principle #2, congruence with the local conditions. In
Faisalabad, local socio-ecological conditions do not match with the formal institutions. For
example, the “Punjab Water Act-2019” declared urban groundwater a public property, but
domestic groundwater exploitation cannot be regulated until the water agency provides a
sufficient amount of piped water to the connection holders. This condition relieves pressure
on the water agency to quickly improve piped water service. In addition, residents chose
what Hirschman (1970) described as an ‘exit’ option, rather than politically organizing
themselves or protesting for better quality water, people choose to go for an alternative
source of water, i.e., groundwater. This solution is not sustainable or viable for a long
period of time because if people keep exploiting the freshwater layer at the current pace,
the city will completely run out of groundwater soon. Therefore, the water agency must
start regulating domestic groundwater extraction; this will then put an additional
motivation on the water agency to improve its quality of service as to minimize the pressure
from the residents to provide water.

Thus, the core issues—free-riding on municipal piped water infrastructure and
unregulated and uncontrolled groundwater use—are collective choice problems which are
harder to solve with external funds or building more infrastructure. The term collective
action refers to a situation in which independent decisions of people produce outcomes
whose impacts are jointly felt by everyone (van Soest, 2013). Individuals stuck in these
social dilemmas are better off cooperating with each other for the long-term sustainability
of the groundwater and efficient provision of piped water for everyone. However, factors
49

such as fragmented or weak formal governance, low administrative capacity, and an
absence of informal community-led efforts, as well the users’ perception that they will
never run out of groundwater, make cooperation harder to materialize. As discussed in the
preceding paragraphs, external funds alone cannot solve public goods and CPR dilemmas,
since it is extremely difficult to control hundreds of thousands of households pumping on
their premises or to encourage people to start paying for the public infrastructure without
institutional interventions. Thus, two policy recommendations are laid out in the next
section, they can help improve both the piped water and the condition of the freshwater
aquifer in Faisalabad.

2.6 Policy Recommendations
Co-Production
The collective action problems do not disappear with the formulation of few
regulations, because the successful implementation of any policy requires cooperation
from the willing citizens (Rothstein, 2005). A governance paradigm, co-production, is
defined as "a process through which inputs from individuals who are not in the same
organization are transformed into goods and services" (Ostrom, 1996, p.1). According to
this model, policy-making is not a prerogative of technocrats (Bovaird, 2007) but the
citizens can play an active role in producing public goods. They can collaborate with
producers and other stakeholders in all or any of the following phases of public goods
provision: planning, design, delivery, and assessment (Ostrom, 1996; Nabatchi et al.,
2017). Co-production has the potential to alleviate several governance weaknesses
identified by the design principles (see Table 2.2). For instance, it can improve monitoring
50

and sanctioning operations using communities as assets (Adams et al., 2019; Ostrom,
1996). In addition, when producers and citizens work together (collective decision-making)
in open, nested arenas, all forms of opportunistic behavior (i.e., illegal connections) are
likely to get exposed (McGinnis, 1999, p.366). Public services get more responsive to the
needs of the public and more accountable to the public (McMullin, 2019). In turn, trust
between the consumers and producers increases (Fledderus et al., 2014), which is essential
for getting out of social dilemmas (Sobels et al., 2001). Overall, free-riding or non-payment
of bills is also expected to decrease, which means more funds for the water agency to invest
in the piped water supply infrastructure.

State-Reinforced Self-Governance
Co-production between piped water users and the water agency will slowly improve
piped water supply system and, in result, relieve some pressure off the freshwater layer.
However, for the long-term sustainable use of the groundwater, grassroots efforts to sustain
and protect the aquifer are necessary. The community-led interventions are crucial because
it is impossible for the government to monitor the discharge from hundreds of thousands
of motorized groundwater pumps in the urban area. In addition, due to the shared nature of
the aquifer, it is extremely difficult to stop anyone from accessing and exploiting the
aquifer. These characteristics of the CPR allow people to consume groundwater and get
away without contributing anything towards its replenishment. Furthermore, the state
cannot coerce people and kick-start self-governance at the community level. The selforganization must be voluntarily for it to produce institutions which are accepted and
followed by all the consumers. Thus, efforts to co-produce piped water must be adopted
along with ‘State-Reinforced Self-Governance (SRSG)’. It is an innovative common pool
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resource management policy being used for the management of irrigation commons in
Japan. According to this institutional arrangement, the government can work with common
pool resource users to avert the tragedy of the commons, and yet remain strategic,
cooperative, and non-participatory. It lets the CPR institutions flourish voluntarily at the
grassroots (Sarker, 2013).

On the other hand, top-down initiatives crowd out local norms, such as social trust,
because external incentives compromise individual intrinsic motivation to genuinely
engage with each other, and thus over time, people may act less cooperatively (Bowles,
2008). Notwithstanding, in a community-led groundwater governance repeated
interactions among the resource users will increase trust, cooperation, and compliance
within the group (Rothstein, 2005). That’s the reason, SRSG dictates that state using
financial, legal, political, and technological means creates a favorable environment for the
people where self-governance flourishes (Sarker, 2013). In Faisalabad, biraderies which
are negatively impacting piped water supply system and freshwater aquifer at the municipal
level can be used to make a positive impact on the water resources as well. Biraderies are
the bases of informal governance units, that have weakened the water agency’s
enforcement capacity. The government can employ these informal trust networks to
provide updated information regarding the groundwater level and the rate of consumption
including the consequences of increasing groundwater withdrawal to the biraderi heads.
They can disseminate this information among all the members of the biraderi. In addition,
state can remove the legal grey area, are informal organizations are allowed to work
independent of the state or not by enacting a new law or amending the existing “Water
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Supply Faisalabad Regulations-2015”. Finally, the state can also provide cheap rainwater
harvesting technology to the people and train them how to use it, again using the biraderi
based trust-networks. Thus, SRSG combined with co-production of piped water will have
strong positive/corrective impact on the weak, and absent design principles, such as
congruence with the local conditions, monitoring, minimum rights to organize, and nested
enterprises (see Table 2.2).

2.7 Conclusions
In this paper, the worsening urban groundwater depletion crisis has been studied in
the Global South context. The distinctive approach employed in this study is to analyze the
problem of aquifer decline in conjunction with the municipal piped water security. The
literature on groundwater governance is bereft of the impacts a poorly performing piped
water supply system can have on the groundwater. Thus, considering Faisalabad as a case
study and employing the IAD framework and Ostrom’s design principles, social,
ecological, and institutional factors affecting the functioning of water agency and
groundwater withdrawal have been studied. The analysis showed that challenges posed by
the ecological and social concerns are manageable if strong formal and informal
institutions are present. Notwithstanding, institutional challenges are harder to tackle; for
instance, the water agency is trapped in a vicious feedback loop in which lack of funds and
informal governance units reinforce each other, pushing the water supply system in a
negative downward spiral. The attempts by the water agency to inject external funds from
multiple donor agencies have made it an aid-dependent institution and slowed the
institutional maturation process. On the other hand, biraderies with more clout and
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influence have successfully used the informal unauthorized governance units for their
benefits and further increased the inequalities in the quality of service.

Action situations showed that people are free-riding on the municipal piped water
supply system and overusing groundwater, simultaneously causing public goods and CPR
dilemma. Moreover, only one design principle out of eight is present in the groundwater
governance of Faisalabad. At the local level the water agency, the government, the
HUD&PHED, and informal governance units are the common elements between piped
water and groundwater consumption. Hence, the challenge of groundwater depletion in
Faisalabad cannot be solved with external monetary help or other technological fixes. It is
essential to recognize the institutional nature of this problem, solving it requires collective
action from all the stakeholders, primarily resource users and the local water agency. I
proposed two policy solutions that must be implemented simultaneously, co-production to
rehabilitate the water agency and state reinforce self-governance to provide a conducive
environment for the groundwater users to self-govern the aquifer.

Lastly, one of the limitations of this research is the absence of analysis on political
will, which is necessary to take up the challenge of groundwater depletion in the city. In
addition, there is a dearth of accurate and regularly updated information on groundwater
use, as the water agency has no technology or system to monitor the consumption of
domestic and non-domestic users. Thus, future research on the groundwater in Faisalabad
can explore aspects concerning the political will and add more comprehensive groundwater
recharge, discharge, and consumption data in the analysis. The other two avenues of
research pertain to the policy recommendations I laid out in this study. The first avenue is
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to determine the public willingness to co-produce piped water. The second avenue is to
explore if residents want to cooperate with each other to manage the aquifer at the
grassroots level.
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CHAPTER 3: COOPERATION IN GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE
A COMMON POOL RESOURCE EXPERIMENT

3.1 Introduction
Faisalabad is a large metropolis of 3.2 million people (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics,
2017). Its residents are exclusively dependent on groundwater as the main source of the
public water supply system, and 72.4 percent of households practice self-extraction of
groundwater to meet their domestic water needs (JICA, 2019b, p.B5-13). The freshwater
aquifer being exploited by the city is a sub-system of the Indus River Basin, which is
naturally saline due to its marine origin. However, due to the seepage from surface water
irrigation canals built in the late 1800s a freshwater layer on top of the brackish water has
developed (JICA, 2019a, p.A3-1). The absence of informal and weak formal, groundwater
governance, in addition, at the minor level, urbanization, and population growth, has led to
unregulated and uncontrolled exploitation of this freshwater layer (Shahbaz, chapter 2).
Today, the aquifer is declining at the rate of 2 feet per year as the rate of discharge exceeds
the rate of recharge (Jamal, 2019, p.17). The lowering of the groundwater table has
triggered an intrusion of saltwater from a deep fossil aquifer, rendering the freshwater layer
unsuitable for domestic consumption (Shakoor et al., 2017).
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Numerous cities in the developing world are facing groundwater scarcity and
associated governance challenges (e.g., Biswas et al., 2017; El-Naqa et al., 2007; Hossain
et al., 2021; Mahmood et al., 2011). The unique difficulties that groundwater managers
face can be partly ascribed to the very nature of groundwater. First, it is a common pool
resource (CPR), meaning the exploitation of the aquifer by one person reduces its
availability for the rest of the community8. Additionally, it is extremely difficult to prevent
someone from accessing and extracting groundwater. Second, the invisibility of the aquifer
adds another layer to the challenge, as it makes it harder to detect free-riding behavior
(Kemper, 2007). These groundwater characteristics allow people to easily and frequently
exploit the resource without contributing anything towards its replenishment and
protection. Thus, individuals who are using CPRs, such as groundwater, face a social
dilemma9: either choose short-term self-interest and individual gains from the resource or
think of its long-term sustainability for everyone (Ostrom, 1999; Rothstein, 2005).

The destruction of commonly held open access resources is inevitable unless they
are regulated by the state or privatized (Hardin, 1968). However, state-led groundwater
management efforts in urban areas have largely been ineffective because governments
usually lack the administrative and technological capacity to monitor large numbers of
dispersed water wells (Molle & Closas, 2020). Similarly, privatization of groundwater
would likely be unsuccessful because boundaries of the aquifer are often unclear; thus, it is
difficult to establish workable individual property rights (Bruggink, 1992). Moreover, it is a

8

Common-pool resources are characterized by two distinct features 1) difficulty in stopping actors from extracting
resource units (i.e., low-excludability) and 2) withdrawal or subtraction of resource unit(s) by one individual/entity
9
It is a situation in which the private and socially optimal actions do not coincide (van Soest, 2013).
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mobile resource, it’s use at one place affects its quantity and availability at other places. Elinor
Ostrom (1990) contested Hardin’s assertion and proposed a third way to manage common
pool resources. She argued that human beings can come together and cooperate because
they are not so much motivated by self-interest, rather by strategic thinking, i.e.,
conditional cooperation. There are now hundreds of examples of local communities where
collective action has led to the development of self-governing groundwater management
institutions (e.g., Garduño et al., 2009; Ostrom, 1965, 1990; Taher, 2016).

The importance of self-governing institutions is even greater in countries like
Pakistan where the state is weak (Malik, 2017). The metropolitan government in Faisalabad
has failed to protect and regulate groundwater for the benefit of the general public. On the
other hand, privatization of aquifer is not possible, owing to its very nature, when it is being
shared by millions of people in the urban context. Hence, community-based informal selfregulating institutions are a plausible alternative method of aquifer management. The
residents of Faisalabad do have de jure minimal rights to develop their own institutions and
operate them but with the consent of the state. The aim of the Citizen Liaison Cell (CLC),
created by the water agency in 2013, is to help water users self-organize and collaborate
with the state for the conservation of water resources in the city (see section 3.4 for more
details). Therefore, there are no serious formal or legal hurdles at the community level that
stop citizens from working together for the protection of groundwater. The question though
is would the residents be willing to cooperate and collectively govern the aquifer as a
common property.
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Many factors can impact an individual’s level of cooperation in common pool
resource dilemmas. The most important element for the success of most, if not all, selfgoverning institutions is social capital (E. Ostrom, 2000; Sobels et al., 2001). It reduces
uncertainty and lowers the transaction costs associated with working together. It also
enables people to develop the confidence to invest in collective activities, believing that
others will do the same (B. Rothstein & Stolle, 2003). Furthermore, individual preferences
like risk-taking (Reynaud & Couture, 2012), patience (Gunatilake et al., 2009), and
egalitarianism10 (Koop et al., 2021) are also known to affect the intensity of cooperation in
the collective choice arenas. Given the information laid out in the preceding paragraphs, I
am setting up two hypotheses. First, groundwater users in Faisalabad will not cooperate to
regulate their groundwater extraction. As the standard noncooperative game theory
suggests, that is a social dilemma, the incentives for free, rational, and self-interested
individuals are such that stimulating cooperation among individuals to avert the tragedy is
difficult. In addition, the amount of social capital is limited and restricted to kinship-based
trust networks (biraderies), which is not enough to overcome the social dilemma and
encourage cooperation among all the residents in Faisalabad (Anwar, 2019 and see section
3.4 for more details). The second hypothesis is that social capital, patience, risk-taking
behavior, and egalitarianism impact groundwater users’ cooperation level and, in turn,
affect the intensity of groundwater extraction. To explore the first hypothesis, I conducted
a common pool resource experiment with the residents of Faisalabad to elicit their
groundwater extraction behavior. The amount of extraction is inversely related to the level
of cooperation among the group members. The empirical analysis shows that players are

10

The term "egalitarian" is often used to refer to a situation that favors a greater degree of equality of income,
wealth, and development across a population.
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somewhat cooperative as they extract on average 7.23±.166 gallons out of 10 gallons
allocated to each one of them. I used an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model
to test the second hypothesis. Findings of the regression analysis show that trust, lack of
corruption in the water agency, patience, and egalitarianism increase the cooperation level,
and in turn decrease the groundwater extraction.

This paper is organized in the following way: at the outset, I discuss the nature of
groundwater as a resource, including different governance modes to manage it. Further, I
review current groundwater governance arrangements in Faisalabad. In addition, I explore
why cooperation is crucial for the success of self-governance efforts. Then, I present the
key factors that impact the level of cooperation in the action arenas. Next, I describe the
research methodology that explains the field experiment and statistical analysis employed
to explore the respondents’ groundwater extraction behavior. Finally, a discussion of the
results and policy recommendations are put forth.

3.2 Local Level Groundwater Governance
Aquifers are critical sources of water essential to agricultural, municipal, and
ecological water needs worldwide (Van der Gun, 2012; WWAP, 2012). They are being
exploited in an unsustainable manner causing the water table to diminish rapidly, especially
in developing countries (Gherghe, 2008; Gleeson et al., 2012). Water governance
authorities everywhere are struggling to reverse this trend and ensure sustainable
groundwater use (S. Foster & Garduño, 2013). Moreover, groundwater is a CPR that makes
its management uniquely difficult, as exploitation by one user reduces its availability for
the rest of the consumers. At the same time, it is also costly to exclude or limit the users'
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extraction activities (Ostrom, 1990). The invisibility of the aquifer adds another challenge
that makes it harder to detect free-riding behavior (Kemper, 2007). Hence, when it comes
to common pool resources, incentives are such that an individual would be better off if
everyone else cooperates while they free-ride on the resource without making any sacrifice
(Ostrom, 1999). In the case of groundwater, people around the world face a dilemma: they
have to choose between short-term individual gains (free-riding) or long-term
sustainability of the resource (Garduño et al., 2009).

According to Garett Hardin (1968), the dynamics of CPR extraction make the
destruction of the resource by self-interested individuals inevitable unless it is privatized
or regulated by the state. The comprehensive review of the state-led groundwater
management efforts shows that the government has largely been ineffective due to the lack
of a high degree of administrative, technological, and legal capacity to monitor a large
number of dispersed water users (Molle & Closas, 2017, 2020; Ross & Martinez-Santos,
2010). Nonetheless, even when the state is strong, involvement of local communities is
often necessary for improved groundwater governance (Mitchell et al., 2011). For example,
groundwater governance problems persist even in the United States where the government
is strong (Zuniga & Nathaniel, 2017). Similarly, attempts at aquifer privatization11 are often
unsuccessful because boundaries of the resource are often unclear; thus, it is hard to establish
workable property rights (Bruggink, 1992). Although there are some examples of successful CPR

11

Privatization is the process that attempts to increase excludability by instituting some form of property rights which
shift access rights exclusively to specific entities or individuals to enhance the efficiency of use (Partelow et al., 2019).
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privatization, e.g., fishing grounds and rangelands (e.g., Guneau & Tozzi, 2008; Pinkerton &
Davis, 2015), scholars were unable to find any positive example of aquifer privatization.

Elinor Ostrom is one of the most prominent scholars who contested Hardin’s (1968)
assertions concerning the common pool resources. She argued that tragedy of the commons
is not inevitable, and the state-led and private pathways to govern the CPRs, do not always
work, especially when the resource is groundwater (Dietz et al., 2003, p.1907; Ostrom,
1965, 1990). In addition, Rothstein (2013) and Ostrom (2005) challenged the standard
game theory assumptions underlying Hardin’s analysis. They contend that human beings
are not so much motivated by self-interest as they are by strategic thinking, which is based
on what other agents do or are expected to do in the action situation. Therefore, in a CPR
dilemma, they can potentially adopt cooperative behavior. Lastly, as suggested by Ostrom
(1990) and supported by the findings in numerous successful examples of community-led
self-governing CPRs (e.g., Baland & Platteau, 1996; Garduño et al., 2009; Ostrom, 1965;
Taher, 2016), it is safe to conclude that aquifers can also be managed collectively as a
common property12.

3.3 Cooperation in Groundwater Management
Urban groundwater systems are composed of technical, environmental, and social
components (House-Peters & Chang, 2011). Therefore, they can be studied as complex
social-ecological systems in which heterogeneous individuals and entities interact with the
resource contingent upon their diverse value systems and objectives (Pahl-Wostl, 2003).

12

Common property refers to exclusive collective access, use, and/or management rights to a defined resource at the
group level (Partelow et al., 2019).
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The inherent complexity and uncertainty associated with the social-ecological systems
present a serious management challenge to the stakeholders (Elsawah & Guillaume, 2016).
Curtis et al. (2016) have argued the best strategy to handle complex natural resource
management issues is to directly involve resource users. They bring local knowledge and
trust networks (i.e., social capital) in the collective choice arena that would increase
cooperation and in turn improve governance, such as reductions in monitoring costs. Thus,
for effective groundwater management social capital is crucial regardless of the governance
approach being employed (Bouma et al., 2008; Rothstein, 2005; Sobels et al., 2001). Social
capital has even greater significance for bottom-up, self-organizing, self-regulating
governance systems (Ostrom, 2000, p.178). Rothstein & Stolle (2003, p.7) defined social
capital as “access to beneficial social networks and having generalized trust in other
people”. It reduces uncertainty, lowers the transaction costs of cooperation, and enables
people to develop the confidence to invest in collective activities, believing that others will
do the same (Rothstein & Stolle, 2003). There are three types of social capital: bonding,
bridging, and linking. The bonding social capital describes the trust and connections within
a specific group. On the other hand, bridging social capital specifies the links and
relationships between individuals and groups with other groups and people who belong
with them. Finally, the linking social capital refers to the ability of people to engage with
external agencies, elected officials, etc. To protect any large-scale CPR, the presence of all
three types of social capital is essential (Pretty, 2003). However, the importance of bridging
and linking social capital is relatively higher because bridging and linking connections
enable people to access information and resources outside of their own social networks
(Ostrom, 2000). To illustrate, “bridging social capital can generate broader identities and
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reciprocity” (Putnam, 2000, p.23). In the same way, linking social capital connects people
across vertical differentials up and down the formal and informal social scale (Ferlander,
2007).
Trust is the most important aspect of social capital (Grafton, 2005; Rothstein &
Stolle, 2003). At the individual level, people who believe that most of the people in their
community can be trusted are also more likely to support civic and environmental
conservation efforts (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2011; B. Rothstein, 2013). According to
Rothstein (2005), there is a causal relationship between trust and corruption. He argued
that social trust in a society starts to decline when officials in public institutions are corrupt.
Rothstein described a three-part causal mechanism illustrating how a lack of institutional
trust leads to lower social trust. In phase one, if the public officials exercising their
authority are being partial or corrupt, people will rationally stop trusting them. In phase
two, people will logically infer that in a society with corrupt officials, most other people
are also involved in corrupt practices to obtain essential goods and services; therefore, they
cannot be trusted. In phase three, individuals realize that to get by in a corrupt society, they
have to participate in corrupt practices themselves. Thus, being oneself, an untrustworthy
person concludes that most other people in the society cannot be trusted as well (Rothstein
2005, p.121-122). Therefore, corruption in public institutions must also be factored in
every social capital measurement.

Additionally, individual preferences like risk-aversion, patience, and egalitarianism
are also known to affect decision-making behavior in social dilemmas (Reynaud &
Couture, 2012; Gunatilake et al., 2009; Koop et al., 2021). The risk-averse individual,
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according to Stefánsson & Bradley, 2019, p.1), is someone who is “disinclined to pursue
actions that have a non-negligible chance of resulting in a loss or whose benefits are not
guaranteed”. The more risk-averse a person is, the more he or she would be willing to
cooperate in the action arena. Similarly, time preference reveals how much an individual
would be willing to trade-off present benefits for future benefits (Magdalou et al., 2009).
The generally held perception is that impatience leads to lower levels of cooperation,
which, in turn, accelerates natural resource harvesting (Gunatilake et al., 2009; Gollier,
1999). Finally, Koop et al. (2021), in their investigation of public attitudes towards water
resource conservation, found that people who believe in egalitarianism consider
themselves more responsible for addressing resource scarcity issues. They also show a
strong belief in the statement that “everyone should have access to the same water
services”, hinting toward a greater willingness to work with others to protect water
resources (Koop et al, 2021 p.5).

3.4 Measuring Cooperation
Field experiments are a popular methodology in CPR governance literature to elicit
the level of cooperation among the members of the community using the commonly held
resource. They are usually employed as experimental games to understand the decisionmaking behavior of the individuals facing real-life CPR management challenges (e.g.,
Gehrig et al., 2019; Goldbach, 2017; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2016; Travers et al., 2011). In
the game, an individual is mechanically forced to pay attention to issues that the
investigator aims to address intuitively. In addition, experimental games allow researchers
to establish causality between variables rather than mere correlation (S. Durlauf & Blume,
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2009; Harrison & List, 2004). Notwithstanding, field experiments have been criticized for
their lack of generalizability beyond the simulated action arena (Galizzi & NavarroMartinez, 2019). Therefore, the level of cooperation exhibited in the games can only be
attributed to the people who belong to the simulated context (Anderies et al., 2011; Fehr &
Leibbrandt, 2011; Goldbach, 2017).
In a typical field experiment,13 a researcher creates a controlled setting or
environment in which a set number of participants make decisions. They voluntarily agree
to take part in the game and receive instructions on its institutional arrangements either
orally and/or in writing. For example, they are informed about the group they belong to,
the payoff structure of the game, possible decisions participants are allowed to make, and
the outcomes that depend on the decisions of other members of the experiment (Anderies
et al., 2011, p.1573). Furthermore, the experimental games are often incentivized to trigger
real-life response from the respondents (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). The payoff structure
is designed in a way that if a person extracts more from the CPR, personal earnings
increase, but, at the same time, group returns that are shared equally among participants
will diminish (Gehrig et al., 2019). Depending on how the experiment is done, all decisions
made by the players are made in a private setting, either on a computer or on paper.
Payments are also made in private, and the exact amount depends upon the decisions
participants made in the game (Anderies et al., 2011, p.1573).

Experimental games have been used to study various aspects of CPR governance
throughout the world. For example, Meinzen-Dick et al. (2016) used field experiments in

13

I will use phrases experimental game and CPR game synonymously.
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hard rock areas of Andhra Pradesh, India, to analyze the groundwater use behavior of local
farmers. The results showed that when the connection between crop choice and
groundwater depletion was made clear to the farmers, they pursued a more conservative
behavior towards groundwater. In addition, farmers who reported a higher level of social
capital in the community acted more cooperatively. Similarly, Dipierri & Zikos (2020),
played an irrigation dilemma game in northwest Argentina to investigate the role of conflict
resolution mechanisms under environmental variability. The findings demonstrated that
most of the groups lacking rules for conflict resolution extracted more water from the
irrigation system when environmental conditions were uncertain. Nevertheless, some
groups were able to sustainably manage canal water appropriation even in the absence of
conflict resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, Foster et al. (2018) designed a field
experiment to study the groundwater extraction behavior of farmers in Guanajuato,
Mexico, under three different policy interventions regarding subsidies (i.e., elimination,
reduction, and decoupling). The results showed that complete elimination of subsidies had
the largest effect on the rate of groundwater extraction, while the reduction in subsidies
had only a marginal effect. Ultimately, decoupling (disassociating subsidies from
volumetric measures in favor of lump-sums) proved to be the best policy solution, as it
produced an effect similar to elimination but without undesirable political implications,
such as resistance of elected officials to changes in the status quo.

3.4 Groundwater Governance in Faisalabad
Faisalabad is located in the central region of Punjab, Pakistan. In 2017, its
population was 3.2 million with 506,879 households (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2017).
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The majority of domestic and non-domestic users consume groundwater because only 27.6
percent of households and 10 percent of non-domestic units have municipal water agency
connections (JICA, 2019b, p.B5-18). The aquifer located below Faisalabad, on which its
residents depend, is a subsystem of the Indus River Basin 14 (Haider, 2000). The native
groundwater of this basin is saline. However, due to seepage from the irrigation network
developed in the late 1800s, it has gradually developed a freshwater layer on top of the
brackish water layer (JICA, 2019, p.A3-1). According to the report published in 2015 by
the Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources, the average thickness of this
freshwater layer is nearly 100 feet and decreasing (Khan et al., 2016). High population
growth (2.5 percent) is another factor in the increased water demand15 and explosive urban
expansion (167 percent increase) in the last 25 years (JICA, 2019a, p.1). A reduction in
rainfall recharge, which was originally contributing 15 percent to the total aquifer
replenishment, is one factor in the depletion of the freshwater layer. Urbanization, which
has brought more buildings, pavements, and roads, has considerably reduced the rainwater
absorption in the city, which is moved out of the city by storm drains (Jamal, 2019).

To date, the local water agency has been unable to regulate groundwater
abstraction. Formal rules (Punjab Water Act-2019) prohibit groundwater draft for domestic
purposes without permission from the local water agency. However, to implement this rule,
the state must provide sufficient access to municipal piped water first. Hence, the water
agency in Faisalabad does not enforce its rules when groundwater is extracted for domestic

14

The Indus River Basin covers 16 million hectares of land.
The estimation based on average per capita water consumption (137 liters), growth rate, and a total population of 3.2
million would increase the water demand up to 2.4 million gallons per day in the immediate next year.
15
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purposes because it has not been able to fulfill the water needs of all the households
(Ahmad et al., 2017). In contrast, there is no confusion regarding commercial and industrial
groundwater extraction for which permits must be sought under the "Water Supply
Faisalabad Regulations–2015” (Clause 17-b). Despite, in practice, these rules, especially
monitoring and sanctioning, exist only on paper (Respondent-D, 2021). The most likely
reason governments fail to protect groundwater is the very nature of the resource (aquifer)
itself: it is not feasible for the state to monitor hundreds of thousands of motorized pumps
in individual households. The weak capacity of the state to reconcile conflicting interests
and garner the political support necessary for the better groundwater management is
another plausible reason (Bruns, 2021). In addition, CPR privatization in the context of
groundwater is difficult to implement because aquifers are usually too large for the
hundreds of thousands of people who depend upon them to develop pragmatic property
rights (Bruggink, 1992). When extracted for domestic purposes, groundwater converts to
an open access resource, and because of the shared nature of the aquifer, this leads to
unsustainable exploitation of groundwater. Hence, attention must be paid to the alternative
that contends that CPRs can be governed as a common property, where communities come
together and cooperate in devising informal groundwater management institutions
(Ostrom, 1965 and 1990).

The study of formal institutions in Faisalabad shows that there are strong
possibilities for community-led informal groundwater management in Faisalabad. To
explain, the “Punjab Water Act-2019” enacted by the parliament of Punjab and policies
like “Punjab Drinking Water Policy–2011” and “Punjab Urban Water & Sanitation Policy–
2007”, issued by the Housing and Urban Development & Public Health Department, an
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executive branch of the Punjab government, advised local governments to involve water
users and civil society in the groundwater decision-making processes. In addition, the water
agency established the Citizen Liaison Cell (CLC) in 2013 and permits local communities
to self-organize and work with the government to protect water resources. If the local
community or a group decides to organize itself, it must first register with the government
according to the “Societies Registration Act XXI-1860” (The Urban Unit, 2010). However,
it is pertinent to note that the CLC has been non-functional since its inception. It has failed
to launch a single program or help develop any self-governing community-based
organization for the protection of groundwater (WASA-F, 2020).

Looking through the lens of Ostrom’s (1990) design principles, it can be said that
groundwater appropriators do have minimal rights to create their own institutions in
Faisalabad. The state does not challenge self-governing institutions directly, but there is a
legal grey area, as it is not clear if the community-based organizations can work alone
without the state’s consent. To explicate matters, the presence of the Citizen Liaison Cell
(CLC) reveals the state’s tacit acceptance of informal methods of governance to achieve
better performance outcomes. This implicit recognition of nested governance, where
management activities are organized in multiple layers, shows that self-governing
groundwater management institutions can vertically link themselves to the water agency.
Moreover, a higher level of social capital is crucial for garnering cooperation among the
stakeholders (see section 3.3 for details). In Faisalabad, biraderi-based 16 trust networks
are an example of bonding social capital. The higher the level of communication and

16

The word biraderi refers to caste, clan, religion, tribe, or sect.
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contact between the members of the biraderi, the higher the level of trust, which reduces
obstacles to cooperation (Gazdar, 2009; Malik, 2017, p.245). In addition, the ability of
biraderies to engage with external formal organizations, like the water agency, to get
exclusive access to water resources (Anwar, 2019) is an example of linking social capital
in society. However, there is a lack of bridging social capital because different biraderies
are not cooperating but competing with one another for the scarce water resources
(Respondent-D, 2021).

In developing countries like Pakistan, capacity of the state is limited and in
consequence many rules of law problems emerge (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Malik,
2017). In such places, adopting self-governing CPR management institutions is even more
significant. There is an abundance of evidence that confirms that self-governing institutions
perform more efficiently at smaller scales (E. Ostrom, 2012; Ross & Martinez-Santos,
2010; Taher, 2016). Unfortunately, the scale of the resource (aquifer) underneath
Faisalabad is large. When the extent of the CPR crosses many socio-cultural, political,
institutional, and geographical borders, it becomes harder to scale up the self-regulation
efforts (Guerrero et al., 2015; Janssen, 2015). In Faisalabad, due to the large population
belonging to different castes, ethnicities, religions, and income groups, heterogeneity is
high. Thus, it is extremely hard for any self-governing institution to work independently
and be able to improve the condition of the CPR in the city. Wyborn (2015) argued that the
best solution out of this quandary is to adopt a polycentric governance system that will help
establish cross-scale linkages between a large number of community-led groups. By a
polycentric system, I mean multiple autonomous decision-making nodes (Ostrom et al.,
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1961), which can make large-scale collective action problems more manageable by
adjusting institutional solutions to local needs and circumstances (Ostrom, 1999).

3.5 Methodology
In the previous section, I have argued that formal water governance institutions give
groundwater users minimal freedom to develop their own institutions. There is also a
recognition of the fact that community-led institutions can play an important role in the
improvement of the groundwater governance. In addition, the presence of bonding and
linking social capital in the society expands the possibility of developing successful selfgoverning institutions. Setting aside the non-functionality and lackluster performance of
the water agency, I am interested in exploring if people are willing to make use of minimal
formal autonomy and limited social capital17 to cooperate on matters concerning
groundwater depletion. Hence, this study makes two hypotheses: first, groundwater users
in Faisalabad will not cooperate to regulate their groundwater extraction. Second, lack of
social capital, patience, risk-taking behavior, and egalitarianism influence groundwater
users’ level of cooperation.

3.5.1 Experimental Game
To explore the first hypothesis, I employed a one-shot common pool resource game
designed and adopted by Goldbach (2017) and Rand & Kraft-Todd (2014). According to
Harrison & List's (2004, p.1014) classification of controlled experiments, it is an
artefactual field experiment in which participants are chosen from the actual location of the
study, who perform an abstract CPR task (Harrison & List, 2004). The goal of this study is

17

Social capital is limited because bridging social capital is absent in the city
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to explore respondents’ willingness to cooperate with other community members regarding
the reduction in CPR abstraction. In the following paragraph, I have explained how this
game was conducted.

(1) The instructions and rules of the game were relayed to players orally in Punjabi
or Urdu. They could also choose to read them on their computer screens in English. Before
the game, I informed the players that they can earn up to 40 PKR ($0.25). The exact amount
of money they could earn depended on their own decisions and the decisions of others
participating in the game. (2) The players were asked to extract from a resource held in
common with three other members (a total of 4 people in one group) of their community.
The three members were actually the last three participants of the CPR game. None of the
players knew the identities of the others. Furthermore, to make the decision-making task
clear and facilitate greater comprehension, the game was framed as a groundwater
extraction scenario. In the game, each player was asked to imagine that the groundwater
reservoir underneath their community/neighborhood contains 40 gallons of water. They
can extract up to 10 gallons of water or choose to leave all of it behind in the aquifer. The
players got only one opportunity to extract the groundwater. The other three members of
the group were given the same decision choice. (3) I explained the payoff function to the
players. The private earning from the groundwater extracted by an individual generated 2
PKR for every one gallon extracted. The groundwater not withdrawn from the aquifer
yielded a group earning of 4 PKR for every one gallon left in the ground, which was equally
shared among the group members. I used real incentives in this game to recreate a kind of
‘commons dilemma’ that people face in real life, where their earnings or benefits do not
depend on their decision alone. (4) I asked the players two comprehension questions. The
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purpose of these questions was to make sure that respondents have understood that their
earnings are composed of both private and group gains. If the player’s answers were not
right, I attempted to clarify the confusion and describe why their answer is incorrect. (5)
Regardless of whether the player answered the control questions correctly or not, they were
asked to decide what amount of water they wanted to abstract from the aquifer. (6) Once
the player decided on the amount of groundwater they wanted to extract; I estimated the
total amount they have earned. The payment was made in cash immediately after the game.
The players were also informed about the decisions that other group members have made
(see Appendix-IV for CPR experiment).

3.5.2 Eliciting Trust and Individual Preferences
To investigate the second hypothesis, after the CPR game, I directly asked players
a few questions about their beliefs and attitudes. With this information in hand, I can avoid
making subjective interpretations as to why some respondents in the game cooperated
while others chose not to, as advised by Durlauf (2002). First, to measure the level of social
(generalized) trust, I asked the following questions: (1) “Generally speaking, would you
say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out
for themselves?". This question (and its iterations) has been used by the General Social
Survey in the United States and the World Values Survey as an indicator of cognitive social
trust at an individual level. The respondents answered it on a stated three-point Likert scale:
helpful, neither, and selfish. (2) “Do you think corruption exists in the water agency?” This
question about corruption has a strong impact on social trust (Rothstein, 2005) and was
answered on a three-point Likert scale as well: no, do not know, and yes.
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I am also interested in examining what impact individual preferences, like riskaversion, patience, and egalitarianism, have on the respondent’s level of cooperation and
on their groundwater extraction level in the game. To elicit information on risk and time
preferences, I asked players to respond to the following statements on a five-point Likert
scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, including a neutral option: “In
general, I am willing to take risks” and “I am a patient person” (same as Goldbach, 2017).
Lastly, to obtain evidence of egalitarianism, I asked players, “Would you consider living
in a community where your water supply service is the same for everyone?”. The
respondent can answer yes or no (see, for example, Koop et al., 2021).

3.6 Data Collection
The CPR game was played with 204 residents from February 2021 to July 2021.
Only the household heads were interviewed since they are mainly responsible for
groundwater use decision-making in their homes. According to the water agency, 60
percent of the households are located in the public water supply service areas, and 40
percent are located in unserved areas (WASA-F, 2020). Therefore, to give equal
representation of the households, I performed 120 experiments in service areas and 84
experiments in unserved areas. To make the sample further representative of the
population, I used a two-stage cluster sampling technique to reach households belonging
to different income groups and locales within the service and non-service areas. In the first
stage, I developed a total of 20 clusters all over the city (13 in service and 7 in unserved
areas). There were 6-12 respondents in each cluster; the exact number depended upon the
positive rate of response to the survey invitation in the cluster (see Table 3.1). This
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recruitment strategy was used in the study “Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of
Iraq: cluster sample survey” by Roberts et al. (2004). In the second stage, I chose
households for interviews. The first household in each cluster was selected randomly.
Then, every sixth house from the last house that participated in the game was invited to
take part in the experiment. To elucidate, after the first interview, the location of the first
household acted as a starting point to select other households in the cluster. This
recruitment methodology was adopted by DiJulio et al. (2018) in their study “Views and
Experiences of Puerto Ricans One Year After Hurricane Maria.” Finally, to represent all
income groups in the sample, clusters were formed in the city’s poor, middle-, and richincome areas. While creating each cluster, I ensured that at least one neighborhood (or
mohalla in local vernacular) of different incomes lies on its boundaries. The goal of this
meticulous sampling strategy was to collect data across all key variables significant to
address the hypotheses and thus compensate for the relatively small sample size.

Furthermore, due to the Covid-19 epidemic, I conducted the experiments online via
video conferencing software (Skype). The survey starts with socio-demographic questions,
followed by questions about egalitarianism, corruption, trust, risk-aversion, and patience.
The CPR game was played at the end of the interview. To ensure a smooth interview and
game experience, an online survey hosting platform (Survey Monkey) was employed to
digitally display questions and instructions on a computer screen in front of the respondent.
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Table 3.1: Neighborhoods in which clusters were developed

Service Areas

Non-Service Areas

Awami Colony, Nasir Colony, CM Colony, Essa Nagar,
Muhammad Pura, New Green Town, Kaleem Shaheed
Colony, Gobindpura, 7-Chak J.B., Christian Town,
Gosia-Abad, Sarfaraz Colony and Dawood Nagar-A

Khayaban, Shirian-wala, Rabbani Colony, ShamsaAbad, Dawood Nagar-B, Kuriwala, and Khalid Garden

3.7 Model Development and Results
The whole interview including the CPR game, took on average 30 minutes to
complete. Each respondent earned around 181 PKR (=1.3 USD18) in cash for participating
in the interview and the experiment. The amount of this payout is a little more than the
poor household’s hourly family income in Faisalabad. To further explore and perform
statistical analysis on the dataset, I used the popular software called Stata (version 16). A
first look at the socio-demographic characteristics shows that all household heads, except
one, are male. In terms of age, 53.72 percent of the respondents were born in 1975 or before
and 46.28 percent were born from 1976 to 2001. Moreover, 19.58 percent of households
are poor, 42.86 percent belonged to the lower-middle class, 16.40 percent belonged to the
upper-middle class, and 21.16 percent belonged to high-income families. The majority of
the respondents, 71.43 percent, have an education up to secondary school (10th grade) or
less. The average family size of the respondents is 6.68 people.

The descriptive statistics of the data pertaining to the game and ancillary survey are
presented in Table 3.2. The factors lacking trust, corruption, risk-taking, patience, and
egalitarianism are dummy variables. Family size and groundwater extraction are

18

Conversion rate 1 USD=159.5 PKR on July 18, 2021.
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continuous variables. The first glance at the mean values shows that 70 percent of the
players think that in general people only look out for themselves (are selfish), and 70
percent perceive the water agency as a corrupt institution. Moreover, only 4 percent of
respondents strongly agree that they love taking risks, and 35 percent perceive themselves
as patient people. Lastly, nearly all respondents, 98 percent, believe in high egalitarianism
and that everyone in the community should have equal access to water resources. The
average groundwater extraction in the CPR game was 7.23±.166 gallons (out of 10 gallons)
signifying that players only marginally limited their level of extraction. 36.27 percent of
the players extracted 10 gallons of water, implying non-cooperative behavior. The second
largest group, 30.57 percent, chose to extract 5 gallons signaling better cooperation among
group members in the game (see Figure 3.1).

Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable

Value Range

Mean

Std. Dev

Lacking Trust

[0, 1]

0.70

0.46

Corruption

[0, 1]

0.70

0.46

Risk Taking

[0, 1]

0.04

0.20

Patience

[0, 1]

0.35

0.48

Egalitarianism

[0, 1]

0.98

0.12

Family Size

[2, 16]

6.68

2.76

Groundwater Extraction

[3, 10]

7.23

2.28
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Figure 3.1: The distribution of groundwater extraction in the CPR game

3.7.1 Regression Results
To further examine the groundwater extraction behavior and underlying factors that
influence it, three Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models were built (Table 3.3).
In these models, groundwater extraction is the dependent variable which refers to the
amount of water extracted during the CPR game. The explanatory variables, lacking
trust and corruption, are the measures of social capital. Moreover, the variables risktaking, patience, and egalitarianism are the measures of individual beliefs. These factors
are known to affect the environmental behavior of people and their level of cooperation in
social dilemmas (see Koop et al., 2021). I have also added family size as the control
variable to know if it impacts the resident’s groundwater extraction decision-making in the
simulated action arena. Additionally, groundwater extraction and family size are natural
log-transformed to measure how responsive a variable is to a change in other variables.
Finally, even though 204 responses were collected, only 189 fully complete observations
were added to the model.
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Total three models were created. In the model-1, variables related to social capital,
individual preferences, and family size, except risk-taking, are included. The value of the
adjusted-R2, 0.303, shows that overall, the model has a moderate fit. The signs of all the
variables were expected; lacking trust, corruption, and family size have positive signs,
while patience and egalitarianism have negative signs. The coefficients, lacking trust,
egalitarianism, and family size, are significant at a 1 percent level. On the other hand,
corruption and patience are significant at a 5 percent level. To further elaborate, going
from trust (lacking trust=0) to mistrust (lacking trust=1) leads to an 11.7 percent increase
in the groundwater extraction, going from the perception that water agency is not corrupt
(corruption=0) to corrupt (corruption=1) leads to a 10.6 percent rise in the groundwater
extraction, and 1 percent increase in the number of family members leads to 0.403 percent
rise in the groundwater draft. Similarly, going from impatience (patience=0) to patience
(patience=1) leads to a 9.9 percent decrease in groundwater abstraction and going from the
people saying they believe that everyone in their community should not have equal access
to water services (egalitarianism=0) to equal access (egalitarianism=1) leads to a 45 percent
decrease in groundwater draft.

In model-2, all the variables regarding social capital and individual preferences are
included. The control variable family size was not a part of this model. The value of the
adjusted-R2, 0.085, shows that overall, the model has a poor fit. The signs of all the
variables were expected; lacking trust, corruption, and risk-taking have positive signs,
while patience and egalitarianism have negative signs. The coefficients, lacking trust
and patience, are not significant in this model. The variable, corruption, is significant at a
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1 percent level, while risk-taking and egalitarianism are significant at a 5 percent level. In
addition, going from the perception that water agency is not corrupt (corruption=0) to
corrupt (corruption=1) leads to a 13.2 percent rise in the groundwater extraction, going
from an unwillingness to take risks (risk taking=0) to willingness (risk taking=1) leads to
a 24.2 percent increase in groundwater abstraction, and going from the people saying they
believe that everyone in their community should not have equal access to water services
(egalitarianism=0) to equal access (egalitarianism=1) leads to a 41.5 percent decrease in
groundwater draft.

In model-3, all the variables related to social capital, individual preferences, and
family size were included. The value of the adjusted-R2, 0.303, shows that overall, the
model has a moderate fit. The signs of all the coefficients were expected; lacking trust,
corruption, risk-taking, and family size have positive signs, while patience and
egalitarianism have negative signs. The coefficients, lacking trust, corruption, and
patience, are significant at a 5 percent level. On the other hand, egalitarianism and family
size are significant at a 1 percent level. To further illustrate, going from trust (lacking
trust=0) to mistrust (lacking trust=1) leads to an 11.3 percent increase in the groundwater
extraction, going from the perception that water agency is not corrupt (corruption=0) to
corrupt (corruption=1) leads to a 10.6 percent rise in the groundwater draft, and 1 percent
increase in the number of family members leads to a 0.394 percent rise in the groundwater
abstraction. Moreover, going from impatience (patience=0) to patience (patience=1) leads
to a 9.9 percent decrease in groundwater extraction, and going from the people saying they
believe that everyone in their community should not have equal access to the water services
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(egalitarianism=0) to equal access (egalitarianism=1) leads to 45.5 percent decrease in
groundwater draft.

Table 3.3: OLS Regression Results, natural log groundwater extraction is a dependent variable

Variables

Model-1

Model-2

Model-3

N

189

189

189

F-Value

17.35***

4.52***

14.63***

Adj R2

0.303

0.085

0.303

Lacking Trust

0.117*** (0.043)

0.078 (0.050)

0.113** (0.044)

Corruption

0.106** (0.044)

0.132*** (0.020)

0.106** (0.044)

-0.099** (0.042)

-0.075 (0.048)

-0.099** (0.042)

0.242** (0.113)

0.100 (0.100)

-0.415** (0.183)

-0.455***(0.159)

Patience
Risk-Taking
Egalitarianism

-0.450*** (0.159)

ln(Family Size)

0.403*** (0.507)

Constant

0.394*** (0.052)

1.514*** (0.185)

2.205*** (0.188)

1.535*** (0.186)

Notes: *p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; standard errors in parenthesis; Adj =adjusted

3.8 Discussion
I have made two hypotheses in this paper: first, groundwater users in Faisalabad
will not cooperate to regulate their groundwater extraction; second, social capital, patience,
risk-taking behavior, and egalitarianism impact groundwater users’ cooperation level, and,
in turn, affect the intensity of groundwater extraction. The results of the CPR game reject
the first hypothesis since players moderately cooperated with other members of their group
in the simulated CPR dilemma. The mean value of the groundwater extracted in the game
was 7.23+.166 out of 10 gallons, implying that some people cooperate and reduce their
groundwater draft. On the other hand, regression analysis (Table 3.3) supports the second
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hypothesis,

as social

capital (trust

and

corruption), patience, family

size,

and egalitarianism (except risk-taking) are statistically significant predictors of
groundwater extraction. These results align with the conclusions drawn by previous studies
(see, e.g., Gehrig et al., 2019; Goldbach, 2017; Koop et al., 2021).
The predictions based on the regression results of model-3 are presented in Figure
3.2. The scale measuring the level of groundwater extraction is laid out along the Y-axis,
and regression coefficients are shown along the X-axis. The variables 'OE' depicts observed
mean groundwater extraction, and 'PE' is the predicted mean groundwater extraction in the
game. The results according to the graph show that predicted groundwater extraction in the
CPR experiment is slightly less than the observed overall groundwater extraction during
the game. Moving on, looking at the mean prediction scores of the independent variables,
where 'T' is equal to the presence of trust and 'NT' represents the lack of trust; 'C' shows
the presence of the perception that corruption exists in the water agency and 'NC' water
agency is not corrupt; 'R' illustrates the scenario when the respondent is willing to take
risks and 'NR' when they are risk aversion; 'P' depicts the high level of patience in the
respondents and 'NP' the impatient behavior; 'E' represents the presence of egalitarianism
among the players and 'NE' the absence of egalitarianism. Here again, the values confirm
the regression results that high trust, less corruption, risk-aversion, patient behavior, and
egalitarianism lead to lower groundwater extraction.
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Figure 3.2: Predicted means of the dependent and independent variables of the regression model

All the variables used in the regression models except for the dependent variable,
groundwater extraction, and independent variables, family size, and egalitarianism are
measured on a Likert scale. To see how robust the regression analysis results are, I ran the
same three models presented in Table 3.3 with the true scale of the coefficients in which
the variables are measured initially. The results validate the findings of model-1, model-2,
and model-3. Similarly, the distribution of the groundwater extraction (see Figure 3.1)
shows that people overwhelmingly select either 5 gallons or 10 gallons. Maybe people
thought if they extract 5 gallons, then it is cooperation and more than that, it is equal to
defection. Hence, I generated a new dependent variable, in which extraction 5 gallons and
less is coded as ‘0’ and extraction more than 5 gallons are coded as ‘1’. Moreover, the
continuous variable family size is mean-centered, so the regression coefficient can be
interpreted as the deviation from the average family size rather than presenting a weird
explanation for the value zero (0). Thenceforth, I ran another (logit) model using updated
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dependent variable (score 0 & 1), mean-centered family size, and other variables in their
true Likert scale. The results of the logit model are the same as OLS regression except for
the variable trust, which is not significant anymore. Hence, model-3 is the best model
overall compared to the logit model.
A deeper look at the results of the experiment reveals that 36.8 percent of the
respondents extracted 5 gallons or less of groundwater. In other words, they have
demonstrated a moderate to high level of cooperation with their fellow group members. In
contrast, the high level of extraction (>5 to 10 gallons) by 63.2 percent of the respondents
must be seen in the light of the fact that one-shot games consist of only one round and
communication among the players was not allowed. Other research has shown that when
people are allowed to communicate in a multi-round game, cooperation among them rises
(Balliet, 2010; van Soest, 2013). The impact of communication is especially relevant for
conditional cooperators who need more information to make their decisions (Janssen et al.,
2014). As per the experiment conducted by Fischbacher et al. (2001), many (50 percent)
people are actually conditional cooperators. Hence, bridging social capital and social trust,
in general, can help people communicate beyond the borders of biraderies, income, or
religious affiliation to improve cooperation on matters such as groundwater protection.

3.9 Policy Recommendations
The primary policy recommendations for the success of informal community-led
groundwater governance in Faisalabad are:
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Big Bang
Improvement in the water agency’s quality of governance is the critical first step to
ensure that community-led initiatives are welcomed and allowed to function along with the
formal groundwater governance apparatus, especially in big urban areas where millions of
people live in close proximity. Moreover, the water agency is the state’s de jure most
powerful administrative arm in matters concerning water supply and groundwater in
Faisalabad. However, 70 percent of the population in the city perceive that water agency
is highly corrupt. Corrupt organizations are unpredictable and may do more harm to selfgoverning efforts than help. However, it is difficult to deal with corruption directly or
incrementally. It is particularly true when corruption is endemic and cannot be corrected
with a political push or a technical fix because these measures are not strong enough to
convince a substantial number of actors to move away from corrupt practices (Diamond,
2007). Rothstein (2011), based on historical evidence, presented an indirect Big Bang
approach as a viable alternative to tackle corruption. It calls for a quick, radical change in
institutions to resolve quality of government issues. Therefore, following the Big Bang
approach, I propose jettisoning the existing municipal water agency and supplanting it with
a new water governance institution. This action might seem drastic, but it has been
successfully tried in several places globally. For example, the municipal water supply
system of Phnom Penh, Cambodia, a country where corruption was rampant, used the Big
Bang approach to improve its water supply service (Araral, 2008). The National Highways
& Motorways Police (NH&MP) in Pakistan, which was created to replace corrupt,
incompetent, and occasionally violent highway police forces (Abbas, 2011), is an example
of the Big Bang approach. According to public surveys, today, the NH&MP is considered
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the most trustworthy and upright among all Pakistan’s civilian law enforcement agencies
(Arain & Arain, 2016).
The regression analysis points out that an increase in the perception that corruption
exists in the water agency leads to higher groundwater extraction. The Big Bang approach,
when successfully applied, can create corruption-free impartial governance that helps
institutional and social trust among the members of a society (Rothstein, 2005; Rothstein
& Teorell, 2008). Again, according to the regression results, higher trust means less
groundwater draft and more cooperation. Furthermore, the corruption-free impartial
government would also ensure that all of its rules, including those that allow people to selforganize, or rules that protect the rights of the appropriators to devise their own institutions,
are applied fairly.

State-Reinforced Self-Governance
For the long-term sustainable use of the groundwater, grassroots efforts to sustain
and protect the aquifer are necessary. Community-led interventions are crucial because it
is impossible for the government to monitor the discharge from hundreds of thousands of
groundwater extraction pumps. In addition, due to the shared nature of the aquifer, it is
difficult to stop anyone from accessing and pumping it. These characteristics of the CPR
allow people to consume it and get away without contributing anything towards its
replenishment. The state cannot coerce people and kick-start self-governance at the
community level. Self-organization must be voluntary to produce enduring institutions,
which are accepted and followed by all the consumers. The ‘state-reinforced selfgovernance (SRSG)’ is an innovative common pool resource management policy used to
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manage irrigation commons in Japan. According to this institutional arrangement, the
government can work with common pool resource users to reinforce their self-organizing
initiatives to avert the tragedy of the commons and yet remain strategic, cooperative, and
non-participatory. It lets the CPR institutions flourish voluntarily at the grassroots (Sarker,
2013).

On the other hand, top-down initiatives crowd out local norms, such as social trust,
because external incentives compromise individual intrinsic motivation to genuinely
engage with other people, and thus over time, people may act less cooperatively (Bowles,
2008). Notwithstanding, in a community-led groundwater governance repeated
interactions among the resource users will increase trust, cooperation, and compliance
within the group (Rothstein, 2005). That’s the reason, SRSG dictates that state using
financial, legal, political, and technological means creates a favorable environment for the
people where self-governance flourishes (Sarker, 2013). In Faisalabad, biraderies which
are negatively impacting piped water supply system and freshwater aquifer at the municipal
level can be used to make a positive impact on the water resources as well. Biraderies are
the bases of informal governance units, that have weakened the water agency’s
enforcement capacity. The government can employ these informal trust networks to
provide updated information regarding the groundwater level and the rate of consumption
including the consequences of increasing groundwater withdrawal to the biraderi heads.
They can disseminate this information among all the members of the biraderi. In addition,
state can remove the legal grey area, are informal organizations are allowed to work
independent of the state or not by enacting a new law or amending the existing “Water
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Supply Faisalabad Regulations-2015”. Finally, the state can also provide cheap rainwater
harvesting technology to the people and train them how to use it, again using the biraderi
based trust-networks. Thus, when the SRSG is applied together with the Big Bang, a robust
governance framework emerges which can improve the water agency’s quality of
governance and in turn, create a suitable environment for the self-governance of the
groundwater to deal with the CPR dilemma.

3.10 Conclusions
In this study, I played a common pool resource game with the residents of
Faisalabad to explore their willingness to cooperate in the CPR dilemma. The empirical
analysis showed that people moderately cooperate as they extracted 7.23±.166 out of 10
gallons allocated to them in the game. Moreover, lack of trust, corruption in the water
agency, impatience, and reduction in egalitarianism negatively impact the cooperation
level and, in turn, increase the rate of groundwater extraction. However, this study is not
without limitations; for instance, one-shot artefactual field experiments are not dynamic,
so they are not a good representation of human cognition in games (Brozyna, 2019). The
experimental games are played in particular socio-economic and institutional contexts;
hence one must be diligent before generalizing the results to other locations. A dynamic
framed field experiment must be employed to further investigate self-governance and
cooperation issues related to groundwater management in Faisalabad. The framed field
experiments usually consist of multiple rounds; they provide opportunities to introduce
different interventions, such as allowing subjects to communicate with each other,
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changing the group size, or instituting sanctions to gather more realistic data and
corroborate the conclusions of this study.
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CHAPTER 4: CO-PRODUCTION AND IMPARTIALITY
IN THE URBAN PIPED WATER SUPPLY GOVERNANCE
4.1 Introduction
Today, 58 percent of the world's population have piped water connections in their
dwellings (WHO/UNICEF, 2015). In the Global South, 42 percent of urban households
and 63 percent in South Asian cities have direct access to piped water networks (Beard &
Mitlin, 2021). However, access to the piped water connections does not always mean that
households actually get water. For instance, in Karachi, Pakistan, 28 percent of the
households have piped water connections, but they receive water for only three days a
week, two hours a day (Mitlin et al., 2019). To fulfill their unmet water demand, urban
dwellers seek alternatives; usually, they settle for groundwater (Foster et al., 2010) and, to
a lesser extent, tanker water (Mitlin et al., 2019). The seminal report published by the
United Nations in 2003, ‘Water for People, Water for Life’ argued that the water crises and
other related uncertainties that the world is facing today are actually crises of governance
(WWAP, 2003). The key challenges, such as high rate of corruption, weak administrative
capacity, lack of finance, and absent or inadequate infrastructure, afflicting the water
supply systems in the developing cities are all governance problems (Bakker et al., 2008;
Plummer, 2008; WWAP, 2012). It is often difficult to tackle these problems directly with
technocratic solutions, like building more infrastructure or seeking external funds for the
continuous operations and management of the water supply systems (Kenny, 2004). These
91

measures offer only temporary respite because the water governance institutions
in developing countries usually struggle to exploit local resources or implement stipulated
laws and policies; and therefore, they regurgitate the same problems after a short while
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; B. Rothstein, 2011). The real and more robust solutions lie
in reforming existing institutions or creating new ones, which is a governance issue or a
collective problem (Ostrom, 1990). Institutions are the instrument through which the
formation and execution of the governance19 occur (Kooiman, 2003). Institutions refers to
formal and informal rules, norms, and shared strategies (Ostrom, 2005). Hence, to ensure
that majority of the residents in the urban Global South have access to the piped water
connections and supply of an adequate amount of water, focus on institutions underlying
various problems is critical.
It is pertinent to note that, water is a common pool resource if it is extracted from
the aquifer or accessed through the piped water supply system. Unlike water, the water
supply infrastructure is a public good as it is: a) non-rival: the use of pipelines by one
person does not reduce the availability of others, b) non-exclusionary: as utilities are legally
bound to serve everyone (Flint, 2011). The ownership of the infrastructure can be open
access if not managed, but usually, it is owned by the public, private entities, or may be
held in common by the community (Bakker, 2007). Another important factor responsible
for devising and enforcing operational rules to optimize the productivity of the resource
and efficacy of the infrastructure, is the governance (Jiménez et al., 2020). Typically, in
developing countries, government authorities provide piped water to residents. The

The term governance can be defined as “the sum total of the institutions and processes by which society orders and
conducts its collective or common affairs (Institute of Governance Studies, 2009, p.1), which takes place both inside and
outside of formal institutions at multiple levels and scales (Ostrom, 2005, p.215)”.
19
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infrastructure is publicly-owned and managed by state officials, and it operates in a strict
top-down bureaucratic manner. In addition, there are few examples of private companies
(Kohl, 2004) and community-based water cooperatives providing water to the public
(Zaidi, 2016). Overall, these traditional governance paradigms have failed to provide goods
and services to urban residents (e.g., Ashir, 2019; Bakker, 2008; Kjellén, 2000).

For the last few decades, the focus on two governance approaches has been steadily
building, 1) Co-Production, according to which consumers of goods and services can play
an active role in producing and delivering them (Ostrom, 1996). The public participation
in the production activities is an effective way to incorporate community values in
decision-making, reduce conflict, and improve the accountability of the public officials
(Bovaird, 2007). 2) Quality of Government (QoG) as Impartiality seeks to apply rules
indicating that public officials must treat everyone equally. Impartial governance reduces
corruption, improves bureaucratic quality, and generates social capital among participants
and the general public (Rothstein 2011). These governance mechanisms have been also
gaining popularity in developing cities (e.g., Holmberg & Rothstein, 2011; Moretto et al.,
2018) and, even when applied separately, they can improve governance. Although, for
optimal results, impartiality and co-production must be employed together (see section
4.2.2 for details).

To further explore the institutional dynamics of urban piped water supply systems
in the Global South context and discuss the innovative water governance models, I am
using Faisalabad, Pakistan, as a case study. It is located in the central region of the Punjab
province of Pakistan (Javed & Qureshi, 2019). It is the third biggest city in the nation, with
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a population of about 3.2 million. The total number of households is 506,870, and the
average family size is 6.45 people (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Only 140,000, or
26 percent of households in the city, have piped water connections (JICA, 2019b, p.B518). The infrastructure network covers only 60 percent of the urban area (WASA-F, 2015).
Securing a water connection or establishing access to the network does not mean that
households will have water access 24-hours a day. The official records show that the water
agency supplies water intermittently for only four hours a day (Respondent-W2, 2020).
Approximately 72.6 percent of the households have installed private in-situ motorized
pumps on their premises to extract groundwater and compensate for the lack of municipal
water (JICA, 2019b, p.B5-13). Thus, improvement in the water agency’s quality of service
is not only beneficial for the residents but also crucial to relieve pressure off the aquifer.

Impartial governance and co-production are critical institutional arrangements to
revamp piped water supply systems. Nonetheless, the question remains ‘do the people in
Faisalabad desire a governance approach that is comprised of impartiality and/or coproduction?. To explore residents' choice for the piped water governance mode, including
the influence of key factors such as corruption, social capital, and perception of waterrelated insecurities on their decision-making, a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE)
consisting of both ownership (municipal, private, and cooperative) and governance
approaches (impartiality and co-production) was developed. The data was collected from
204 household heads, who were randomly selected from the case study area. Then, I used
the conditional logit model to estimate the discrete choice model. The empirical analysis
showed that across all the alternatives, respondents compared to the existing water
governance mode (municipal ownership without impartiality and co-production) prefer a
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state-owned piped water supply system with both impartiality and elements of coproduction. On the other hand, respondents are least likely to prefer privately-owned piped
water supply systems absent of impartiality and co-production.

I have structured this paper in the following way: at the outset, I laid out different
water governance models with detailed discussion on ownership and governance. Then I
presented a comprehensive analysis on the piped water governance situation in Faisalabad.
Further, I explained the process of the DCE preparation and data collection. Penultimately,
I introduced the conditional logit model and the discussion of the regression results. Lastly,
I put forth a couple of policy proposals and a brief conclusion with future research
directions.

4.2 Theoretical Background
There are four types of goods: public, private, club, and common pool (McGinnis,
2011). When accessed through the piped water network, water is a common pool resource
(rival and non-excludable). On the other hand, water supply infrastructure is a public good
(non-rival and non-excludable) in which the water flows and is delivered to households20.
Similar to the types of goods, property rights/ownership are also of four kinds: private,
common, public, and open-access (McGinnis, 2011). Although water infrastructure is a
public good, it is not a public property automatically. In practice, the infrastructure can be
public, private, or commonly held by the users. When it comes to the governance of piped

20

A good or service is a public good whose benefits are accrued to all agents whether or not they contribute
to its provision, and the use by one agent does not reduce the benefits for other agents (van Soest, 2013).
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water supply, ownership of the public good (i.e., piped water supply network and ancillary
infrastructure) is more important as it is the conduit of the water. Whoever owns and
manages the piped water infrastructure has a disproportionately larger impact on the
decision-making about how operational and collective choice rules will be created and
enforced. In contrast, the nature of the good, water being a CPR, possibly has a limited
effect on the performance of the piped water service.

4.2.1 Ownership of the Water Supply System
The distinctive features of the municipal/public, private, and community-owned
piped water supply systems are briefly discussed below:
Public
The state, as a guardian of the public interest, provides piped water in most of the
cities of the world, especially in the Global South (Beard & Mitlin, 2021; Kopaskie, 2016;
Van Doorn et al., 2020). The state normally takes this responsibility because building
centralized networks of water pumping, filtration, storage, treatment, and delivery is a
highly capital-intensive endeavor. The private sector and other lending organizations are
typically unwilling to invest huge sums of money for a long-lived highly durable
infrastructure that does not yield substantial profits (Hanemann, 2006).
Community/Cooperative
In some non-service urban and peri-urban areas, residents instead of waiting on the
state or the private sector to provide piped water, build their own infrastructure (Arvonen
et al., 2017). The most practiced and known form of a commonly owned water supply
system is the water cooperative (Juuti & Katko, 2005). In cooperatives, people voluntarily
get together to meet their “common economic, social and cultural needs through a jointly
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owned and democratically controlled enterprise” (MacPherson, 1995, p.3). There are only
a handful of community-led schemes that, at a small scale, have been able to provide cheap
and clean water to the people, for instance, in Orangi Town, Karachi (Zaidi, 2016), and
small urban communities in northwest Cameroon (Tantoh et al., 2019).
Private
The rapid urban growth and lack of funds led the local governments in many cities
of the developing world, to experiment with private water utilities, starting in the early
1990s (Araral, 2008; Franceys, 2003). The proponents of privately owned piped water
systems argued that a private utility functions better than a state-controlled utility in a
competitive market (Bishop & Kay, 1989). In addition, a private company can invest in
large infrastructure projects, easily extend the coverage of the water supply network,
augment staff productivity, and lower the cost of water production (De Albuquerque and
Winkler, 2010). However, private companies struggled to achieve profitability in the
developing cities and consequently left those places over time (Beard & Mitlin, 2021).
Thus, today, the majority of the private piped water systems are present in developed
countries like Manchester, UK, and Seville, Spain (Dore et al., 2004).

4.2.2 Governance
Although there are exceptions, publicly owned water utilities are often operated by
the state itself. The private water supply systems are managed by one or more private
companies, while cooperatives are run by local communities. In state-led water supply
systems, public officials set goals, deliver water, and enforce agreed-upon rules (Newig
and Fritsch, 2009, p.200). They might use technocratic solutions, such as building more
infrastructure, to increase the amount of water produced or opt for other management
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approaches to govern the water supply system (Bakker, 2010). In terms of performance,
state-owned and governed piped water systems in developing countries have largely failed
to provide quality water service to the public (e.g., Biswas et al., 2017; Shirley & Ménard,
2002). The key factors that have negatively affected the public water utilities are low tariffs,
overstaffing, rent-seeking, bribery, lack of or unequal enforcement of laws, and extremely
low tariffs of piped water (Bakker, 2010). In contrast, market mechanisms are a regulatory
framework of privately owned and operated systems. The proponents of the private sector
involvement expected greater efficiency, cost recovery, and better customer service at a
higher price than the public systems (Cross & Morel, 2005). However, just like the public,
privatization of water supply systems in developing countries has received only the
modicum of success (Kjellén, 2006). The failure is due to the fact that private companies
focus more on optimizing corporate profitability and are often reluctant to invest in muchneeded infrastructure (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Similarly, privatization was unsuccessful
in Jakarta, Indonesia, and Cochabamba, Bolivia, because of widespread corruption and
disregard for socio-political realities (Kohl, 2004; Bakker, 2010). The failure of state and
market-driven models has triggered the emergence of community-based water supply
systems, i.e., water cooperatives (McDonald & Ruiters, 2012, p. 201). The cooperatives
are expected to be more responsive to people’s needs and serve the community’s interests
(Day, 2009; Bakker, 2010). However, the evidence shows that water cooperatives in
developing countries often fail due to high tariffs and poor quality of the water supply.
Additionally, poor financial and operational management are other causal factors
underlying the ineffective water cooperatives (Bakker, 2008).
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The performance reviews of the water supply utilities in Asia, the United States,
and Europe indicate that ownership, though important, does not predict the efficiency of
water supply systems (e.g., Bakker, 2008; Bayliss, 2003; Braadbaart, 2002; Prasad, 2006;
Renzetti & Dupont, 2004). Institutions related to the governance have a greater impact on
the utility’s quality of service (Martin, 2004). Notwithstanding, in developing countries,
regulatory institutions exist mainly on paper, rules and policies are often ignored,
subverted, or applied on an ad hoc basis; a situation that is conducive to sow confusion and
mistrust in the governing authorities among the general public (Acemoglu & Robinson,
2012; Kessides, 2005, p.86). The above discussion indicates that when governance
apparatus fails to follow the agreed-upon formal or informal operational rules, when it is
rife with corruption and administrative inefficiencies, ownership does not to matter much.
To investigate the significance of institutions in the governance processes, I have discussed
the concepts of Quality of Government as Impartiality and Co-production in the next
following paragraphs.

Impartiality
The idea of Quality of Government (QoG) as Impartiality views impartiality as the
most important and all-encompassing principle for the quality of governance21. It implies
that public officials while performing their duties, "shall not take into consideration
anything about a citizen/case which is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law"
(Rothstein & Teorell, 2008, p.170). Geoffrey Cupit frames it like this, "to act impartially
is to be unmoved by certain sorts of considerations–such as special relationships and

The government does not strictly mean ‘state’ but governance by any entity regardless of the ownership
type.
21
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personal preferences" (Cupit, 2000, p.16). Thus, when public officials apply monitoring,
conflict resolution, collective decision-making, or other stipulated laws equally on
everyone, impartiality increases, and so does the quality of government. However, it must
be kept in mind that treating everyone equally does not mean everybody must get the same
service or good because "only people in need of a kidney transplant should get one." In
other words, people will be treated based on the severity and merit of their needs (Rothstein
2011, p.16).
Corruption, such as free-riding, deception, and other forms of untrustworthy
behavior, is a threat to the effectiveness and fairness of institutions (Rothstein & Varraich,
2017). Transparency International's 'Global Corruption Report-2008' contended that
corruption is the most prevalent governance problem faced by the water sectors of the
developing countries today. According to Oscar Kurer (2005, p.230), corruption "involves
a holder of public office violating the impartiality principle to achieve [a] private gain." In
other words, corruption occurs when public officials are not impartial in exercising their
duties, which ultimately causes an institution to falter (Rothstein, 2011). Corruption
pervades all aspects of water management (Jenkins, 2017), but remains the least confronted
issue (Davis, 2004). Moreover, corruption is not limited to rent-seeking, bribery, or state
capture. Other examples of corruption include tweaking water provision and pricing in
favor of inﬂuential supporters, diverting money from public budgets into their own pockets
(Transparency International, 2008), or applying laws arbitrarily or unfairly (UN-Water,
2009).
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Consequently, when public officials exercising their authority are partial or corrupt,
people will rationally stop trusting them. They will logically infer that most people in a
society are also involved in corrupt practices to obtain essential services (Rothstein 2005,
p.121-122). It is a situation where rationally minded people, even if they want to play fair,
cannot stop participating in corrupt practices because everyone else is expected to be
playing dirty (Schiemann, 2000). The lack of trust eventually leads people into a social
trap/social dilemma (Rothstein, 2005), in which crude individual rationality might very
well turn into a collective irrationality, such as free-riding public goods (Lichbach, 1997).
In the water sector, the non-payment of bills is akin to free-riding, as connection holders
have access to the public good (water infrastructure) without contributing to its provision
(Jensena & Chindarkarb, 2017). As a result, most water utilities in the Global South cities
are in a financially unstable condition. The lack of funds further degrades the quality of
government because it diminishes their ability to provide or resume providing efficient
water supply service to the people (Transparency International, 2008).

Few studies have analyzed the idea of Quality of Government in the water sector.
For example, Povitkina & Bolkvadze (2019) explored the relative importance of impartial
institutions and democracy in the provision of water service. The authors found that more
democracy benefits only when the quality of government is high. Democracy alone, in the
absence of quality institutions, can be more harmful because political arenas cannot make
long-term goals, commitments, and plans. They are very good at setting the agenda of the
public good and bringing it onto the political platforms, but it is the administrative
institutions that shape and implement policies. Similarly, Parag & Roberts (2009)
investigated the link between public water supply institutions and rise in the bottled water
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use in the world using the idea of Quality of Government. They found that increasing flight
from the tap water is partly due to the growing distrust of the state to protect the health of
its citizens. Additionally, the bottled water firms contribute to creating this distrust and
weakening of public policy responses.
Moreover, impartiality principles can help water utilities trapped in social
dilemmas to reform themselves and get out of the social trap. For instance, Phnom Penh,
Cambodia, is well endowed with freshwater, but until the early 1990s, the local water
supply system known as the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA) was in terrible
condition. The coverage of the piped water supply network and bill collection rate was 50
percent. The staff was unmotivated, and 80 percent of them worked less than two hours a
day (Biswas & Tortajada, 2010). Only 12 percent of connections had meters, and 72
percent of the water was either stolen or leaked into the ground. In addition, public officials
were involved in all sorts of corruption (bribes, rent-seeking, state capture, and political
particularism), thus eliminating public trust from the PPWSA. People were unwilling to
pay bills, thus the water utility started looking for external funds (though not always
successfully) to maintain the status quo (Araral, 2008). However, in a decade, the PPWSA
managed to make a massive turnaround. It was able to reduce corruption using measures
such as meritocratic recruitment policy, internal checks, and balances reinforced by the
norms of integrity set by its top management and responsive customer service. Moreover,
supportive actions by the political leaders had a significant psychological effect on the
general public in the city. Politicians, rather than avoiding payments, started to pay their
water bills publicly. This gesture enhanced the credibility of the PPWSA in the eyes of the
public (Tortajada & Biswas, 2019). The water agency officials started to follow and enforce
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agreed-upon laws impartially, as a result, corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies started
to decrease. With time, uncertainty diminished, and trust between the consumers and the
PPWSA increased. Today, nearly 100 percent of the connection holders pay their bills, and
92 percent of Phnom Penh’s population has access to piped water (Craig & Kielburger,
2020).

Co-Production
The idea and the term co-production originally came from Elinor Ostrom and her
colleagues in the 1970s (Ostrom, 1996). This concept refers to an institutional arrangement
where producers of goods (and services) and the consumers work together in the
development and/or delivery of these goods. Individuals and groups who produce for
exchange in society are regular producers, while individuals or groups of consumers who
act outside of regular production roles and contribute to the production of a good are
consumer producers. For instance, when consumers feel that their opportunity costs are
low and wish to supply the service with their own input, they become consumer producers.
On the other hand, consumers who think that their opportunity costs exceed the wages of
the regular producers, prefer to have their services supplied by regular producers (Parks et
al., 1981). The collaboration between the producers and consumers can take different
forms: 1) co-planning, a process that involves strategically identifying and prioritizing
much needed public services, 2) co-design, activities that incorporate inputs from users in
operational decision-making, 3) co-delivery, a joint eﬀort among state actors and users at
the point of delivery of services, 4) co-assessment, processes of monitoring and evaluation
(Nabatchi et al., 2017). Furthermore, co-production has the potential to make public
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services more transparent, accountable, and responsive to the needs of the clients
(McMullin, 2019). It can cut production and delivery costs, and improve monitoring and
sanctioning operations using communities as assets (Adams et al., 2019; Ostrom, 1996).
McGinnis (1999, p.366) adds that when producers and citizens work together in diverse
sets of open, nested arenas, productivity increases, and all forms of opportunistic behavior
are more likely to exposed.

There are several examples of water utilities in the world that have successfully
adopted co-production as a water governance strategy. For instance, in the Malawian cities
of Lilongwe and Blantyre, community-based water user associations partnered with the
city administration to improve the domestic water supply system. The collaboration
stabilized tariffs, enhanced transparency in the operations, and ensured accountability of
the officials (Adams & Zulu, 2015). In the same way, the government of Iran launched an
integrated participatory crop management program (IPCM) in 2009 to conserve depleting
resources of freshwater in the country. This program aims to bring together a plurality of
the knowledge types, research capacities of local farming communities, scientific and
bureaucratic institutions to facilitate the adoption of eco-friendly and economically sound
adaptation strategies. The progress so far revealed that the application of co-produced
knowledge has significantly increased water productivity and helped identify key
opportunities for building resilience under water-scarce conditions (Zarei et al., 2020).
Moreover, in Bandung, Indonesia, households, communities, and private actors
collaborated to expand the water supply network to unserved areas and ensure equitable
access. The findings suggest that institutionalized co-production arrangements led to an
improved access to affordable water supply (Nastiti et al., 2017).
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Combining Impartiality and Co-Production
The best possible governance framework emerges when co-production and
impartiality are employed together. The institutional trust that impartial institutions
generate is essential for consumers to collaborate with the producers. It is because impartial
institutions are accessible, transparent, accountable, and most of all, less corrupt. Impartial
governance mechanisms are also clear and enforced on everyone equally. Therefore,
impartial institutions are also crucial to reap the benefits of co-production (e.g., better
monitoring and sanctioning). There are numerous cases where co-production as a
governance strategy failed to realize its goals (Adams & Zulu, 2015; Rusca et al., 2015).
In almost all these examples’ institutions producing the resource, or managing the
consumer and producer relationships, were not impartial. For example, co-production
rather than abolishing the existing power structures reproduced them (Steen et al., 2018).
Thus, impartiality can also act as a critical check against the negative impacts of coproduction. Furthermore, when the collaboration between stakeholders increases,
communication among them helps develop horizontal relationships, and social trust
(Putnam, 1993). The higher the level of trust among the partners, the bigger the possibility
of all forms of opportunistic behavior, like corruption, of getting exposed (McGinnis, 1999,
p.366), which will enhance the quality of government (or impartiality). Therefore, coproduction and impartiality complement and reinforce each other. The combination of coproduction and impartiality provides a robust and cohesive governance framework, an
optimal way to get out of social dilemmas like non-payment of bills and corruption.

4.2.3 Situation in Faisalabad
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The total domestic and non-domestic water demand in Faisalabad is 170 million
gallons per day. In contrast, the designed capacity of the water agency is only 110 million
gallons per day (Respondent-W1, 2021). In addition, the water agency is operating at 64
percent of its production capacity, further reducing the production of piped water from 110
million gallons per day to 70.4 million gallons per day (JICA, 2019a, p.A8-3). This
reduction is mainly caused by the deteriorated water uptake capacity of the pumping
stations at Chenab well field (43 percent reduction), Jhang Branch Canal (28 percent
reduction), Rakh Branch Canal (88 percent reduction), and water treatment plants (56.5
percent reduction). The water agency is unable to maintain crumbling infrastructure and
cuts in the hours of operations to avoid exorbitant electricity charges (JICA, 2019b, p.B37). Furthermore, the total amount of water produced by the water agency does not reach
the consumers; 40 percent of it leaks through pipes or is stolen via illegal connections.
Therefore, the actual amount of water in the water supply network is only 42 million
gallons per day (or 25 percent of the demand), of which 37.8 million gallons are supplied
to households and 4.2 percent to non-domestic users. Thus, the total water shortage is 128
million gallons per day (JICA, 2019b, p. A8-3). Moreover, there is no way to know how
much water connection holders are consuming because water connections are not metered
in the city (WASA-F, 2017).

In 2013 the water agency developed the Citizen Liaison Cell (CLC) under the
guidance of the “Punjab Urban Water and Sanitation Policy-2007” and “Punjab Drinking
Water Policy-2011”. The goal was to establish community-based organizations (CBOs) to
amplify and include the voice of the citizens in the service delivery and enforcement
activities of the water agency. In addition, it aims to employ the ‘component sharing model’
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as a development strategy, in which potential water users financially contribute to building
new infrastructure to expand the water supply infrastructure to the un-served areas
(WASA-F, 2020). In the last seven years, only four CBOs have been established. The first
CBO was located in the Shahbaz Nagar neighborhood, where the government of Punjab,
the water agency, and the local community worked together to build an independent water
supply system using a component sharing model. The other three CBOs work to recover
unpaid utility bills (Respondent-W1, 2021). Overall, the CLC achieved a modicum of
success, as the CBO in Shahbaz Nagar achieved its objectives due to the World Bank
funding (Respondent-D, 2021), while the other CBOs struggle to recover unpaid bills
(JICA, 2019a, p. A7-19).
There are several reasons as to why the CLC has not been able to effectively
perform in Faisalabad. For instance, the comprehensive review of the Citizen Community
Boards (CCBs) established between 2001-2008 under the military rule via the ‘Local
Government Ordinance 2001’ shows that most citizens are economically and politically
dependent on powerful individuals (e.g., biraderi heads, politicians, etc.). They could not
imagine taking any public initiative on their own. In addition, many poor and middleincome residents stated that they do not have additional time and resources to do the ‘social
work’. They also believe that community groups led by a pooror less influential person
would not be successful. No one would join them since the leaders of these groups do not
have connections with the powerful and wealthy. Thus, in practice, all the CCBs end up in
the hands of powerful individuals who use these organizations to line their pockets with
government funds (Gazdar et al., 2013). In addition, academics and donor agencies at the
local level discourage community involvement in the municipal water provision and
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groundwater conservation activities stating, that it would rather harm marginalized
communities than help them (Respondent-W1, 2021; Respondent-A, 2020).

Furthermore, another big hurdle in the development of collaborative relationships
between local communities and public officials is a corrupt water governance. The water
agency has been captured by the informal governance authority, which consists of
biradari22 based trust-networks, politicians, and bureaucrats (Anwar, 2019). Thus, formal
rules that are supposed to guide the water agency’s operations are largely ignored,
selectively applied, or followed when expedient. According to Malik (2017), this
connection between informal trust networks and state officials is an example of type-III, or
unauthorized, collective choice units that “provide rules and determine who gets what when
and how, at times directly contradicting laws and formal rules” (Malik, 2017, p.65-66). .
These governance units are an example of a patronage system, in which patrons (e.g.,
politicians and bureaucrats) give clients (e.g., members of the biraderi) goods and services
in return for votes, employment, bribes, promotions, or unspecified support (Malik, 2017).
A patronage system is inherently corrupt because it does not give access to goods and
services based on need or merit but instead on connection with the powerful (Rothstein &
Varraich, 2017). In addition, politicians are known to protect neighborhoods where illegal
connections are commonplace and areas where consumers do not pay their utility bills
(JICA, 2019b; Respondent-D, 2021). The partiality of officials in their decision-making
and the decline in the quality of water service caused by the lack of funds leave people
unsatisfied with the organization (the water agency). According to Rothstein (2005), in

22

The term biraderi refers to caste, clan, religion, tribe, or sect.
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such situations, institutional trust, and in turn, social trust, falls in society. Individuals and
groups (e.g., biradaries) stop cooperating and start pursuing their self-interests. It is a
perfect environment for people to begin free-riding the good/service and stimulate a public
goods dilemma.

4.3 Data and Methodology
The existing piped water supply system in Faisalabad is owned and operated by the
municipal government. There are no private piped water supply systems, and only one
community-owned water system exists in the Shahbaz Nagar neighborhood. The water
agency has created CBOs to involve local communities in crucial operations, such as the
recovery of unpaid bills, and infrastructure expansion (co-production). On the governance
front, the water agency has been captured by the powerful informal governance units that
influence the day-to-day activities of the water agency in favor of well-connected and
wealthy; therefore, it is not impartial. Given this information, I have investigated the
residents’ water governance mode choice, which consists of the ownership and the
governance approaches for the piped water supply system in Faisalabad. In addition, I have
explored the impact of social capital, public perception of corruption in the water agency,
and the perception concerning piped water insecurities (i.e., scarcity and pollution) on their
governance mode choice.

4.3.1 Experimental Design
To elicit residents’ preferences regarding the ownership and governance of the
hypothetical piped water supply system, I used the Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE). It
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is a popular technique, particularly useful when the proposed good or service is multidimensional, and the trade-offs between the attributes that make up the good are of
particular interest (Hosking et al., 2014). In this study, only two attributes of governance
are part of the DCE: co-production and impartiality. In the survey protocol, I have labeled
them as community involvement and non-preferential treatment, respectively, so people
can understand these concepts more clearly. Each attribute has two distinguishable levels:
‘yes’ and ‘no’. The full factorial experiment design technique23 generates four choice tasks
(or alternatives), allowing for the estimation of main effects and interactions. Interviewees
were presented with a total of five alternatives, four are the choice tasks, and the fifth option
is ‘none’ for those who want to opt out of the DCE (see Table 4.1). In addition, to elicit
residents’ choice regarding the ownership of piped water supply system, participants were
asked to choose one of the following four options: municipal/state, membership
organization (cooperative), a private company, and none.
Table 4.1: Piped Water Supply mode choice Scenarios

Attributes
Non-Preferential Treatment
Community Involvement

Alternative-1

Alternative-2

Alternative-3

Alternative-4

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Alternative-5

None

Which alternative do you
prefer the most?
Which alternative do you
prefer the least?

Further, to collect information about social capital/social trust in the society, I asked
respondents the following three questions: 1) “Generally speaking, would you say that most

23

In statistics, a full factorial experiment design consists of two or more factors, each with discrete possible levels, and
whose experimental units or choice tasks take on all possible combinations of these levels across all the factors (Oimoen,
2019).
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people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?” 2) “Do you
think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they
try to be fair?” 3) “Generally speaking, would you say that most of the time people try to
be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?". These three questions
have been used by the General Social Survey in the United States and the World Values
Survey as an indicator of cognitive social trust at the individual level. Similarly, to measure
public perception regarding the corruption in the water agency, I asked the following
questions developed and used by Rothstein (2005): 1) “Do you think corruption exists in
the water agency?”, 2) “Do you think water users bribe WASA officials?”, 3) “Do WASA
officials ask for bribes?”. Finally, to gauge public perception about the piped water
insecurities, the following four questions were asked: 1) “How do you rate your experience
with piped water scarcity compared to an average person in your community/city?”, 2) “If
you think about the next 5 years, how likely is it that you will experience reduction in the
piped water availability?”, 3) “How do you rate your experience with polluted piped water
compared to an average person in your community/city?”, 4) “If you think about the next
5 years, how likely is it that you will experience polluted piped water?”. The respondents
answered all the questions on a stated three-point Likert scale (please see the questionnaire
attached as Appendix-V for more details).

4.3.2 Sampling Approach
To determine the sample size, term that refers to a group of subjects which are
selected from the general population and are considered a representative of the population
for a particular study, I used the equation provided by (Dilman et al., 2014, p.78).
Considering the available human and financial resources, at the 90 percent confidence
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interval and ± 6 percent sampling error at least 188 individuals must be surveyed to
maintain the precision of the statistical estimates and the power of the study to draw
conclusions (IWH, 2008). Furthermore, I chose to interview household heads who are
responsible for bill payments and decision-making related to the water usage in their
homes. To collect a representative dataset, I contacted households from diverse locations
and income groups in the metropolis. First, using a proportionate sampling approach, an
estimated sample (i.e., 188) was divided into two groups. This action ensures that an
adequate number of houses are selected from the service areas, which covers 60 percent of
the city, and the areas without service, which cover 40 percent of the city (WASA-F, 2020).
To identify service and non-service areas, I superimposed the municipal water agency's
water supply network map on the google image of Faisalabad. This process helped me
locate neighborhoods connected to the piped water network and those outside of it. So, I
performed 124 surveys in the service and 80 surveys in the non-service areas, 16 surveys
more than the 188 required. Next, I used a two-stage cluster sampling technique to further
diversify the population reached for the interviews. First, I created 20 clusters, 13 in service
and 7 in non-service areas (see Table 4.2). From each cluster 6-12 respondents were
selected; the exact number was determined by the local response rate to the interview
invitation. This recruitment strategy was used in the study, “Mortality before and after the
2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster sample survey” by Roberts et al. (2004). Second, the first
respondent in each cluster was chosen randomly. Then, to select second and subsequent
respondents, every sixth house from the last house that participated in the interview was
invited to take part in the survey to capture the variations in the responses. To elucidate,
after the first interview, the location of the first household acted as a starting point to select
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remaining households for interviews in each cluster. This recruitment technique is followed
in the study “Views and Experiences of Puerto Ricans One Year After Hurricane Maria”,
by DiJulio et al. (2018). To fully represent all income groups in the sample, clusters were
formed in poor, middle, and high-income areas of the city.

Table 4.2: List of service and non-service areas surveyed

Service Areas

Non-Service Areas

Awami Colony, Nasir Town, CM Colony, Essa
Nagar, Muhammad Pura, New Green Town,
Kaleem Shaheed Colony, Gobindpura, 7-Chak J.B.,
Christian Town, Gosia-Abad, Sarfaraz Colony and
Dawood Nagar-A

Khayaban, Shirian-wala, Rabbani Colony,
Shamsa-Abad, Dawood Nagar-B, Kuriwala, and
Khalid Garden

Furthermore, households were interviewed from February 2021 to July 2021. Due
to the restrictions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, I used online video conferencing
software and an online survey hosting platform to digitally display questions on the
respondent’s computer screen, making the interview experience smoother. All the
questions in the survey are structured. It starts with questions about socio-demographic
information, household water use, and household preference for the ownership of the piped
water provider. Then, the DCE was presented followed by questions about corruption,
social capital, and perception about the water-related insecurities. At the start of the choice
experiment, the meaning of the terms, ‘community-involvement’ and ‘non-preferential
treatment’ were explained with examples in local languages (Punjabi and Urdu).

4.4 Data
In total 204 responses were collected but 190 fully completed surveys were used
for the statistical analysis. The statistical software, Stata (version 16), was used for the
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socio-demographic, descriptive, and regression analysis. A first glance at the sociodemographic data shows that there are marked differences in the official and observed
values. According to the official data, 27.10 percent of the population is older, and 72.9
percent is younger than 45 years. But, in the sampled data, 53.44 percent and 46.56 percent
of the population are older and younger than 45 years, respectively. The older population
is over-, while the younger is under-represented in the data. Furthermore, 99.35 percent of
the respondents were male as, culturally, only males assume the role of household heads.
The average family size in the observed data is 6.75 persons which is slightly higher than
the official 6.45 persons. The values of the three categories of education (primary, school,
high school, and graduate school) are substantially different. The census data shows that
31.73 percent of the population have studied up to primary school, 5.91 percent high
school, and only 1.07 percent have graduate degrees. In contrast, the observed data shows
that 19.47 percent of the respondents have primary, 11.58 percent have high school, and
13.68 percent have graduate degrees. In terms of income, an extremely poor population is
not represented in the sample. In addition, the poor are 42 percent of the actual population
but only 19.47 percent of the respondents in the sample are poor. The rich who constitute
around 7 percent of the population are over-represented in the sample, 21.58 percent.
Table 4.3: Official and observed socio-demographic information
Variable

Official Values^ (%)

Observed Values (%)

≤1975

27.10

53.44

>1975

72.90

46.56

Male

51

99.35

Female

49

0.65

Family Size

6.45 persons

6.75 persons

19.16

18.42

Age

Gender

Education
No Education
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Primary School

31.73

19.47

Secondary School

38.59

33.16

High School

5.91

11.58

Undergraduate

3.23

3.68

Graduate

1.07

13.68

Extremely Poor

9

-

Poor

42

19.47

Middle

31

43.16

Upper Middle

11

15.79

Rich

7

21.58

Income

^ The source of this information is the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2017)

In the discrete choice experiment, respondents select an alternative they prefer the
most and an alternative they prefer the least. The descriptive statistics of the ownership and
governance factors (alternative-specific variables of both the most preferred and least
preferred options) are laid out in Table 4.4. In the case of the most preferred option, 60.5
percent of the respondents chose municipal, 24.7 percent private, and 14.7 percent selected
cooperative ownership for the piped water supply system. In the same way, 95.7 percent
of the respondents want impartiality (or non-preferential treatment), and 60 percent want
co-production (or community involvement) in the piped water governance. On the other
hand, in the case of the least preferred option, 31 percent of the respondents selected
municipal, 42.1 percent private, 26.8 percent cooperative ownership. In terms of
governance, 2.6 percent of respondents prefer impartiality and 6.3 percent community
involvement in piped water governance.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics (Alternative-Specific Variables)

Variables

Most Preferred

Mean

95% CI

Std.
Dev

Mean

95% CI

Std.
Dev

[0, 1]

0 .605

0.535, 0.675

0.490

0.310

0.244, 0.376

0.464

Private
Ownership

[0, 1]

0.247

0.185, 0.309

0.433

0.421

0.350, 0.492

0.495

Cooperative

Cooperative
Ownership

[0, 1]

0.147

0.096, 0.198

0.355

0.268

0.204, 0.332

0.444

Impartiality

Impartial
Governance

[0, 1]

0.957

0.929, 0.986

0.201

0.026

0.003, 0.049

0.160

CoProduction

Collaborative
Governance

[0, 1]

0.60

0.529, 0.670

0.491

0.063

0.028, 0.098

0.244

Label

Description

Municipal

Municipal
Ownership

Private

Value
Range

Least Preferred

Furthermore, descriptive statistics of the case-specific variables (corruption, social
capital, and piped water problems) are presented in Table 4.5. The three variables are
related to corruption, the mean values of these factors show that 70 percent of the
respondents believe that corruption exists in the water agency, 32.1 percent of the believe
that other water users pay bribes to the public officials, and 41.6 percent said that water
agency officials ask for bribes. Similarly, the three variables represent social capital. The
mean values illustrate that only 13.2 percent of participants think that other people can be
trusted, 21 percent believe that other people are fair, and 27 percent said that other people
try to be helpful. Moreover, four variables denote water-related problems. According to the
mean values, 44.2 percent and 75.7 percent of the respondents think that they experience
higher risks related to the reduced piped water supply and polluted piped water supply than
an average person in the community, respectively. In the same way, 22.6 percent and 46.3
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percent of the survey participants believe that in the next five years, they have a higher risk
of experiencing reduced piped water and polluted piped water.
Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics (Case-Specific variables)
Variable

Corruption

Social Capital

Piped Water
Problems

Value
Range

Mean

95% CI

Std. Dev

Corruption in the water agency.

[0, 1]

0.7

0.634, 0.765

0.459

Piped water users pay bribes.

[0, 1]

0.321

0.254, 0.388

0.468

Public officials ask for bribes.

[0, 1]

0.416

0.345, 0.486

0.493

Most people can be trusted.

[0, 1]

0.132

0.083, 0.180

0.338

Most people try to be fair.

[0, 1]

0.210

0.152, 0.269

0.408

Most people try to be helpful.

[0, 1]

0.273

0.209, 0.337

0.447

[0, 1]

0.442

0.370, 0.513

0.497

[0, 1]

0.226

0.166, 0.286

0.419

[0, 1]

0.757

0.696, 0.819

0.429

[0, 1]

0.463

0.392, 0.534

0.499

Description

Experience of reduced piped water supply compared
to an average person in the community.
In the next 5 years, the likely risk of experiencing
reduced piped water supply.
Experience of polluted piped water supply compared
to an average person in the community.
In the next 5 years, the likely risk of experiencing
polluted piped water supply.

To further examine the water governance mode choice behavior and influence of
factors such as corruption and social capital on the decision making, a Conditional Logit
(CL) model was estimated. The CL regression is a popular econometric model developed
by McFadden (1973) to interpret discrete choice data (Wang et al., 2020). The CL is an
appropriate method to use when the choice among alternatives is modeled as a function of
the attributes rather than the characteristics of the individual making a choice (Hoffman &
Duncan, 1988). To build the CL model, I have updated the DCE with three ownership
variables, municipal, private, and cooperative, in addition to the two governance factors,
impartiality, and co-production, already present in it. According to the full factorial
experimental design, there are 12 alternatives available to each individual.
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The analysis of the alternative selection patterns of the respondents are presented
in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. The ownership of alternatives 1-4 is municipal and labeled in
the conditional model as Alt-MIC, Alt-MIX, Alt-MXC, and Alt-MXX, respectively.
Similarly, ownership of alternatives 5-8 is cooperative and labeled in the conditional model
as, Alt-CIC, Alt-CIX, Alt-CXC, and Alt-CXX, respectively. Finally, the ownership of
alternatives 9-12 is private and labeled in the conditional model as, Alt-PIC, Alt-PIX, AltPXC, and Alt-PXX, respectively. The alternative selection pattern of the most preferred
option (Table 4.6) shows that respondents did not select alternatives 7, 8, 11, and 12.
Moreover, people overwhelmingly prefer state-owned water supply system, to a lesser
extent, privately owned, and least of all, the option of water cooperative. When it comes
governance, people mainly select options that offer impartiality and co-production. The
alternative selection pattern of the least preferred option (Table 4.7) shows that respondents
did not select alternatives 1, 5, 6, and 10. They overwhelmingly dislike privately owned
water supply system, to a lesser extent, municipal, and least of all, the option of water
cooperative. In addition, respondents most dislike alternatives that do not offer either or
both impartiality and co-production.

Table 4.6: Water Governance Alternatives Selection (Most-Preferred Option)

Governance/
Ownership

Municipal

Cooperative

Private

Alt

Freq

Label

Alt

Freq

Label

Alt

Freq

Label

Impartiality and
Co-Production

1

63

Alt-MIC

5

20

Alt-CIC

9

28

Alt-PIC

Impartiality

2

44

Alt-MIX

6

8

Alt-CIX

10

19

Alt-PIX

Co-Production

3

3

Alt-MXC

7

-

Alt-CXC

11

-

Alt-PXC
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None

4

5

Alt-MXX

8

-

Alt-CXX

12

-

Alt-PXX

Note: Alt=Number of the Alternative; Freq=Number of times alternatives are selected

Table 4.7: Water Governance Alternatives Selection (least-preferred option)

Governance/
Ownership

Municipal

Cooperative

Private

Alt

Freq

Label

Alt

Freq

Label

Alt

Freq

Label

Impartiality and
Co-Production

1

-

Alt-MIC

5

-

Alt-CIC

9

4

Alt-PIC

Impartiality

2

1

Alt-MIX

6

-

Alt-CIX

10

-

Alt-PIX

Co-Production

3

2

Alt-MXC

7

1

Alt-CXC

11

5

Alt-PXC

None

4

56

Alt-MXX

8

50

Alt-CXX

12

71

Alt-PXX

Note: Alt=Number of the Alternative; Freq=Number of times alternatives are selected

Additionally, I prepared two datasets, one to model the most preferred options and
the other to model the least preferred alternatives. The alternatives not selected by the
respondents are removed from the data (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7). As per full factorial
statistical experiment design principles, there were 1520 rows/cases in each dataset as there
were eight alternatives for every one of the 190 decision-makers. The structure of this
dataset is different from what is typically used in any other regression analysis. It is a matrix
where each row represents an alternative available to a decision-maker, and each column
represents attributes of the alternative. Additionally, I have created five dummy variables
to see if the factors, impartiality, co-production, municipal, cooperative, and private, are
selected or rejected by the respondents in each dataset. 24 The presence of the attribute is
coded as “1”, and absence is coded as “0”. Another dummy variable, choice, was created

A dummy variable is dichotomous, takes only two values, “0” or “1”. It represents the absence or
presence of categorical data, such as gender, political affiliation, etc.
24
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to depict the preference/selection of the decision-maker. It is a dependent variable whose
value is “1” when the respondent chooses a case/alternative and “0” for the rest of the
alternatives (see Appendix-VI). I have also created three composite variables, corruption,
social capital, and piped water problems, combining the scores of three corruption
variables (corruption in water agency, paying bribes, and asking for bribes), three social
capital variables (trust, fairness, helpfulness), and four piped water-related factors (reduced
piped water and polluted piped water) respectively. These composite variables or metrics
produce the joint effect of the indicators they are made of. Lastly, alternative-4 (Alt-MXX)
was taken as a base alternative in the regression analysis to depict the ownership and
governance of the current water supply system and compare the result with this alternative.
Afterward, using the statistical software Stata (version 16.0), four CL models were
estimated.

4.5 Regression Results
Model-1 and model-2 are based on the dataset representing the most preferred water
governance mode (Table 4.8). Model-1 is comprised of alternative specific variables only.
The results show that signs of the variables, private, impartiality, and co-production, are
positive and as excepted. However, the positive sign with municipal ownership was
unexpected as 70 percent of the respondents believe that the existing state-led piped water
governance system is corrupt. The ownership coefficients, municipal and private, are
significant at a 1 percent and 5 percent level, respectively, while the cooperative ownership
is omitted from the model to avoid multicollinearity. The coefficients related to
governance, impartiality, and co-production, are significant at a 1 percent level. Thus,
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succinctly, the results of model-1 show that people prefer a state-led water utility that
governs itself impartially and is willing to involve water users in the development and
delivery of piped water supply.

Model-2 consists of both alternative and case-specific variables. The signs of all
the alternative specific variables are positive and similar to model-1. The ownership
variables, municipal and private, are still significant at 1 percent and 5 percent levels,
respectively. The impartiality is significant at 1 percent, and co-production is now
significant at 10 percent level. The case-specific variable, social capital, is not significant
in any alternative. In the Alt-MIC, which combines public ownership with impartiality and
co-production, a sign of the case-specific variable, corruption, is unexpectedly positive and
significant at a 5 percent level. The coefficient piped water problems has a negative sign,
and it is statistically insignificant. The Alt-AMIX unites municipal ownership and
impartiality. The sign of corruption is unexpectedly positive and significant at a 5 percent
level, and piped water problems has a negative sign, and it is significant at a 10 percent
level. The Alt-MXC offers respondents municipal ownership with co-production. The
signs of coefficients, corruption and piped water problems, are the same as Alt-MIC and
Alt-AMIX. In addition, corruption is significant at a 1 percent level, and piped water
problems is insignificant. Moving on, Alt-CIC combines cooperative ownership with
impartiality and co-production. The sign of corruption is positive as expected and is
significant at a 1 percent level. The sign of piped water problems is negative and significant
at a 1 percent level. The Alt-CIX merges cooperative ownership with impartiality. The
sign of corruption is positive as expected and significant at a 1 percent level. The sign of
piped water problems is negative and insignificant. The Alt-PIC combines private
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ownership with impartiality and co-production. The Alt-PIX unites private ownership with
impartiality. In these alternatives, the sign of corruption is positive as expected and
statistically significant at a 1 percent level. The piped water problems are negative and
significant at 5 percent and 10 percent levels in Alt-PIC and Alt-PIX, respectively.

Table 4.8: Results of Conditional Logit Model (Most Preferred Alternative)

Variables

Model-2

Model-1

Alt-MIC

N

1520

1520

Cases

190

190

Wald Chi2(4)

93.96***

93.21***

Log likelihood

-333.919

-288.695

Municipal
Private
Impartiality
Co-production

Social Capital
Corruption
Piped Water
Problems

1.340***
(0.212)
0.518**
(0.238)
2.593***
(0.366)
0.405***
(0.148)

Alt-MIX

Alt-MXC

Alt-CIC

Alt-CIX

Alt-PIC

Alt-PIX

0.078
(0.820)
5.339***
(1.732)
-1.776
(1.170)

0.856
(1.625)
5.621***
(1.625)
-2.337**
(1.078)

-0.018
(0.762)
5.204***
(1.653)
-2.039*
(1.097)

1.792***
(0.315)
0.699**
(0.357)
5.647***
(1.464)
0.304*
(0.177)

0.439
0.617
-0.946
0.562
(0.677)
(0.683)
(1.380)
(0.728)
3.647**
3.715**
9.006***
5.449***
(1.567)
(1.567)
(3.345)
(1.659)
-1.459
-1.704*
-0.393
-3.761***
(0.995)
(1.010)
(1.439)
(1.207)
Notes: : * p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; **p≤0.01; standard errors in parenthesis

Model-3 and model-4 are based on the dataset representing the least preferred water
governance mode (Table 4.9). Model-3 is composed of alternative specific variables only.
The results show that the signs of the variables, municipal and private, are positive, while
the signs of impartiality and co-production are negative as excepted. The ownership
coefficients, municipal and private, are significant at 10 percent and 5 percent level
respectively. The governance coefficients, impartiality, and co-production are significant
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at a 1 percent level. Thus, overall, the results of model-3 show that people strongly dislike
private water utilities without impartiality and co-production. Model-4 has both alternative
and case-specific variables. The signs of all the alternatives specific variables are same as
model-3 except municipal ownership coefficient, municipal, is negative and insignificant.
The private is still positive and significant at a 5 percent level. The signs of governance
variables are negative as expected. The impartiality and co-production are significant at a
1 percent level.

In model-4, similar to model-2, social capital is not significant in any alternative.
In the Alt-MIX, that combines municipal ownership with impartiality. The sign of the
coefficient, corruption, is positive as expected but statistically insignificant. The sign of
the piped water problems is positive and significant at a 10 percent level. The Alt-MXC
unites municipal ownership and impartiality. In this alternative, none of the case-specific
variables is significant. The Alt-CXC offers respondents cooperative ownership with coproduction. The sign of the coefficient, corruption, is negative as expected and significant
at a 1 percent level, while the piped water problems is insignificant. In addition, the AltCXX is an option that proffer cooperatively owned piped water supply system without
impartiality or co-production. Similarly, the Alt-CXC sign of the variable, corruption, is
negative as expected and significant at a 1 percent level, and piped water problems is
insignificant. The Alt-PIC merges private ownership with impartiality and co-production.
The sign of corruption is negative as expected and significant at a 1 percent level, while
the sign of piped water problems is positive and significant at a 10 percent level. The AltPXC combines private ownership with co-production. The sign of corruption is negative
as expected but insignificant. The sign of the piped water problems is positive and
123

significant at a 1 percent level. The Alt-PXX offer private ownership without impartiality
or co-production. In this alternative, the sign of corruption is negative as expected and
statistically significant at a 1 percent level. The piped water problems is positive and
significant at a 5 percent level.
Table 4.9: Results of Conditional Model (Least Preferred Alternative)

Model-4
Variables

Model-3

Alt-MIX

N

1520

1520

Cases

190

190

Wald Chi2(4)
Log
likelihood

122.33***

125.00***

-267.301

-224.718

Municipal
Private
Impartiality
Coproduction
Social Capital
Corruption
Piped Water
Problems

0.065*
(0.194)
0.444**
(0.179)
-2.416***
(0.464)
-2.708***
(0.298)

AltMXC

Alt-CXC

Alt-CXX

Alt-PIC

Alt-PXC

Alt-PXX

-0.477
(0.743)
-6.526***
(1.657)
2.951*
(1.295)

0.325
(0.508)
-1.053
(0.943)
2.377***
(0.806)

-0.231
(0.228)
-2.328***
(0.483)
0.901**
(0.402)

-0.357
(0.265)
0.364**
(0.192)
-3.864***
(1.294)
-3.302***
(0.488)

-0.609
0.540
-0.381
0.058
(1.164)
(0.682)
(0.853)
(0.229)
0.214
-0.322
-2.892***
-2.142***
(1.949)
(1.487)
(1.025)
(0.496)
2.197*
0.679
-0.227
0.995
(1.320)
(1.346)
(1.413)
(0.420)
Notes: : * p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; **p≤0.01; standard errors in parenthesis

Furthermore, the DCE presented to the respondents comprises governance
variables, impartiality, and co-production (see Table 4.1). Models 1, 2, 3 & 4 are based on
the artificial construct, based not only on governance but ownership variables as well.
Hence, to check the robustness of the results presented in the conditional models (Tables
4.5 & 4.6), I estimated two more conditional models that consist of governance variables
only. The model-5 represents the most preferred option, and model-6 represents the least
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preferred option (Table 4.7). The results show that the main effects of the
variable impartiality are the same as models 1 (positive and significant at 1 percent level)
and 3 (negative and significant at 1 percent level). However, the main effects (negative and
insignificant) of the variable co-production are different from model-1 (positive and
significant at 1 percent level) but the same as model-3 (negative and significant at 1 percent
level). The interaction effects between impartiality and co-production are also explored
(Table 4.7). In model-5, the interaction between impartiality and co-production is positive
and not significant. In model-6, the interactions between them are positive and significant
at a 1 percent level.
Table 4.10: Conditional Regression Results (Governance Variables only)

Variables

Model-5

Model-6

N

760

760

Cases

190

190

Wald Chi2(4)

81.76***

166.31***

Log likelihood

-161.031

-61.618
2.681***
(0.462)
-0.510
(0.730)
0.911
(0.745)

Impartiality
Co-production
Impartiality x Co-production

-3.789***
(0.505)
-3.566***
(0.453)
3.566***
(0.840)

Notes: : * p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; **p≤0.01; standard errors in parenthesis

4.6 Discussion
This study aims to explore residents’ piped water governance mode choice in
Faisalabad, Pakistan. Preferences of the public were elicited using a discrete choice
experiment, and four conditional logit models were estimated. The results of model-1 show
that respondents prefer impartial state-owned piped water system, whose institutional
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arrangements allow for collaboration (co-production) with water users in the governance
processes. To a lesser extent, people prefer private ownership with both impartiality and
co-production. In model-2, in addition to the alternative, case-specific coefficients were
added. The results of this model show that preference for the impartial municipally-owned
piped water system is still strong, while the choice of the co-production got statistically
weaker. The influence of case-specific variables on the selection of individual alternatives
reveals that Alt-MIC is selected by people who believe the water agency is corrupt.
Likewise, respondents who prefer Alt-MIX do not perceive a high risk of experiencing
piped water problems and think the water agency is corrupt. Furthermore, Alt-MXC and
Alt-CIX are selected by those who think that the water agency is corrupt. In the same way,
those who choose Alt-CIC, Alt-PIC, and Alt-PIX do not think there is a high risk of
experiencing piped water problems and believe that corruption exists in the water agency.

The results of model-3 show that respondents least prefer the alternatives which are
privately-owned, not impartial, and do not allow for collaboration with water users. To a
lesser extent, people least prefer municipal ownership without impartiality and coproduction. In model-4, alternative and case-specific coefficients were added. The results
of this model show that a dislike for the privately-owned piped water system, which is not
operating impartiality and involving the local community in the decision-making, is still
the same. In addition, municipal ownership got statistically insignificant. Moreover, dislike
for Alt-MIX and Alt-PXC by those who believe that there is a high risk of experiencing
piped water problems. Those who reject Alt-CXC and Alt-CXX do not think corruption
exists in the water agency. Lastly, people who least prefer Alt-PIC and Alt-PXX do not
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believe the water agency is corrupt but perceive a high risk of experiencing piped water
problems.

The choice of impartiality and co-production across all the alternatives in model-1
and model-2, and the dislike of options that do not have impartiality and co-production in
model-3 and model-4 show that the residents of Faisalabad prefer to have these two
institutional arrangements in their piped water supply system. The combination of
impartiality and co-production is the best possible public utility governance option (see
section 4.2.2). Regarding the ownership, piped water system in models 1 & 2, people
strongly prefer the municipal ownership over the private. In models 3 & 4, respondents
reject private ownership, while the municipal ownership is either disliked or statistically
insignificant. Overall, the residents chose the municipal piped water system over the
privately owned systems. These results show that public preferences in Faisalabad match
with the findings of previous studies, which maintained that governance institutions have
a greater impact on the utility’s quality of service (Martin, 2004) than the ownership
(Braadbaart, 2002; Prasad, 2006).
Additionally, insignificance of the co-production in the most-preferred option
(model-5) shows that impartiality has the strongest effect when people select their most
preferred alternative. In contrast, the interaction effects among them shows are not
preferred together. On the other hand, in the least preferred option (model-6), respondents
dislike alternatives without impartiality and co-production, but the interaction between
them is unexpectedly positive. It means people tend to dislike the alternative in which both
impartiality and co-production are present together but at the same time dislike the
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alternatives in which impartiality and co-production are absent individually. In sum,
looking over all the models, people prefer alternatives with impartiality more strongly than
the co-production. Simultaneously, people dislike alternatives in which both impartiality
and co-production are present together. Or, in other words, they would like to have one of
them as the piped water governance mode.
When it comes to social capital, its insignificance in all the alternatives is surprising
and requires some explanation. Rothstein & Stolle (2003, p.7) defined social capital as
"access to beneficial social networks and having generalized trust in other people." There
are three types of social capital: bonding, linking, and bridging. Bonding social capital
describes the trust and connections within a specific group, e.g., among the members of the
biraderies. On the other hand, linking social capital discusses the ability of groups to
engage with external agencies, elected officials, etc. As representatives of biraderies,
leaders have informal connections with the water agency, although these connections are
not equal for all the groups. Finally, bridging social capital explains the links to other
groups and individuals. The social capital metric used in this study is the measure of
bridging social capital. To get out of a social dilemma, the presence of all three types of
social capital is essential (Pretty, 2003). The importance of bridging and linking social
capital is relatively high as they enable people to access information and resources outside
of their social networks (Ostrom, 2000). The descriptive statistics show that (bridging)
social capital is low, but it did not impact the respondent's water governance mode choice.
This finding can be further explored in future studies. Moreover, it makes sense for the
people to select alternatives that combines cooperative and private ownerships when
corruption in the public water supply system is high. However, the results pertaining to the
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alternatives with municipal ownership in model-2 are particularly interesting. Despite
having the perception that the existing public water agency is corrupt, residents chose
alternatives with municipal ownership. Thus, further analysis on the issue of corruption is
also warranted.

4.7 Policy Recommendations
The DCE reveals that respondents have a strong preference for impartiality,
municipal ownership and to lesser extent co-production (compare models 1 & 5). However,
the current municipal piped water supply system in Faisalabad is not impartial.
Additionally, efforts to promote collaboration between water users and the water agency
(co-production) were mainly unsuccessful. Nonetheless, people still would like to have a
public piped water supply system with impartiality or community involvement. In the
following paragraphs, I laid out two policy proposals to metrialize these public preferences.

Big Bang
To introduce impartiality in the water agency’s operations, which has been captured
by the informal governance units, I recommend adopting an indirect “Big Bang” approach.
It calls for a quick, radical change in institutions to resolve the issues of quality of
governance. This approach is especially beneficial when it is difficult to dealwith
challenges such as corruption is difficult. To explain, when in a society corruption is
endemic, tackling it with a political push or a technical fix is not enough to convince a
substantial number of actors to move away from corrupt practices (Diamond, 2007).
Following the Big Bang approach, I recommend scrapping the water agency and replacing
it with new water governance institutions built on impartiality principles (e.g., robust
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accountability mechanism). This action might seem drastic, but it has been successfully
tried in several places globally. For example, the municipal water supply system of Phnom
Penh, Cambodia, a country where corruption was rampant, used the Big Bang approach to
improve its water supply service (Araral, 2008). The creation of the National Highways &
Motorways Police (NH&MP) in Pakistan is another example of successful implementation
of Big Bang approach to replace corrupt, incompetent, and occasionally violent highway
police forces (Abbas, 2011). According to public surveys, today, the NH&MP is
considered the most trustworthy and upright among all the civilian law enforcement
agencies in Pakistan (Arain & Arain, 2016). The impartial governance creates institutional
and social trust, which are crucial for initiating successful co-production efforts.

Citizen Liaison Cell
Once the new state-led impartial water supply system is in place, introduce the
agreed-upon institutional arrangements that support co-production like the creation of
Citizen Liaison Cell (CLC). The office of the CLC will encourage community involvement
in activities such as monitoring, delivery, tariff setting, bill collection, etc. Citizens’
participation in the public service provision will increase institutional and social trust,
which are essential for successful collective action. Moreover, since co-production is
challenging to adopt independently because problems such as power imbalances or a large,
diverse population can become a hindrance, it requires support from strong impartial
institutions to ameliorate the negative impacts of these obstacles (Popovici et al., 2020).
Impartial governance using its rule-making and financial powers can, to a large extent, help
overcome these barriers (e.g., power imbalances).
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4.8 Conclusions
The piped water supply system in Faisalabad is in shambles, and people are not
satisfied with its performance. Water users do not pay their bills and steal piped water,
leaving the water agency without funds to improve its operations. Such a situation (freeriding on the public good) has contributed to the creation of a public goods dilemma. This
paper explored households' preferences regarding new water governance mode to revamp
the water agency using a discrete choice experiment. The results of the conditional logit
models show that, across all the alternatives, people prefer to have a state-owned impartial
piped water supply system. Moreover, to a lesser extent people also prefer to get involved
in the production and delivery processes. In addition, respondents do not prefer, in fact
dislike when impartiality and co-production are combined. Hence, they do not select an
institutional framework that is potentially more effective to help them get out of social
dilemmas. One of the limitations of this research is the corruption metric, which is
comprised of three factors, a) perception of corruption in the water agency, b) bribes paid
by people, c) bribes asked by public officials. The measure of corruption is very limited
as it does not include other forms of corruption prevalent in the water agency, like
patronage and state capture. Thus, the issue of corruption must be further explored to
validate the results of this study.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I explored urban groundwater governance from the institutional
perspective. The unique contribution of this study is that groundwater is investigated
alongside piped water supply system. In Global South, municipal piped water agencies do
not provide adequate water to the citizens. In turn, people usually end up using
groundwater. Due to the weakness or absence of formal and informal institutions to govern
the groundwater withdrawal, people usually over-exploiting the aquifer. It is too simplistic
to propose solutions for groundwater management in isolation, especially when there is a
strong connection between these two major water sources in developing cities. Moreover,
improvement in piped water supply must be an essential part of the groundwater
management plan because more piped water for the public means less pressure on the
aquifer. Therefore, the ultimate goal of this research was to understand the dynamics
between groundwater and piped water and provide both relevant and pragmatic policy
recommendations to manage groundwater.

5.1 Summary of the Findings
In chapter 2, factors affecting groundwater and piped water supply were thoroughly
examined. The results showed that many factors negatively impact the piped water supply,
such as (partial) capture of the water agency by the informal governance units, aid
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dependency, and corruption. In addition, the water agency has fallen into a negative
feedback loop, lack of funds and informal governance units reinforce each other, causing
further damage to the water agency. The deterioration in the quality of piped water supply
means more pressure on the groundwater. Similarly, factors negatively affecting the
groundwater withdrawal are the absence of informal groundwater governance rules,
weakness of formal rules, groundwater draft for domestic purposes is open access. The
common factor between piped water supply and groundwater is the weak water agency,
responsible for piped water provision and regulating groundwater in the city. Hence, efforts
to protect groundwater go hand in hand with improving the piped water supply
system/water agency.

In chapter 3, the possibility of developing bottom-up informal groundwater
governance institutions was explored. It is challenging to manage the common pool
resource using exclusively using state regulations or privatizing the resource. Local
communities must come together and self-organize for the long-term sustainability of the
resource. Hence, to assess would people cooperate in Faisalabad, a one-shot common pool
resource game was played with the household heads. The results showed that people do
moderately cooperate to manage groundwater. Moreover, factors like trust, corruption in
the water agency, patience, and egalitarianism impact the respondent's decision-making.

In chapter 4, I focused on how to improve piped water supply system. I laid out
that theoretically, the combination of Impartial governance and co-production is a robust
institutional arrangement to reform a public utility. I asked for the residents' preferences
regarding the piped water governance mode using DCE. The results showed that people
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overwhelmingly prefer state-owned impartial piped water supply system. or state-owned
system with opportunities for co-production of piped water. Overall, the conclusion across
all the papers is that it is impossible to ensure sustainable groundwater withdrawal without
reforming the water agency. As water agency supplies piped water and enact operational
rules concerning groundwater. The impartial water agency will make sure groundwater
regulations are fairly enforced and help create a conducive environment for the informal
self-governance of the groundwater at the community level.

5.2 Limitations
•

A small sample of interviews in the chapter 2, and CPR and DCE experiments in
the chapters 3 and 4.

•

The focus of analysis in the chapters 3 and 4 is on domestic groundwater and
domestic piped water users.

•

The groundwater scarcity is occurring due to increasing pollution of the aquifer.
The analysis in the chapter 1, did not include this aspect of the problem.

5.3 Future Research Directions
This research work can be extended in the following two significant ways:

Rural-Urban Water Use Connection
The natural progression of my research would be to explore ways to get surface
water for the municipal piped water supply system. Currently, canal water is almost
exclusively used by the farmers in the Faisalabad district. It will be interesting to explore
the conditions under which farmers will be willing to give up some water for the city. The
use of surface water will help relieve some pressure off the freshwater aquifer.
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Urban Groundwater Pollution
Groundwater quality is deteriorating in Faisalabad. The wastewater is thrown into
the open drains without treatment. When this wastewater seeps into the ground, it pollutes
the groundwater aquifers. People cannot use this polluted groundwater for domestic
purposes because of the high levels of mercury and arsenic. The contaminated groundwater
is exacerbating the problem of water scarcity. The groundwater quality and water scarcity
issues are tied in the city. Using the institutional analysis, I will first explore then propose
policy solutions to tackle this problem.
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APPENDIX

Appendix-I: Expert Interviews

Water Agency
1. What is the current biophysical condition of groundwater in the city?
2. What steps have you been taking to protect the city's groundwater?
3. Can you give a brief overview of legal and institutional arrangements governing the
city's groundwater?
4. How would you describe the relationship between groundwater and the local
community?
5. Do you think WASA's current water tariff system that does not cover water production
expenses needs to be reformed?
6. Why the WASA's water bill collection rate is low?
7. Does WASA face obstacles or pressure from politicians or other powerful coalitions in
the city while implementing its laws?
8. Do you think poor quality service and preferential treatment of some water users have
created a lack of trust between WASA and the public?
9. Is WASA planning to reform its water supply service beyond its plans to expand
infrastructure?
10. Would you collaborate with the local community for the betterment of the water supply
service?
Local academics
1. Which ethnic, religious, and caste groups in Faisalabad city are most influential (i.e.,
economically, culturally, or in self-governance)?
2. How big of a role local powerful coalitions and groups play in the provision of piped
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water and the performance of the water supply system in a particular neighborhood?
3. What can you tell me about the prevalence of norms like 'inter-personal trust' and
'reciprocity' in the local populous?
4. What is the impact of Faisalabad's peculiar history, customs, and culture on its present
economic condition?
5. What governance problems WASA is facing, and how those challenges can be tackled?
6. Can you imagine a way in which the local community productively collaborate with the
WASA?
NGO
1. Kindly tell me about the efforts your NGO is making for the provision of water to the
people?
2. Please tell me about the work your organization is doing on groundwater issues in the
city.
3. Does WASA have any official mechanism to involve NGOs for the betterment of water
supply service?
4. How would you rate the WASA's performance on water supply?
5. What efforts can WASA make in your opinion to improve its service?
6. Do you think there is a potential for WASA and community collaboration for water
provision in the future?
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Appendix-II: Network of Irrigation Canals

Network of irrigation canals in the Rachna Doab
Source: JICA, 2019b

Appendix-III: Piped water supply network

Source: Water & Sanitation Agency, Faisalabad
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Appendix-IV: CPR Experiment

I want to play a quick game with you that will take up to 7 minutes in total. You can
earn up to 40 PKR at the end of the game. The exact amount of money you will earn depends
on your own decisions and the decision of others participating in the game. Therefore, please
consider your decisions carefully. Please let me know if you have any question before we start
the game.

Decision problem:
You are in a group with 3 other people, a total 4 members in the group. You do not
know their identity, and they do not know yours. Now, please imagine that the groundwater
reservoir underneath your community contains 40 gallons of water. You can extract up to 10
gallons of groundwater. Every gallon you do not extract will stay in the reservoir. The other
three members of your group will make the same decision.
Please note you can extract water only once!
After your decision we will estimate how much money you have earned. Your earnings are
composed of two elements:
Private earnings: You will earn 2 PKR by selling 1 gallon of groundwater. No one except you
earns from the groundwater you extract from the aquifer. If you extract, for example, 5
gallons, you will get 10 PKR. If you decide to extract 10 gallons, you will get 20 PKR.
Group earnings: Every gallon left in the reservoir by any member of your group is worth 4 PKR,
you will share this amount equally with 3 other group members. For example: If 10 gallons are
left in the reservoir, your group earns 40 PKR. This amount will be divided into four, which
means you will get 10 PKR on top of your private earning.
Note: The amount of water extracted by the group members of first three respondents will be randomly
determined based on prior data collected from real people. The amount of water extract by the group
members of respondent number four and beyond will be collected from prior three interviews.
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Now I want to ask two short questions which do not affect your earnings:
I.

Does the money you earn depend on the decisions of your group members?
• No
• Yes

-> The right answer is yes: The more groundwater your group members leave in the
reservoir, the more money group earns, and the higher is the amount of money you get. This also
means: The more groundwater your group members extract from the aquifer lower the group
earnings will get.
II.

Now please tell:
• What will be your total private earning if you take “10” gallons of water?
• What will be your total earnings if you and others leave their “10” gallons of water
12) Now please let me know, how many fish would you take from the pond?
in the ground?

Comment: As you can see, you can earn more you if you cooperate with other group members. However, in
real life you do not know if others will cooperate with you.

1) How many gallons of water you want to take out of the groundwater reservoir?

Note: You can take any number of gallons from 0 to 10.

Payment Calculation
Number of gallons respondent extracted:__________
Number of gallons group member 1 extracted:_________
Number of gallons group member 2 extracted:_________
Number of gallons group member 3 extracted:_________
Number of gallons left in the reservoir:_____________

Private earnings:_________PKR
Group earnings:_________PKR
Total earnings:_________PKR
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Appendix-V: Household Survey

Urban Household Interview to Understand the Groundwater and Piped
Water Use behavior in Faisalabad, Pakistan

Date: __/__/____
________________

Name of the Interviewer:

Socio-Economic Information
Are you a household head?
•
•

Yes
No

If no, interview will not commence.

Respondent’s Personal information
2) Name: __________________
3) Gender:
• Male
• Female
4) Age: ____ (year of birth)
5) Religion:
• Islam
• Christianity
• None of the above
6) Political party (voted for in the last provincial elections):
• PML-N
• PML-Q/ Tahreek-Insaaf
• PPP
• None of the above
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7) Level of education:
• No education
• Up to primary school (≤ 5th grade)
• Up to secondary school (≤ 10th grade)
• Up to high school (≤ 12th grade)
• Undergraduate level
• Graduate level
• Prefer not to say
8) Average monthly household income (in PKR):
• ≤ 20,000
• 20,001-40,000
• 40,001-60,000
• 60,001-80,000
• > 80,000
• Prefer not to say

Household Information
9) How many people are in your household? ________
10) How many people 18 years and older live in your household? _______
11) How many people < 18 years old live in your households? _______
12) Ownership status of the house:
• Owned
• Rented
• Other_________
• Prefer not to say
13) Name of the community/neighborhood where the house is located:
_________________________________________
14) GPS location of the household: __________
15) How long have you lived at the current location?
• _____________years
• prefer not to say

General Water-Use Practices
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16) Do you have a municipal water connection in your home?
• Yes
• No
17) How much do you pay for the piped water monthly (in PKR)?
• 83
• 124
• 145
• 242
• 322
• 644
• 966
• Other________
• I do not know
18) If yes, for how many hours a day do you get water?
• _______hours
• I do not know
19) Is the quantity of municipal water enough to fulfill your daily water needs?
• Yes
• No
• I do not know
20) If the answer to questions 16 and 17 is ‘No’, which source among the following do you
use to fulfill your ‘full’ or ‘remaining’ daily water needs?
• Groundwater Pump
• Tanker Water
• Other, please specify______________

If you are using a groundwater pump, then please answer the following questions:
21) What type of groundwater pump do you use?
• Manual
• Motorized

22) If you are using a motorized pump, what is its power?
• ______________Horse-Power (HP).
• I do not know
23) For how long a day do you use your motorized groundwater pump?
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•
•

____________min
I do not know

24) What is your total monthly expense, including the electricity bill (if applicable) for
groundwater pumping?
• _____________PKR
• I do not know

If you are using tanker water, then please answer the following questions:
25) How much tanker water do you use daily?
• ________liters
• I do not know
26) What is your total monthly expense for tanker water?
• _________PKR
• I do not know

If you are using a source other than groundwater pump or tanker water, please
answer the following questions:
27) How much water from this source do you use daily?
• _________liters
• I do not know
28) What is your total monthly expense for this source of water?
• __________PKR
• I do not know

Storage Tanks
29) Do you have a water storage tank?
• Yes
• No
30) If yes, what is its size?
• ________gallons
• I do not know
31) How many tanks of water are filled by the piped water?
• _________tanks
• I do not know
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32) How many tanks of water are filled from groundwater?
• ___________tanks
• I do not know
33) How many tanks of water are filled from tanker water?
• __________tanks
• I do not know
34) How many tanks of water are filled from other sources of water?
• ________tanks
• I do not know

Positional Good
35) All else equal, which community between the two presented below would you prefer
to live in:

a) Community A:
• Municipal water supply will be interrupted to your house for 5 days a month
• To the rest of the community, municipal water will be interrupted for only 3
days a month

b) Community B:
• Municipal water supply will be interrupted to your house for 7 days a month
• To the rest of the community, municipal water will be interrupted for 9 days a
month

Now, please see if you consider community ‘C’ to the make water supply service
equal/similar for everyone?

36) Community C:
• Municipal water supply will be interrupted to your house for 6 days a month
• To every other house in the community, water will be interrupted for 6 days a
month as well
37) Kindly state if you agree or disagree with the following statements:

Questions

Disagree

a) Everyone should have free access to water.
b) Everyone should pay for water.

1
1
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Do not
know
2
2

Agree
3
3

c) There is enough water for everyone.
d) We will eventually run out of water.

1
1

2
2

3
3

Preference of water provision mode
38) Would you prefer a reasonably improved piped water supply?
• Yes
• No
• I do not know

Assuming you have selected ’Yes’, I would like to ask you the following questions:
39) Following are the available options for piped water supply ownership. Which one
would you select?
• Private company
• Municipal/State
• Membership Organization (co-op)
• None
a) Which ownership enlisted above would you prefer the most? ___________

b) Which ownership enlisted above would you prefer the least? ____________
40) Please select an alternative for water provision from the five choices presented
below, keeping in mind its attributes “Non-preferential Treatment” and “Community
Involvement”:

Attributes
Non-Preferential
Treatment
Community
Involvement
a) Which alternative do
you prefer the most?
b) Which alternative do
you prefer the least?

Alternative-1

Alternative-2

Alternative-3

Alternative-4

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

41) Please state which attribute among the following is the most important for you in
any water supply service?
• Ownership
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Alternative-5

None

• Non-Preferential Treatment
• Community Involvement
• None
42) Please state which attribute among the following is the least important for you in any
water supply service?
• Ownership
• Non-Preferential Treatment
• Community Involvement
• None
43) In the light of what you have answered in questions 37, 38 and 39, do you still stand
by your selection of the ownership type for the water provision service?
• Yes
• No
• I do not know

a) If no, which type of ownership do you prefer the most now? __________
b) Which kind of ownership do you prefer the least now? _________

Corruption
44) Which alternative presented in Q.39 would you expect to be most corrupt? ________
45) Which alternative presented in Q.39 would you expect to be least corrupt? ________
46) Which type of water service ownership do you find the most corrupt? _________
47) Which type of water service ownership do you find the least corrupt? _________
48) Kindly respond ‘Yes’, ‘No’ or ‘Do not know’ to the following questions:
Questions

Scale

a) Does WASA treat everyone equally?

No

Do not know

Yes

b) Do you think corruption exists within WASA?

No

Do not know

Yes

c) Do you think water users bribe WASA officials?

No

Do not know

Yes

d) Do WASA officials ask for bribes?

No

Do not know

Yes
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Individual Attitudes - Risk and Time Preferences
In this section, I intend to find out your risk and time preferences.
49) Kindly state if you agree or disagree, on a scale from 1-5, with the following statements.

Questions

a) I am a patient person.
b) In general, I am willing to take
risks.
c) I am willing to take risks in
financial matters.
d) I am willing to take health risks
in everyday life (e.g., not wearing
a helmet on motorcycle rides).

Strongl
y
Disagre
e
1
1

Disagre
e

Neither
Agree,
nor
Disagree

Agre
e

Strongl
y Agree

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

50) Think about the period of time you have lived in this community, state if you have ever
experienced one of the following events?

Questions

Never

Rarely

Often

a) Lowering of groundwater table

1

2

3

b) Salty groundwater

1

2

3

c) Reduction in the piped water
availability
d) Polluted piped water

1

2

3

1

2

3

51) If you have selected options ‘rarely’ or ‘often’ in the above question, please state how
much it affected your daily life?
Please rate the effect on your life on a scale from 1-5. One represents weakest affect and
five represent strongest affect.

Weakest
Affect
a) Lowering of groundwater table 1
b) Salty groundwater

2

No
Affect
3
4

Strongest
Affect
5

2

3

5

Questions

1
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4

c) Reduction in the piped water
availability
d) Polluted piped water

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

52) If you think about the next 5 years: how likely is it that you will be affected by these
events? How high is the risk? Rate each event on a scale from 1 to 3.

Questions
a) Lowering of groundwater table

Least risk Same risk
1
2

Highest risk
3

b) Salty groundwater
c) Reduction in the piped water availability
d) Polluted piped water

1
1
1

3
3
3

2
2
2

53) How would you rate your water related risks compared with an average person in your
community/city? Rate each event on a scale from 1 to 3.

Questions

Lower

Higher

Same

a) Lowering of groundwater table

1

2

3

b) Salty groundwater

1

2

3

c) Reduction in the piped water availability

1

2

3

d) Polluted piped water

1

2

3

Individual Attitudes - Trust
54) Please respond to the following questions according to the scale provided next to
each question.

Questions
a) Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted, or that you can't be too
careful in dealing with people?
b) Do you think most people would try to take
advantage of you if they got the chance or
would they try to be fair?
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Can’t be
too
careful
Exploit

Scale
Neither
trusted
nor
distrusted
Neither
fair, nor
exploit

Trusted

Fair

c) Would you say that most of the time people
try to be helpful, or they are mostly just looking
out for themselves?

Helpful

Neither
helpful,
nor selfish

Selfish

Choice

Appendix-II: Data Structure

Data structure of the conditional logit model
id

Impartiality

Coproduction

1

Alternative-1

Alternatives

Municipal
1

Co-op
0

Private
0

1

1

0

1

Alternative-2

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

Alternative-3

1

0

0

0

1

0

1

Alternative-4

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

Alternative-5

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

Alternative-6

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

Alternative-7

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

Alternative-8

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

Alternative-9

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

Alternative-10

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

Alternative-11

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

Alternative-12

0

0

1

0

0

0

2

Alternative-1

1

0

0

1

1

0

2

Alternative-2

1

0

0

1

0

1

2

Alternative-3

1

0

0

0

1

0

2

Alternative-4

1

0

0

0

0

0

2

Alternative-5

0

1

0

1

1

0

2

Alternative-6

0

1

0

1

0

0

2

Alternative-7

0

1

0

0

1

0

2

Alternative-8

0

1

0

0

0

0

2

Alternative-9

0

0

1

1

1

0

2

Alternative-10

0

0

1

1

0

0

2

Alternative-11

0

0

1

0

1

0

2

Alternative-12

0

0

1

0

0

0
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